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Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552]
Victor Villepa [ISB No. 5860]
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT or
THE STATE OF mABo, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON·
BR.OWN, Husbml and Wife,

CASE NO. CV 2012-353

DEFENDANT'S DISCLOSURE
or EXPERT WITNESSES

Plaintiffs,

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MJMOTO
ORBBNHEAR.T, an individual,

Defendant, Aupsta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenheart (hereinafter "Oreenheartj, by and
through her attorneys of record, Borton-Lakey Law Ofttces. hereby provides purauam to Rule

26(bX4) of the Idabo Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Order Settlna Proceedinp and
Trial, Dffendant '1 Dllclonn of&pm Wltnu1u.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENr

Because all witneaaa in this action have not been deposed and beca:me documentary

\\

subjects on which the expert will testify, the complete substance of experts' opiniona ,
DBPENDANT'S DISCLOSt1RE OF BXPER.T WITNESSES· 1
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provide a fbll report of tb.oae opiniou.

P. 3/9

Accordins11, Defendant reaervea the right to aupplemem

thi1 dilcloame. Defendant f\Jrther reserves the rlaht to present rebuttal and/or surrebuttll expert
opJn1on testimony In respome to evldae presented by Plaintitfl that ounot. at th1s time. be

reuonably anticipated.
Defendm

PlaJntlffil u

al~

reserves the rlabt

elq)ertl In this

to

call any individuals appropriately disclosed by

cue to dilCUtl Ill)' matter for which they aro c:ompctent to teatify,

includtq any matter within the acope of their experdM bued upon. their 1rafnlna, eduedon

end/or experlence.
Defendant fUrther points out that a number of person1 identified by tbe partiel who are
employees of tbe Idaho Department of Water Resources and the Blmore County Al1e110t'1 and

Treasurer'• oftlces while not a retained expert witneas, may offer testimony baled on the apecifio
expertise and Jmowledp pined while pert'ormina their job that may include opinions and

lnfenm.cel rationally based on their knowledae, experience, and education conaiatent with Rule
702 and 703 of the Idaho Rula of Evidence.

Insofar 11 discovery In this matter II onaoina. Defendant reserves the rlaht to amend or

supplement this lilt

to

include the cleaipiton of additional expert witnellel

11

may be

necessitated by iuther discovery.
Any export witnellCS Defendant electa not to call at trial are declared to bo consultfns
witneuea only, pursuant to Rule 26(bX4)(B). No other party may call such consultina expert

without counsel'• express permiaion.

By dilcloliq bee experts and the substance of their test!mony, Defendant reserves the
right to ohallqe the PltlntUf1' uae of extrimic evidence to add or wry the terms of the

W!f!Dty Deed md/or Purchase and Sale Asre=mt In this cue.

DBPENDANT'S DISCLOSURE OP BXPER.T WITNBSSBS • 2
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PQENDANT'S DISCLOSURE 01' UPEBT WITNESS
1.

Kenneth Brush
Kenneth BNSh Appralsa1a
19724 Dixie River Road
Caldwell, Idaho 83607

208-454-9090
A.

Idcmtlflcatlcm Md Swpmery of OpaUfigetigp•. Mr. Brush is a real eatate appraiser

lice.med in Idaho. Qreaon and Nevada. He i1 the owner of Kmmeth Bruah Apprailllt an.cl deall
exclusively with appn.iling rural and qrleultural flrma an.cl ranches. A detailed list of Mr.

Brush'• q1111lflcad.ons ere Ht forth In. hll resume attached hereto u Exhibit A end incorporated
here .. if tull)' ut forth herein.
B.

SvllJoct Matter md S»Mtango ofoprlona. By virtue ofhls training a a certified

real estate apprai• and his experience in appiaisins real property in Blmore County, Idaho Mr.

Brush bu expertise on the valuation of aarlcultural and farm property in that area with and

without water riahtt

durini 2007.

Mr. Brush is expected to rebut the testimony of Pl&intlft"1

expert u well u teltify t.hai the purcbue price Defendant paid fot the proport)" is commensurate

with property with an appurtenant water riaht
C.

Fact apd Data Bllicd Upon. Mr. Bn1lh will rely on the cummtly avellable

documentary evidence lncludlna. but not limited to. the exhibits to the Complaint, documents

produced by the pm.ties in diseovery and documents on ftlo with the Idaho Department of Water

resources (available to the public online).
D.

pµblicatioJll: Mr. Bruah bu not published any publications

E.

Cogmgtlm to be gaid: Mr. Brush charps Sl.200 per day plus expenses to

testify.
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tour (4) yem: Mr.

Brulh bu tnti1iad in a deposition in Caldw1ll v. De la Cont:1pt:lon. Canyon County Idaho lA

2010.
2.

Andy Emlco
Andy Enrico and Company Real Batate
2183 Roclaidge Way

Bahe, Idaho 83712
208-336-8880
A.

Idmf.iftcation an4 SummatY of OuatlftcatioDt. Mr. Bmlco la a real estate broker

licensed in Idaho and is the owner/broker Andy Enrico and Company R.eal Estate.~. Mr. Bmico
cummtly serves as a Real Estate Commlalonor for the State of Idaho. Mr. Bm1co ls
accredited real atate instructor accredited by tba Idaho Real Eltate Commiuion

111

teachina

conthwlna education classes IUCh as teachlna aaents how to use and :tll1 out various Realtoie
fonns. Mr. Enrico '1 quaHflcationa are llt forth in his resume attached hereto u
~here u

B.

Exhibit B ad

if t\Uly Mt forth herein.

subitct Matter and Suhatange of Opiniona. By virtue of his trainJna and

experience u a real estate broker, aeoredited real estate lnatructor and other experiencea lilted. in
his resume. Mr. Enrico bu expertise lA how real estate forms developed by the Idaho
Aaaociation of R.ealtont> are to be filled out. Mr. Enrico will teeti.fy that if water rishts wa

Intended to be excluded from the sale lA this cue. then the RE-24 Vacant Land Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Aareement or 111 Addendum. to the RB-24 would have identi:fted the water

rlaht belna excluded. Mr. Enrico may also be called to rebut the testimony of Pbdntlft's expert
u

to the

value of the Oreenheart Property

at the time

of purchase u well aa testify that tba

pun:hue price Defendant paid for the property ls commensurate with ·property with an

appurtenant water riaht.
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Mr. Bmlco will rely on tba curromly available

documentary evidence lncludlna. but not limited to, the exhibits to the Complaint, documema
produced by the parties in dilcovery and dooumenta on file with the Idaho Departm.mt of Water

reaourcea (availabJAt tD the public onllno).
D.

py'bUsmtona: Mt. Bmlco bu not published any publicatlou.

B.

Compenatlon

to

Mr. Bnrico c1mps S200 per hour for

be -

reviewlna

docnmumta and for teeiffylna.

P.

Pmious CUii tntiMna In eltb• depotitiqn or trial within four C4l yem:

Mr.

Emlco ha teltUled in a deposition in MM lnw1tm1nt1 lno. and Mont1go Ba, Inc., v. Candy

Mmmtalll, I.LC 1t al, CV OC 0821965, Ada County. Idaho in 2011.
DATED this 1911t day of December, 2012.
BORTON LAKEY LAW OFFICES
By

CQTDICAD or SERVICE
I HBREBY CERTIFY that on tbla 19• day otDecember, 2012, a true and correct copy of

tm foregoinl document WU le&'Vtd by flnt.olul ail, poltqe prepaid, and addtel8ed to; by fax

tnmsmillion to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person
mcbatp of the office u indicated below:

Miebll1 c. Creamer
Thomu B. Dvonk

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Fax
[ l Overnilbt Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

OIVINI P'UULIY LLP

P.O. Box. 2720
Bou., m13101-2120

Telephone: (208) 388·1200
Facshnlle: (201)388-1300

~~

Victor Villega
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usma
KENNITH L Bll1JSB, AJl.A.
1972' DIXIE RIVlll llOAD

CALDWELL. mABO 83"7
208/4,...,.,.
JAX 20l/45W890
EDUCATION
BS ApioultmalBqmoeriq. UnivenityofCalifomiat Davia, Dooembet 1975. CourHwork
distributed throuPout practioal eqlDeer1q prineiplea. mimll science, and bUlineu manapment.

WORK IXPDIENCE
lne 1981-Preleat: Selt-emplo,ed; IC.en Brush Appniaala.

Aootedited Jlural Appraiser (ARA) AppniaiDa rural and qrioultural tarm., ranchet, and
tpeOialty qricultural propertiel luoh .. feedlotl, potatO . . oDioll i; boa Wll'tbouM,eto.;
qricultural IDd eoonomio comultiq. Certlfie4 Appraiser in Idaho. Otep ad Nevada.
1'7Wne 1'81t Doane-Weatem. Caldwell. Idaho.
Apicultunl louccmapondem and field ot11ccr for AEtna~ and CUUalty wt Mutual of
New York for real e11ait mortppa. !telpouibWtlea mclwle tlnanclal and maagement IDllyt1I,
credit review, appraiea1 of security, loan oriafDatlon and aubmfalon, loan serviciq and collection.
Otherrespoulbilltiel included management comultlns, real estate appniaala, economic tmibility,

and. real lltltl Illes.

AFFDJA.TIONS

Certified Appraiser in Idaho, ()rep ad Nevada
Accredftod member- Am.erlcan Socfet)' of Farm Manaaon and R.ma1 Appraiaera, Idaho
State Chapter and Treuure Valley Local Group
Member-Various Commlue. for the A.8FMRA
Put Prelldent, ISPMRA
Director- Pioneer Dixie Ditch Company, Upper Center Point Ditch Company
Member- Lower Boise River Watershed Aclviamy Group
Member- Caldwell United Motbodiat Church
Eaale Soout- Boy Scouts of Amari.ca

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Ap: 59, married. 36 ymt, OU dauabter
Own and operate a 375+ held cow/oalf oporatlon tn Idaho i: ()rep
Buy 100-300 oalvetlyearlfnp ammally; feed a: anze these yearlinp in Idaho & Oreaon
Have 20CMOO head of steon & he1fen ouatom fed to •Jauabter amwally
Hobbies hlolude campiaa. filhtna. and woodwotkiq
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QUALDICATIONS

or

KENNITH BR.USB, A.a.A.
OCCVPA.TION

lleal Batato Appralaer
ldlho Stm Certified Appralaer tU2
Oieaoa Cerdt1ed Appralaer #C000287
Ntwda Ceztiftecl Oeam1 Appralaer #00540

2.

ADDUSSIPBONB

19724 Dixie River load, Clldwe11, Idaho 83601 208/45+9090
FAX: 208/455-9890

3.

COLLIG&

. l.

Bachelor of Science in Alliculture. 1975 Unlvaity of Clllfornla. Davia
Self employed . , . 1915
Jolatd WeatnPum Mina..- Compuy in 1976
Wlltlal Farm Manqement Compa.y and Dolnel Aarlcu1tunl Sa'Ylcel.

Jno.. aqccl!n 1981

Completed American Society of Farm Manapn and 1lmal ApJnilerl
Co'unll-Far.m AppraiM1, Advanood Far.m Apprailal. Ranch AppraiM1,
numtrOUI Mmiun
AccreditedlutalAppniser(ARA) ofAmerican Scciety ofPumM&napl'I
and Ilmal Apprailll'land Mombcrofldlho Society ofFann Mln&prl and
1lmal Appra!Hrt Certified II cuaent OD CODtlnuiaa educatf.cm with

.ASFMRA
SPECIAl. ASSIGNMENTS
Ptepll'ld appraiuJ.a on rural IDd qribusinm pt0perd11 in Idaho, Orep.
Wllbiqtol, Utah, Nevada. Montana, and Califhmia fbr corpontlom,
aovemmem apnciea, lendera, a mdMduaJJ

CLIENTS INCLUDE InlermouDt&in Comrmmity Bank (a divilion of Pmmandle State Bank)
IP Morpn CblM (fmmcrly Wubfqtoa Mutual Bank .t WlltlrD. Bank)
Bank of the Cucldes (formerly Pamen .t M.._ State Baa1r.)
US Bank (fotmedy West One .t Idabo Pint Natlo.aal BIDk)
Wolll PllJO Bmk A Wells F1110 Al Credit (t'armaly Fint Intentate .t
Pint Seourit)' BIDkl)
BIDDlrBank

Ctdr.om Buaincu Bak
Key But of ldlho
D. L. BVl.DI Bak

USDA-Farm Service A.lfJ1Jl1'i (formerly FmHA.)
Farm Credit sem.
H&rvtlt Capital O>mpany

Amcrlolll Pam Moltpp ComplD.)'
Norwat Aarf.cu1tum1 Ctedit Inc.
Ziont Apica1tmal , . _ . Zloa Bank
R.abo-~ (formedy Lmd Leuo Asri·Bumcn)
Tri-Sta111 UvtltaCk Credit Cotponttcm
:&mt.I Wff
efNtiw'Y-edl
The Church of Iesu Chrlai of Lauer-Day Salim
Vlrioua IlM!fvlduals, Accoumanu it Attorneys

.._ea.,.,
284
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LU1L Lit.C

Joo Bolton [ISB No. 5552]
Vtetor Villqu [ISB No. 5860)
BORTON LADY LAW OFPICBS
1-41 S. Carlton Ave.
Meridlan, ID 83642
BoiJe. Idabo 83702
Oft!oe: (208) 908-4415
Fax: (208) 493-4610
Bmail: victor@borton-laby.com
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BARBA~A S~ELE
ORT
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CLERK OF TH

.4ttornq1 for Dl/indant
IN THE DJSTRIC? COURT OJTD JOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OJ
THI STATE or mABO, IN AND JOR THI COUNTY or ELMORE

JAY BROWN and CHR.ISTINB HOPSON·
BROWN, Husband and Wife,

Platntifti,

v.

CASE NO. CV 2012-353

. MEMORANDUM IN
OPPO&mONTO
PLAINTIJ'JS' MO'l10N FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
OR.EBNHBAR.T, an individual,
/

Defendant.

Defendant. Aupta Sayoko Mlmoto Oreenheart. by and tbrouah her attorney of record,
Victor Villegu and Borton Lakey Law Offices, aubmitti this Memorandum. in Opposition to
Plahmffi' Motton for Summary Judsment
INTRODUCTION
This case involves a quiet title and declaratory action ftlcd by P1alntlfti Jay and Christine

Brown (hereinafter collectively referred to u "Browns.,) aeeldng a declaration that Defendant
Aupta Oreenheart ("Grecnheart") ~ no right. title or interest to certain around water rights

286
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st Carlton Ave

No. 5005

P. 2l

that are appurtenant to approxhnately aJxty (60) acres of real propert)' that Chwnheart purchased
in January 2007.

STANDARDOPDVIEW
Summary judamcni tba1l be granted to the movtna party when it shows tbat there it no

pnuine dispute
. as to any material fac& and the movina party ii l!ltitled to ajudgment
. u a matter

of law. I.lt.C.P. 56(c}. Once the movlna partf establishel the abaenct of any pnulne dlaputea
of material faot, tbe nomnoviq party must dte to apeclflc evfdenee in the record that creetel a
dispute or show that the evidence cited by the movina party does not establish the absence of a

pnuine dispute. The nonmoviq party

ommot

rely on mere allegations to. defeat l\l11UUf1

judgment, but must aot forth specfflc facta and probative evidence to show disputed

tacts.

W'attlnbarpr v. A.G. Edwardl & So111, lnc., 246 P.3d 961, 970 (2010),
ARGUMENT

· L Th• Groadwater JUshtl Were Appurtenant To The Eadn Ortpal Brown Propertf
And Tlaenfore The Gneaheart Propert)'.
.
Brown ques that the subject 8f0undwater riahts were not transferred because it WU not
appurtenant to the Greenheatt Pioperty at the time of sale. Brown' 1 araument it incorrect

because the p:oundwater automatically became appurtenant to the entire 320 acres upon the
'Niter rlaht decree& tom the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") court that speciflcally

described the entire 320 acres u the area of penniuible "Place of Use". &1 SW Dier•• for
Wat,, Right Nos. 61-71Jland ~J-2188 attachld to &blbJt "i" and Srb.tblt. "C': to Complaint.
The &et that Brown could choose where within the 320 aeres to irrigate 11 a distinction without
any lepl slpificance. It did. not change the lepl cft'ect of the SRBA court's determination of

Place ofUao, WhiCJi iiDU!e me water n_. appnrttn•nt to that mtire specific amount of acteagt.

287
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In addition, Brown's araument that there ls no appurtenant water riaht to the Onenheart
Propert)t because It had net been irripted for yean undersooret the 1ep1 ldpU1cance of Brown's

conduct placlns the water In the W• Bak. In hi• ddavlt, Mr. Brown admltl that hi applied
to leue portiom

ot the water rlaht to the Idaho Department of WrbJt R.esourcee Board Water

Supply Bank. SI• Brown A§ldavtt ft 13-15. Mr. Brown a1lo statea that the acret he contrlctcd
not to bripte included the llltirety

or the Orecoheart Property. Id.

7he purpme of placina water

In the Watet BaDk ii to avoid the penalties far nonuae which include forfeiture reaultfna In

severwe of the water riaht troSn the property. St• LC. f 42-1764 ("Water rlahta••• ctedited to
the water supply bank are not subject to f'orteiturc for noo.use••• "). The purpose ls not to sever
the water right from the property u Brown arpes.
A Memorandum dated Aupst 11. 2003 contained In the records of the Idaho Department
of Water R.eaoureet reptdlq BroWn•1 appllcation to the Wm Bank i11uatrates thll point

Tho appllclnt baa chanaod his fmming operation Ind no lonaer ccnthmously
farms the 320 acres for which he bas water rights His currem pmotlce is to
farm about 160 lores and allow the remainJq 160 . . . to remain tallow.
Accordms1Y• in order to avoid torreitute of the UllUltd water rlpta. or
dJmlnutlon of the tlowl he has historically used, He wbhes to place the
umuecl water in tba water honk.

Attached are copies ot tax bills lhowlns applicants name and legal
descrlption.-.and. SRBA records for the water rlpts 61·7151 and 61·2188.
Plcue let me know if' you need .more intotmation
See JDWR M1morantlum Exhibit ..4 to Vlllep Ajftdavlt In Oppolftlon To SllmlnQr)' Judgmtmt.

BIOWl1 bu not poimed tbil Court to any applieable statute or decision that aaya once a

water rlabt ia placed into the Water Bank. it ii thereafter aevered from the property. Nor has
Brown pointed to my authority that 1111 pladng a water right in the Wat« Bank modifies the

SR.BA court's aecree ideiidfylii1 PDCi ot U&
acte

rt dDri wa nu appm'tftltlt ...,_.,apt to tbe 60

Oreenheart Property u Brown now arps, Brown would. bav• had no reason to comract
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with the Idaho Water R.esourcel Board not to lniaate the 60 acrea. Brown could have simply

applied the water to other parts of the 320 acres.
Simply put. the around water dshft were appurtenant to the entire 320

IC1'es

per the

SR.BA court'• Place ofUac determination and Brown•• act ot'placina a portion of that water in
the Water Bank did not chanp the appurtmmt l1atUI of that Wits or mocllff the water riahta
decree. For thele reuona Oreenheart asks this Court to fin4 u a matter of law there wu lfO\Dld
water appurteant to the Oreenhelrt Property durina tho trlnlfct by Warranty Deed and that

tbHe aroum water tlahta currently sit in the Water Bank.

U. Thia Coart Should Not Coulder Eltrlmlo E'f'kfenee To Explaln The Warrantr Deed.

Brown argues that under Idaho law, when a deed contains "appurtenance" languap it ia
amblpoua with reapcot to whether water rlahta are ln1ended to be tnmlferrecL Therefore, B!OWA
arps the "result is to automatlca11y allow extrluio mdence of the pattiu' intent." Plalntiff1

M1morandum In Support of Summary ./udgm•nt PS· 13. Brown's analysis of Idaho law ii
incorrect and it directly contradicted by the decision in Koon v. Empq, 40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 1091
(1924) whleh held that the use of ..appurtenance.. languap in a deed it not ambipoua and
therefore exuinaic evidence is prohibited by the parol evidence rule.

Elflll'Y involved a lawsuit t.o quiet title over 600 inches of war and to el\foin the delivery

of that water. Empq at P. 1098. The specific facts and procedural history of the cue are u
followa:
The deeds by which Olive conveyed the lands now owned by reapondent dJd not
speeifically mention any water, but they contain the clause: "Togetbs with all and
sinaular the tenements. hereditsmenta and IJ)l1Ul1anQOI thereunto belonainl or in
lll)"Nlse appertainlna, • • *" which respondent contendl effected the transfer of all

._ . . . .,,._._wilie laad
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Oil tbl contrary, appellanta contend that when the deed.I wore executed and delivered.
the parties qreed that the water apputteDmt to the land WU to be retamed by
appellant Olive; and mellanta attempted to utalzlllh Mh rwmtima by a»l.

The court refuted to permit the introduction of oral evidae tor such puzpose. ad
the actloa of the court Is Ulianed u error.

Id. (underllnina added).
The Empq court helcl that "[it] is an c:1ementmy rule for the conatructlon of deeds. the
1anpaae of whicb it plain and \IDllmblpout. that. In the ablOllOe of bud or
~on

mistake. tht

of the partl• Dl\1lt bo ucertained from. the inrtntment Itself••• .Parol evidence is not

admJllible for uh pUrpose." Id. The Empq court recognized that the use of the expreaion

...together with all and llngular the appurtenances thereto belongina and apperta1nlng,' or ou .of
idmitar purport..." in a detd ii effective to transfer an appurtenant water riaht unlees there la a

specli1c reaervation In tho deed. Id. ai P. 1099. Ultimately, the Empq court aftlnned the trial

court'• rof'.-1 · to permit extrinsic evidence because the appurtenance lanauage wu
unamb!pou1. The court belcl "[t]ho 1anpp of the deeds 11 plain and unamhiauoUL From the
deeda the intent of the

arantor to convey the lands, tosethcr with tbo umvttnn• pla1nly

appears. There wu no allep.tlon of hid or mistake In the execution of the deeds, and no bud

or mistake ls claimed." Id. (underlinina added).
In thil cue, the pertinent parts of the Warranty Deed to Ms. Oreenheart from tht Brown•

reads "TO HAVB AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said
Ormtee ...." S.1 &Mblt D to Complaint,• &hlbU B to ..4jfldavtt

'o.f .A.ugu.rta Gr11nheart In

Support of Motton For Samtmary Judgm1nt. The deed contains tho typical "appurtenance"
Ianpae and per the Empq decision it la not ambiauous as a matter of law as Btown arauea.

More imptantlr. the exception to the perol evidenco nile (fraud or m.iatak.e) that would permit
0

I

the introduction of extrinsic evidence has never been pled by Browns. Brawn'• Complaint does
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alleae had or milteke and certainly does not meet LR.C.P. 9(b) requirlna that fraud or

miatab be pled with particularity. Al a result. the extrinaio evidence Brown attempts to

Introduce (which Ommh.eart cummtJ.y cbaDenps in her motion to strike ft1ed concmrent1y) u
the foundation for their motion cannot be a buia for pnt1na aumnary judgment.

JIL Th• Purclwe and Sale Aptement DOtl Not Support SullblW')' Jadpaeat.

Blown also attempts to

arsue that the 1anpap of the Purcbale and Sale Aareement

unambiguously provfdel that water wu not intended to be part or the sale. These aspnems
ahould also be dlsreprded and aummary judpient denied for two reasons.

First. the DootrfDe of Merger dictates that "[w]hen a deed ls delivered and accepted u
pedorma11co of the contract to convey. the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of

the deed may vary &om thole contafm:d in the contract. the deed alone must be looked to

determfne the rl;hta of the parties...." Cap1tar Rlldto Operating Co. v. Lawrlncf, 143 Idaho 704,
110. 152 P.3d 575, 511 (2007)•. The Wlrtt11t'/ Deed In this cue was executed and delivered
pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Aareement. Therefore, this Court is left with interpreting the

Warranty Deed. As explained above. the Warranty Deed bu the typical appurtenant lanpage

and therefore unless Brown can. show &aud or mistake (which bu never been. uaerted in this

cue). extrinsic evidence such u the use of the terms of the Pmchase and sale Agreement cammt
be used to establish the intent of the partiee.

Second, mm lf this Court were to comider and Interpret the Purchase and Sale
~

the plain Ianauaae of the Aareement contradict& Brown's argumema. The Purohue

and Sala Agreement speciftcally reads:
1~. WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rights. water systems, wells sprlnp,
water, d1tC&lt attai rlihfit ete. if ii)'. mat are &ppmtlJuant theieto that • new ea er
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&1 Edltblt A to J,6ldavU ofA.up1ta Gr1tnhlatt In SUpport OfDI.fondant '1 Motion For
SummotyJudgm1nt. Thi• Coun should deny Brown'• motion for summary Judpient on a

finding 11 a matter of law that the plain 1mauap of the Purchaae and Sale Agreement included
water u part of the purchase.

IV. If Tlail Court Coulden Tile Estrbl8c Evidence Offered By Plabatlfti There Are
Of Faet Tkat Preelue Smmary Judpent.

lu••

PllhdiffJ rely heavily on post-aa1e writinp that Oreenhearc sent to third parties to

establish that she knew around water

riahtl were

excluded from the sale. If' this Court

dete.rmhie1 that it will comlder those written atatementl, there are iuuel of fact that would
preclude summary judgment. The 4ffldavtt of Allf"'lta Or11nhlart In Support of Dl/•ndant'1
Oppollttan to 9""""""1 .Jud,,,..nt ~,,,,,_,., Oppolltlon 4fftdavtt.") provides speclfto detail
reprdina what the meant when she wrote those communications and What her underttandfna
\VU of the

words "water right" and "dry". Her undmtanding and intent were very cli!ferent than

what Brown attempts to portray.
.

Summary judamezit is appropriate only when all of the pleadings. afftdavits and other

relevant documcnta before the court indicate that there are no genuine issues of material fact for
a jmy to decide and the movins party ls entitled to a judgment under the applicable law. I.R..C.P.

S6(c). In each

hlatm~

the

movma party bean the burden of establishing a lack of pnuine

luues of material fact. Id. All reasonable inferences and concIUlions are drawn in favor of the
~-movins party.

Id.

In this case, Oreenheart understood the tonn "water rlahta" meant a situation where
"water nms acrou the surface of hmd and the owner of thai land bu a right to take that water

and UIC it for their purpoSll.

water rlaht"

°'''""'art

U~MORANDUM

SO if there ia no watei' t1mnina across tbe !lfid Y!life :ti dc'vlbuslJ HO

Oppoaltlon Afildavtt ft 6 and 13. Therefore, when she stated sho wu
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aware she had no water rlshts sbt wu merely refetrlna to her lcnowledp that there was no
surface water nmnin1 across bar property. Oreeaha.rt•s post sale statement& were not an

admfpion that lhe knew around wata- rlpta existed and that they were exoluded &om the sale.
Similarly, Otemheart testlfted in her aft'ldavit that her undentandlns of the wont "dry"
end her use of that 'WOrd in her tax appeal wu mere17 used conve)' her undentan.dlng that there

wu no nrtaee water. Grlenhtart Oppo1lt1Dn A,f/ldilvlt, 12.

.

She did not lnteocl her statement to

mean the knew tbero wu no pound water rlpt. CJreonb.eart in fact believed .U could dig a well
baled on her conversatiou with ber real estate aaent and the intormatlon. contained In the

multiple listlns service hando~ G11111Mart Oppo.rttton Ajfldavlt,,. 7-8. She wu never told
that there WU I pound water right exfatod and that it WU excluded ftom. the sale. Gr1tnh1art

Oppo1ltlon ~It, 9.

Based on the discussion above. the testimony provided b7 Orecmheart in her affidavit
oppo1in1 rummmy judament, viewed in light moat favorable to her, a least ostabllahcs iuues of
fact. There are i1sues of fact whetUr Greoiiheart knew durina tho sale that a groundwater right

existed. and whether she Jenn that tho p>undwater riaht was excluded from ~ sale. As such,
Oreenheart aakl this Court to deny summary judpumt bocauae of the existence of those iactt.

V. BrowaBll l'alled To Prove The Elements Of lltoppel, Waiver Anet Lichee.
Brown argues that this

~mt

ea~l to prevent Oreenheart from

should apply equitable principles of quui and equitable

assertiq that she did not know 8f0und watoT WU excluded

from. the sale. However, Brown incorrectly applies those estoppel prlnciplel to the wrong period

of time.
Oree.nheart'1 representations to Elm.on County and the fact tbat she wa able to obtain a

reau.ction Iii hit property taxe• didn't liii'm Brown or cause BNwn mtab a diff'eient petition:
After the sale and transfer of the Grecnheut Property the water at that point had been tranale.rred
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via Warranty Deed. Obtalnlq a tax reduction doesn't ohanp the fact fbat the water bad been
tftmlferred. Thul the conduct to be judged to detennine whether estoppel prinoiplee, waiver or
1aohel will apply would be to look at the conduot dudna the sale of the Oreenheart Propelt)'. In
other wmdt, for my of those prlaciplet to apply there must have been conduct by Ortenheart

cNtlDI the gt, of the Ofelnheert Property that Induced Brown to ohanp poeltlons to their·
detriment.

Thia dootrlne oi quasi eatoppel appliel when: (1) the oft'endlna party took a dliterent
position than bil or her

orialnal position

and (2) either (a) the offendfng party pined an

advamap or caused a disadvantap to tho other party; (b) the other party wu Induced to ohanae
politlons; or (c) lt

~uld

be uncoucionable to permit the oftlmdm1 party to ma!ntain an

incomiatent position ftom one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced In. Atwood v.
Smlth.143 ldlho 110, 114, 131P.3d310. 314 (2006).
In thla case, Brown Cannot point to ID)! spodfic facta durlna the sale of the Oreenheart
Propelt)' that show Ms. Oreenheart did anythin1 to induce Brown to chanp positions to their

detriment. Greenbeart never met the Browm during the tramaction. 4/Jldavtt of GN1nhlart In

Support Of Dl/lndant'1 Motion For Summary Judgmlnt, 3. Oreenheart did not prepare tho
Warramy Deed or the typewrittell lquago in the Purcbue and Sale Agreement. Id 1 6. She

wu not presem in the room wheD the Bl'O'WDI signed the deed. Id. , 1. · In fact the Pmchue and
Sale Ap:ement unambipowdy stated that water WU part of the purchase. There is DO evidence
that Oreenbemt' • conduct tainted tho sale or induced Brown to chanp poslttom to Oreenheart's

advantage.
The doctrine of equitable ntoppel is likewise inapplleable in tis case. The elements of

equltibli estoppel are: (1) a Hilse representiUofi or concea1Tnem ot1 materhd tact with actual oz
conatructive Jcnowledp of tho truth; (2) the Pl!t1- asll!tina estoppeJ did not know or could not
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discover the truth. (3) the falte representation or contABlment wu made with the intent that it be
relied upon and (4) the person to whom tho repnuntat!on wu made or from whom the facts
weze concealed. relied

met acted

upcm tho reptelllltation or conculment to his prejudice.

Thtrlmdt v. A.H. Rob"'6 Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 303. 307, 698 P.2d 365. 369 (1985).

Here, Brown once again can point tc>110 IYidence that Greenheart made a false atatem.em
or representation during the sale which would have Induced Brown to lip a Wmanty Deed that

did not reservt the around water right. Al ltatld above, Oreenhemt did not prepare tho Warranty
Deed or the typewritten 1anpqe in the PurQhue and Sale Agreement. Id. There la no evldenoe
that Cltetmheut prevented Brown tiom

readlna the Warranty Deed either. The elements for

equitable estoppel cannot be met in thil.caao and therefore equitable estoppcl does not apply.·
Brown also attempts to que that waiver and lache1 apply in this case however both are
not applicable In thi1 case. Waiver ls "a voluntary, intentional rellnquishmint of a known rlaht
or advantage." Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981). "[T]o

establish a waiver, it must appear that the adversary party has acted in rellanee upon such a
waive and altered

bis position." Thero is no evidence produced by Brown of Oreenheart's

conduct durina the sale that would have caused Brown to alter their position. Greenbeart
reincotporatel the qumema immediately above.

The doctrine of

lach~

is likewise hlappllcable. Like quui..eatoppel. laches 11 an

affirmative defense and tho party

assertina

the defense has the burden of proof. Thomas v.

Arlr:oolh Producl, Ina., 137 Idaho 352, 359-360, 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 • 1249 (2002). Whether a
party la

auiltf of 1acbes primarily is a question of fact and therefore Its dcterm1natlon is within

the province of the trial court. Sword v. Sw11t, 140 Idaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492, 499 (2004).
The necessary elements to ma11ifiin a Clirerlii of CiCliii arc:
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(l) defendant'• lnvuion of plahrdft'1 riahts; (2) delay in assertina plalntlil'a
rlabta, the plalndft"bavln1 had notice and en oppommliy to institute • suit; (3)
laoi of knowledp by the dtfcmdant that plahulif would uaert his rfahts; and
(4) ~ury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief ii accorded to
pJalntH! or the nit ii not helcl to be barred.

Thomar v. hl:oo.rlt Produc1, Inc., 137 Idaho 352. 359-360. 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 • 1249 (2002)
In this CIR Brown attempts to use an aftlrmativo defenae u a sword nther than a shield.

Brown IUld Oreenhoart to quiet title not the other way around. Under Idaho law the around
water wu trafelred with the Oreenheart Property via the Wamnt'/ Deed beeause there wu no

taerVation of the

water

riaht that deed.

At that point the around water

riahta belonpd to

Ctreenheett and there la lop! no action that she would have to brina to utabllsh ownenhip.
Lachea does not apply here because there wu no delay by Orcenhean since she dldn't havo to

brina an

action. On the other hand, bad Brown brought this action within the statute of

limitatiODI (which Brown did not), Gmnheart could use the defense of lacbea to argue that
Brown waited too Iona to brina the quiet title action.

Bven it Brown could use J.achot as a direct cause of action there are lssuea of fact that

would pmclude the application of 1aohel to this summary judpnent action. Oreenheart testified
that she "dld not know that a pound water rlaht with respect to the Oreenbeart Property existed
until the Pl~ lay Brown contacted me sometime in February 2012 to tell me that he made a
mistake when he sold me the ground~ riaht" Gr11nh1art Opposition AJfldavtt, 1O. She

wu never informed. during the sale that there wu even a decreed ground water right and that it

wu excluded itom the sale." Gflenhtart Opposition Alfdavtt , 9. Therefore. Greenheart had
no notice and opportunity to bring a lawsuit.
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the undisputed facts and the

arsuments

set forth above, Oreenheart

respectfully requests that the Court din)' Brown'• Motion for Summary 1udgment.

DATED tbl12d day of December, 2012.

BORTON LAKBY LAwomCBs

By

y~~
VlotorV

..4no,.,,.,,for IA/lndtmt

CIBTIFICATE or SQVJCE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ..2L day of December, 2012, a true and cotreet copy
Of the foregoing documem WU served by ftrst..clau mall, postap prepaid, and ~- to; by
fax tramnUuion to: by overnight delivery to; or by persoull)' dellverfna to or leavfna with a
person in chirp of the office u Indicated below:

Michael C. Creamer
Thomas B. Dvorak

[)('] U.S. Mall
[ ] Pax

GIV!NI PUasLBY LLP

[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Bolte. m83101-2120
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Fecsfmile: (208) 388·1300

~y~

victor villeaaa
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Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552]
Viator Wlepe [ISB No. 5860]
BORTON LADY LAW OFFICES
141 B. Carlton Ave.
Meridian. m83642
Boise, Idaho 83702
ot!lce: (208) 901-4415
.Fax: (208) 493-4610
Email: vic:tot@borton·lakey.com

c~ARBARA Sl'E:ELE

ERK OF TH~CfURT
DEPUT

J''

Attol'nfylfor Dl/lndant

IN TD DISTRicr COURT 01' THE l'OURTB JUDICIAL DISTRicr 01'
THE STATE 01' IDAHO, IN AND roa THE COVNTY 01 ELMORE
JA.Y BROWN and CHRISTlNB HOPSON..

CASE NO. CV 2012-353

BR.OWN, Husband Ind Wife,
Plafntift'i.

v.

DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT

or MATERIAL l'ACTS IN
OPPOSITION TO

AUGUSTA SAYOK.O MIMOTO
OREBNHEAR.T, an individual,

PLAINTD'FS'SUMMARY
JVOOMENT

Defendant.

Defendant, Aupsta Sayoko Mhnoto Oreenbeart. by and throup her attomey of record,
Victor Vlllepa and Borton Lakey Law Offices, submits thil atatement of material facta that are

pnUme issuea of material fact and therefore are not in dispute.

This atatement ls ofterad

pursuant to this Court's Schedulina Order and to aasist this Court in its consideration of

Dlfandant '1 ()ppolltton To Plabttffl' Motion F01 Summary Judgmfnt and other pleadings tlled
in opposition to said motion filed simultaneously herewith.

DEPENDANT'S STATBMENT OF MATBIUAL FACIS..IN.OPPOSITION TO PLAINm'PS' MOnON PO:R.
SUMMARY ruDOMENT • l
l ~0
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MATERIAL ISSUES 01' JACfS
1.

On or about Pebmaey S, 1981 Plaintiff Jay Brown acquired approxim•t.el)' 320

acres otlmd lltuated in the But \4 of Section 24, T4S. R.5!, B.M.. in BJmore County ("Orlafnal
Btown Property'). S11 Complaint.

2.

The Snake

River Bain AcUudlcatlon ("SRBA") Court in Twhi Falla, Idaho,

demed Water 1Uahts Noe: 61·2188 and 61-7151 (the •water Rightl") to P1aintlii Jay Brown on

October 26.2000, authorizlna tbe U1CS of aroundwater to the 320 acres comprlsfna the Oriainal

Brown Propeity. 811 &hlbtt "B" and &htbtt "c• to Complaint.

3.
printed a multiple liatlna 80l'Yioe handout which detailecl that the property had a proposed well.

A/ftdavlt o/ .A.ugu1ta <Minn.art In ()ppolttlon to Summary Judgm1111 r'Gr11n1Mart Oppoltn1
.A,ffd. ·~.

4.

I>urlq the purchase of the Oreenheatt Property neither Plaintlfrs or their

iepresentadvea told Oreeoheart that there wu a decreed around water right or that said water

riaht wu excluded tom the sale. Gr"nhtart Oppo11nf A,ffd. , 9.
S.

Orconheart did not know of the exilteDco of a decreed

aroundwar.r

right

applicable tO the property she purchased until !ho wu contacted by Ptafntiff Jay Brown In

FebNary 2012. Gn1nltlart Oppoam, 4ffd. ,, 9·l 0.
6.

PJaJntli!' Jay Brown told Orecmbmt durlna that telephone conversation. on

Felxuary 2012 that he miatlkenly sold the groundwater right to Greenheart. Gre1nhlart
Oppollng .Affdfl 10-11.; Gr11nlaa11 D1po1ltlon Pl· 143 ll. 7-22.

7.

When GiiihDi1't med BW!lOttce otflX lppeid wtm the !tmote Cumttt lhe w1ote

that "... I wu told the land is dry...." Oree.ahean'• statement was not intended to eonvey a
DlWENDANT'S 8TATBMBN1' OP MATBIUAL f ACTIIN OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR.
SUMMilY JUOOMENT • 2
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knowledge or belief that the Oreenheart Property bad a around water right or that she knew that
groundwater rlahtt were specifically excluded trom the ale of the Onenheut Property.

Gr,,,,,,,., Oppo.rlng Aid, 12.
8.

Slmllarly. when Greenbeart wrote her email to Ms. ICriatina Schindele in reaponae

to an otter 1iom Elmore County to purchue her property, stattng that

Gteenhelrt Ploperty " ••• ls dry

a

knew that. the

arazin8 only dua to a lack of lrrlption l)'8tlD1 and no water

riabts" aba merely meant that a knew her property did not have surt'aco water. Gr11nhlart

DATED this

L

day ofDeeember, 2012.

BORTON LAKEY LAW OFFICES

By

DSPBNDANTS STATBMENT OP MATERIAL PACTS IN OPPOSlTION TO PLAJNTJFFS• MOTION FOi.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 3
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gBmJCATE OF SQYJCI
I HDBBY CERTIFY that on tllll ,JL day of December, 2012. a true and comet cop)'
of the inPI document wu served by fil'lt-clul mail, postqe pzepald. and addreuecl to; by
fax trammialcm to; by overniaht dellVC')' to; ot by personally deliverln1 to or leavlna with a
penon ln d1qc otthe oftice u indicated below:

MlohMl c. Creamer
ThomM& Dvorak
OMMI PUut.8V LLP
601 Wat Banoek S1net
P.O.Box2nG
Bolee. IDG701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
FICl!mile: (208) 388-1300

[A'] U.S. Mall

[ ] Fax
[ ] Ovemipt Deliver)'
[ ] Hand Delivery

DBF!NDANT'S STATBMENT OP MATBIUAL PACTS IN OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIPFS' MOTION FOR.
SUMMAR.Y nJDOMENT • 4

] () ·l

~ec. 21. 2012 9:38AM

14

st Carlton Ave

No. 5005

P. 11

FILED
2Gl2 DEC 21 AH 9: 49
Joe Borto1l [ISB No. 5552)
Victor VU1eps [ISB No. 5860]
DOR.TON LAKBY LAW OFFICES
141 B. carlton Aw.
Meridian, m 83642
Botse. Idaho 83702
Oftloe: (208) 908-4415
Pax: (208) 493-4610
Email: victor@borto1l·laby.com

BARBAR A S·7ELE
RT

CLERK OF THE
DEPUTY

.A.ttomq1for De/-"'nl

JN THI DISTRICI' COURT or THE JOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICl' or

TBB STATE or IDAHO, IN AND ll'OR THI COUNTY or ILMORB
CAD NO. CV 2012-353

JAY BR.OWN ud CHRISTlNB HOPSON·
BROWN, Husband and Wife,

ADIDAVIT or AUGUSTA

Plaintiffs,

SA.YOKO MIMOTO
GRUNllEART IN S'OPPORT
or DEJ'ENDANT'S
OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.
AUGUSTASAYOKOMIMOTO
ORBBNHBAR.T, an individual,
Defendant.

STATEOFNBVADA

)
) SI,

CountyofClark

)

AUGUSTA SAYOKO MJMOTO OR.BENHBAR.T, being duly awom upon oath deposes
and says u follows:

1.

That I am an adult over tho 11e of eighteen (18) years, that I am a resident of Lu

Vepa, Clark County, Nevada, and that I am the named Defendant in this matter personal knowledae of the facts set forth in this Affidavit.
APPIDAVlT OF AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO OREBNHSAR.T lN SUPPOR.T OF DEPENDANT'S
OPPOSmON TO SUMMARY ruDOM'SNT • 1
JO

2

I have

Oec. 21. 2012 9:38AM

2.

st Carlton Ave

No. 5005

P. 12

1bat while I have a dootorate In. education and a muten in ieachina, I have never

taken a law reJated coune and have no lepl tndnlna.

3.

At the time or my purohae ot the Oreenheart Property I wu unf'amiliar with the

State ofldaho'• Wits law with respect to how a aurtace or around 'Rifer right i• obtained and/or

how aaurfa or around water riabt ls transferred.

4.

UDdentandina of written and verbal

That l submit this atlldavit to explain my

statemema thll I had made to individuals and aovenunental entities during and after the purchase

of the Oreenhelrt Property.

5.

Althouah I make this afBdavit in part to explain my statementa, I do not waive

any of my deten. that my statements 1hould not be used to add or var/ the unambiauoua tenns

of the Warranty Deed and/or PUIChase and Sale Agreement
6.

My

underataDdlna of the words "water rishta"

and how I •

it in a 1111tence

meam: to duodbc a situation where water runs across the smiico of land and the owner cf that
land has a right to take that water and use it for their putpOMI. So if there 11 no water nmning
across the land there ls obviously no water rlP,t.

7. .

Durina my purchaso of the Oreenhean Property I asked my apnt Daryl· Rheed if

thtn WU water on the property and I WU told by him that the property W8I "dry", I undentood

Mr. Rheld.'1 statement to mean that there was no

water

on the sur:fico of the property I wu

pun:huJ.na. I never understood Mr. Rhead.'I statement to mean that a decreed around water right
existed and that such pound water rights were excluded tom the sale cf tbe property.

8.
~

It was my understanding that I could dfa a well to aet lfOUl1dwater to use on the
Property. This underatandina wu based on my convenatiOlll with Mt. Rhead u

Will u tfii lht6fmmton ptevided In the nmltipl1 ~'Al fGice fnfmmttfon that I had printed out

AFFJDAVIT OF AUGUSTA Sit.YOKO MJMOTO OREBNHEART IN SUPPOl.T OF DBFBNDANTS
OPPOSmON TO SUMMAlY JUOOM!NT • 2 J Q 3

Dec. 21. 2012 9:38AM

011

st Carlton Ave

January 3, 2007 that said there

WU

No. 5005

P. 13

a "Propoted Well." A true and comet copy of tho

multiple lilting aervfce handout ii attached to this aftldavit 11 2lhiblt A·

9.

Durfna the purchuo of the Oreenheart Property 1 wu never informed by tho

Plainltffs, Mr. Rhead. or any representatives of Plaindft'a that there wu a decreecl around water
riaht that exlated or that those deoreed around water riahts were excluded from the la1o of the

Oreenheart Property.
10.

l did not know that a ground water rlaht with respect to the Oreenheart Property

existed until the Plainti« Jay Brown contacted me emnedme in. February 2012 to teU me that he

•

made a mittab when ho sold me the groundwater rlaht
11.

It wu only after that Pebrulry 2012 telephone call with Jay Brown that I began

looldna into the existence of a around water risht by contactms the Idaho Department of Water

Resources.
12.

Attached u

IUibit Dto this affidavit is a true and correct copy of the tax appeal

that I filed with Elmore County on lune 10, 2007. In that document I typed:
I purchased 60 acres ~-Mr. Jay Brown. At the time of purchuc. I WIS told
tho land 11 dry and that the aras• that arow• ii good tor cattle and that there 1a
no structure ol any kind; tb.en:tore. the tax would be adnlmal. I wu vary
autprised when. I received tho year 2007 tu uaeument. I COJ1taCttcl Mr. Jay
BrowA and he ii now h1 communication with tho Elmore County Assessor's
Oftlce reprdlng the nature of the lad that I purchased from him. Ploue
mfew my pateel for tax auessment apin.. Thank you for your time and
comideratimi.

When I wrote that parqraph to Blmore County I still did not know that there wu a decreed
ground water right applicable to my property. In addition I was not expressina that l had
knowledge that around water right11 were excluded from the Oreenhean Property when I

means thore i1 no wat.cr runnina across the property and therefore the land ls "dry".
AFFIDAVIT OP AUGUSTA SAYOICO MlMOTO ORSINHB.UT IN SUPPORT OF D!FBNDANT'S
OPPOSmON TO SUMMAR.Y JUDGMENT· 3 J Q

4

·Dec. 21. 2012 9:38AM

13.

ut Carlton Ave

No. 5005

AUached u Slhibil C10 tills aftldavit ii an email that I t)'ped to 1 Ml. Kristina

SclUndole ID. rospome 10 111 otl'et I received ftrom Btmore Cowlly to purchase the Oteenheart
Plopeny. Thi relevant portioaa of that emal1a teldl:

At the time of m7 purchae. I Wll Vff1 aware that my paroel la strictly for
ftmnina and that I hid no way to 'bull4 a residence. A.pin, at the time of the
purcbue, I wa alto veq •._,, that the parool lt dry arazinS only due to a
lack oltrrlptfoa l)'ltlnl and no water riabtt····

All I meent ia my email WU that I bow there WU no auriice water runnina tbrouab the

Oreenheatt Property, Therefore I had no right to tlke water that obviously wa not rumlin1
tbrouah my property.

In flee, I explained my email and what I meant in that email to Plaintlffl'

auomey during my deposition. Attached hereto u ixbfblt J) ii a portion from my depolition

.

pqea 131 tbrouah 139 in which I provide my explanldon of that eman.

•

SUBsCR.IBBD and SWORN to before me this

.n

de)' ot'.December, 2012•

•

f4to:1i(lt..

==

AFFIDAVlT OF AUOUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO OUBNHBAl\T IN SUPPORT OF DBFENDANf•s
OPPOSmON TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ·4
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Dec. 21. 2012 9:38AM

st Carlton Ave

No. 5005

P. 15

QBtmCA'lJ Ol llBYJQ;
I Hlm.BBY C!R.TIPY that on 1bia ..AL day of December, 2012, a true and ccmeot copy
of die foreaofna document wu served by tint-class mall, pottllp prepaid. and addreased to; by
fax transmiafon to; by ovemiaht delivery to; or by penonally dellverlna to or leaving with a
person in ohll'p of the oftlce a indicated bolow:
Michael c. Cremner
ThomM E. Dvorak

[~]

U.S. Mall

[ ] Pax
[ ] Ovemilht Delivery
[ l Hand Dtlivery

OMNI PulsLBY W

601 West Bannook Street
P.O.Box2720
Boiee. ID 83701-2720
TelephoM: (208) 388-1200

Facsh:nile: (208)388-1300

APPIDAVJT OP AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO ORBENHBAJtT IN SUPPORT OF DBFBNDANT'S

onosmoN ro SUMMA!lY roooM!NT. s
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I

UmllO .. Ol"IUUo

No. 5005

~~~~ ;~~-Hll

HI .... 111111

P. t 7

IPfl•Olf~,.-··1

·,ti·t l «
~

_.,

.

Before nie Board of EquallzaUon
Elmore County, Idaho ·

l

Appellallt(~N1~(1), t;wlA~' 9.t•~o 0 ~~ar-t. Addreu

Q'loB~ilWwM~lt

5t c111.9' v'e4l.[

State

1-lV ·

Z1p "if /J {

Ch1ckonet

P•nn•..._

.App..I ftJtd_, An lndMdu~ Hwrband and \We_
A Corporation__ Truat11_ oth1r._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Appellant(•) wril be

,.p~1nted bYI

Hert11112' Hlmaelf_ Th1m11IY••-

Company Offloe_r Name and T I U . . , . " - - - - - - - - - - - ;Atton11<

• N~• and Addre.. Jlll.~~

f~$- W. S'Cffi.. ~.f.4.~ 1 fl\t+l-e., JI>

---~

,,=:;.1

......

•· lB Di°htf"

,

•

•

..

.
lAN( •·'

"'"'9<

a

.11 •

..
-·
.
.
'
Appellant(•) 11quaat(a) that th• Board enter ltll Judgment h•Nln d1t1nnlnfna th• Mariclt Value
of th• abov9 dNCrfb•d property to be no mont than:
.
. ..
-·
....
:.
Lanc1 •
au11canas 1
othlr •
Tatar•·---.. :-·

, "t1'

.~

ti

'

•nd orct.rlng that •uoh valU• be 1ntarecl In ttUI Ala1nm1nt Ron of !lmore County, and 1uah

other and turthar nH1f u the Soard~ deem 1qulllbla.
Brief romarb • • ttlng f'crth around• cf thlll appeal:

Dated:

Ju.co, Zoo?

App1Han _ _ _ _ _ _ __

,,,. ,.... I

EXHIBIT_fi_ 1 n8

~~
11•11a.-~

•Dec. 21. 2012 9: 39AM

st Carlton Ave

No. 5005

Print

P. 18

Pap 1 oft

. . , . Rt:

°"" letter

Prom:

Alltuftl ._., Mlmato GtetnhHrt Cmlmoto..tnh~

T•

lcaahi'ldt,...,,..oountv.ors

Co:

~ rnal'tlml~.oom; ftnn~ t:hebrownoniw4fm1n.oom:
~oom: rlo~AOSArulce.ntt;

Sundlv, NMmitr 8. 20C>t 10:24 PM

D• Ma. Schindele,
R.e: Elmore Coq Parcel# R.P 04S05B249010A
At the time of ft!)' pvrchue, I wu very aware that my pame1 Is strictly fat f'armlq and that I bad no way
t.o build a retidlllCI. A.pin, at tbe time of the purcbue. I alao wu very aware that the parcel ia dzy
amfna only due to 1acJc of ID irription system lald no water riahfa. I apprecfate your time and etl"ott in
tryfna to derlvina 1he purchase ofter prlco for my land; I, bowevet, llll not interatcd in •Wna it It this
time at the price otrered. Il at some time tho Blmon County atill wtntl to puidlue my Imel, please
contact me whell your oft'ering price reaches more sapectable figure. R.eprdl, Au;uata Grecnheart

...

- On Thu, 10l29J09, Krlltlna Schindele <kachlndtl•O,elmonH:Ounty.org> wrote:

From: Kt1st1na Schbldelo <kachindelo@elmorecounty.org>
Subject oft'er lotter
To: mlmotopeenheart@yahoo.oom
Cc:jdavisla~.com

Date: Thursday, October 29, 2009, 11:19 AM

Ma. Greenheart
Pl11• ftnd encloaed herein a copy of the County's offer to resolve any clatm regarding the
property Jay Brown IOld you.

Krlltlna M. Schlndele
Elmore County ProtecUUng Attorney
1QOS. 4th!.
Mountain Homa, Idaho 83&47
lalchlndeleCDelmorecount.t.org
telephone: (208) e87·2144, ext 603
facllmlle: (208) 887·2147

EXHIBIT '
309

EKOOl7

*

, •

·Dec. 21. 2012 9:39AM

1
2
3
4

ast Carlton Ave

A.YA

Q. Do

a
3

•
•
••
6

Q. How did IM lcftow you wert ~la tbe

(Blcbibl 24 nmlced.)

0. (BY ML DVORAK) Hlftdlnayou whlrl been_.

1

0

Q. Tllil tun email that you1nt to
Kmtinl ...... Do ,,al ... that?

2
3

..

5

lbchlblt 14, do )'OU have

A.Ya

1
3

..

5

,'
8

9
0
1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

cc

Q. lt loob
In tht line tiwrets
tbebrowncrew4@mln.com?

A. Thea I dld.
Q. In f'lct you told Ml. Schladtl• In thll email,
"A.pin a the time of thl purch-.1 wu allo wrJ
t.Wlft thM dlt parcel II dr)' srotnl only due to Jade of'
Ill in'iaation ~ md DO water rlghta. • Do )'OU llt

tblt'I
A.Y&
Q. At JM by Noveinber 8 of2009 you bid an
aWll'Bll ot what water ri&hts me1111 by the t'IOI you're
Ulfn1 lt In hn; correct?
A. Wron..
Q.Oh?
A. tr you wmt me to explail\ whln 1llW my land,
thero'I DO Wl1tr coming to 1he around, above ground and
no...,,. to provide Irr/ Wiier. ~no waw
rtpt. Wm npt, in my mind. It Wllll' that ts comina
throu8b my puac1 nndna dvou&h • toplOl1 when~
CID . . . bucket IDd piok It up lftd WllS 1111 ~
Tbllft nothfq lika 1bat, iD my vltw. 'Ihcnfort. DO

0
1

Wita' rftht.

2
3

Now l team that around it day, IO It nut be CllJled dr'J
palna. 1.-n. ri&bt? Dry grm. Orm. Notbina
&1'0M- It Wit dry ......

•

If you look It the email below, Ill emlil hm
Ml. Schlndele with a copy to. qucM. "CountYt offer to

2
3

resolve any claira npdlng the property Jay Brown sold
you.. Do )IOU• 1bat?
A. Ya.IMit.
Q. And do you recall wbll tho county's offer wu?
A. 8U)'lna the land tom me.
Q, For bow mw:h?
A. San price 11 flll purchued price from
Mr. Brown.
Q. B\ll Wt otl'lr wu reftmed by you?
A. 'nlatl comet.

'
5

6
7

1
2
3
Pa91 13'1

2

0
1

8
9
0

A..Yll.
Q, You copied Jry Brown on It • well?
A. Did I? I don'l tcnow.

ua

'7
8

'

laWlllit7
A. I blve now.a. J clo not know.
Q. 8o lhljlllt -.l)Ol lft email out of the blue?
A. '11lll'I OOMO&.
fat~ putpOIOI u
that In hat of )'Ol.17

1

'

!
6

email'

dlll Jawault that Mr. Brown hid

A.

t
0
1

)'OU•

It Wiii dry.

And here dq lfUlnl.,.,... whit I hid been uaina.

P. 19

giound Clft be Uled for tniftl- lo 1ooncacted I few
thinp into thla lmlll pll'lplpk.
Q. But you CO..- this parqraph?
A. I campol9d thll pltllllpll vwy pOOrly.
Q, 111 I poor choice of v.udi?
A. Poor . . of wonll lllCl minmdentlndina. Dry,
to me, la dry. WhM . . can you dllartbl dry'l Dry II
nat Wider la 'I'll/ mind. Dly la nat I molalt.
Q. lt . . . . . oa,. ,,. Wll fllpODdlns to,

1
2
3

A.. I did.
Q. Wh1 did you ma hlr?
A.Sbeaentmememlll.
Q. lhe eent )'OU . . . . nntt

you . . . . . . . . .
.,•• lomllhlna
....
......
•

No. 5005

M1t VILLBOAS: Counsel, Clll we p otrthe
record?

M1t DVORAK: Sure.

'

s
1

2

3

~tlbn.)

Paqe 139

(Bxhlblt25 llll'ked.)
Q. (BY MR. DVORAK) I'm aolnt IO hind you wbat11
been marked fbr identUbdon pmpoa. Bxhibit 25.
Do )'O\l IM that?

A. Ya
Q. Parqraph IMll on there, it that your

Ii.....,

A.Ya
Q. I'll npcuent tbit It 1 Notice of Chant• in
Waw ltlaht Ownenhlp, that. Jfllal It, you ftlod with
the ldlho Deputment of Waw J\llOU1'Cel?
A. Ya.ldid.
Q. k wu ftW on Februmy 14, 2012?
' A. I don't remembor mot1y the date.
Q. For the rec«d. to me rilht aide of your
lipmre on Une _.. thlt data appcmt
A.Y&
Q, Doll: that rehlb your NCOlllOdon 1110 when
it Wll ft1ed?
A. Not whlll I ftlld. I don't remnber the met
date. But 1did file somerime.
Q. I note tblt down Ill the borrmn tberl'l a
MCt1on thlt llYt tor Idaho Dlplnmtnt ofW• RMCUrCI
omce. an1y. Do you aee tlw? "tDWll oi!ico \111
on

•9•

35 (Pages 137 to 140)
(208)34&-9811

M & M COURT REPORTING

310

(208)340 (fax)
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r
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st Carlton Ave

No. 5005

P. 2

FILED
£G!2 DEC 2 l AH 9: 49
BARBAR AS TEELE

Joe Bortoa [1SB No. 5SS2)
Vlotar Vlllopt [ISB No. 58d0]
DOR.TON LAKBY LAW OPPIC!S
141 B. cmt.on Aye.

CLERK OF Tt~~~URT

·

DEPUT 1~'

Merldlat. ma'42

Bolte, 1dlbo 83702

Oflloe: (208) 908-4415
Pax: (208) 493-461 O
Bmall: vtctcr@borton·lakly.com

JN TBB DJITRICI' COVR.T or TD JOVKTB JDDICIAL DJSTRicr OJ

TRI ITATI ormAHo. IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OJ &LMOU
JA.Y BROWN and CHRISTIN! HOPSONBROWN. Husband and Wlf'e,

CAI& NO. CV 2812-353
Al'l'IDAvrr oir XINNl.TB
BR.USll DI StlPPOllT OJ'
DUINDANT'S OPPO&mON
TO SUMMAllY JUDGMENT

Ptaintlffl.

"'·
A.UOUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO

ORBBNHBA.R.T, an Individual.
Defendant.

STATBOFIDAHO

)

County ot Ada

)SS.
)

KBNNBTH BRUSH, beins duly nvom upon oath deposu and •YI u fellows:

I.

That lam an adult over the ap of efabteca (ti) YCil1, thlt I em a realdcnt of

ldaho, and that l have personal knowledp ottht fictl aet forth In this Aftldavlt.
2.

t am a Cclrtlfted Ocneral AppnJser licwed ln tho Stas of Tdaho, Oreaon and

Nevada.
AFFJDAVIT OP KBNNl'nl BRUSK lN SUPPOR.T OP DBFBNDANT'S OPPOtmON TO IUMMAllY
JUDOMBNT·l
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P. 3

Attlched hcnta • f.lblblc A la my rtaume aettlna f'orth IDY educational

baokaround. oxperlenoo and quallftclUont.
4.

l Ill the ow. of an apprallll bualn• naaned Kon Btulh Appnlult and deal

exclualvet7 with appnlllq raral and qrloult&nl 1'rma tad ranoh propertl• throupout 'Nevada.

ONIOll lftd Tdabo.
S.

l haw appraleed native

ranaeland. undevaJopod lll1d with

WO

rlabtl, and

produolna firml and nnohel: located In Bhnore County. Watot rlahta ll't an lntelflf part of tho
apprailal prooea wltll aplcuhural Janda In Elmcn County.
6.

1 have appralad qrlcultural latml and ranchm located In Elmore County In 2007 ·

and In yean prior md since. ao t am famlllu with the land cluslflcadon1 and land values for
aarieultural propertln Ill Elmore County tbr 2007.

'!.

Thai I have reviewed; (1) tho. Complaint tlled lft dUI cue and the exhlbtts to the

Complaint lnoludlna the decreed pwnd water rlahts; (b) tho Purchase and Sale Alf'Oll\ent: ad
(o) tho aftldavlt of Toni LIRM Manduoa.

a.

That hued on my revtow of tho documents above and baaed on my knowtedp

and ox.perienco as a Cert1fiecl General Appraj• In Idaho, 1dtsqrec wl~ Ms. Lahe'• opinion of
value olM1. Oreenhearrs proporl)' 11 Kt forth In Paragraphs 11 11\d I2 of her aftldavk.
9.

lo tnY opJnlon Ms. Gteenheart'1 purchaso of price of Sl,333.33 per

ICl'C

l1

commenlUl'ltl with land that ha Wltlr riabts but wat undeveloped fol' lrrlpcion at tho time of

aalo. The word "UndeYeJapect' rofen to real property that laob irrlptlon lmprovementl lucb u
m lnlptlon i)"ltem conahtSn1 of dtatributlon mainUnes and a sprinkler l)'ltem tuob 11 wheel
Unn, plvota, or hlndllno iprinldm ot some fonn of pavity lrrlptlon 8)'ltom and usaolated land

hwoltng.

Al'PIDAVIT OP tc.BNN!'m BltJSH IN S'UPPOR.T OP ~S OP'POSmON TO SUMMAlY

JUDCJMBN1'·2
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QBDllC4D 01 myt(.1

1HSR.!BY CBllTIPY that on thll ..ll dq of December, 2012. a true ud correct oopy
or the fbreaoln1 doaumom was laived by ftnt-01111 man. poltlll prepaid. ud addreaed to; by
ta t1'llllmilllaa ta; by ovemfaht dellv.y to; ar by pereoully dellverlna to or leavtn1 with a
penon ln cbarp of tho offtoo u Indicated below:
[)(] U.S. Mall
[ ) PIX
[ J OVemtabt Delivery
( ] Hmd Delivery

Mlchaol C. Creamer
Thomal B. Dvarak .
OIVBNS PuuLIY.LU
601 Weat 88nnock Street
P.O. Box 2120
BolM. ID U?Ol ·2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
F1e11mllr. (208) 388·l 300

AIPJDAVIT OP X!NNBn! BRUSH IN SUPl'OlT OP DBP!NDANT'S OPPOSmON TO 8UMMAllY
JUDOMINT·-4
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RISllMI
XINNITJI E. BR11SU. A.LA.
1~ DIXIE RIVD ROAD

CALDWELL, mABO 83607
2011414-9GM
PAX 208/455-9898
EDIJCATION
BS Aptcuiiurat Ensineorina, Univaity ofCalifomia. Davia, December 1975. Counewort
diatributed tbroupout pnotical qineeriq prlnciplel. Ulima11eionoe, and buinea manapment.
WORKEXPIJUENCE

June 1981-rre.t: Solf-emplO)'ld; Ka Brush Apptatala.
Aoctedlted llunl Appraiac (ARA) Appraiaina mra1 and apicultural tanm, ranohea, and
specfa1ty •arioaltmal propertie& llUCh .. f'eedlota. potato lheds. onion ct bean. wmhouael,etc.;
aaricultutal and economic conaultiq. Cenlftecl Appraias in Idaho, Orep and Nevada.
1f7Wune 1985e Doane-Weetern, Caldwell. Idaho.
Agrlc:Wmral loan comapondent and field offtcer for ABma Life.and Caaualty and Mutual of
Now Yort tor real estate mortpp1. Rnponsibilttlea include flnancial and mnpment analysis.
orcdlt review, appraisal of aeourity, loan. orisinadon and submlaion. loaa. urvicina and collection.
Otberreaponm'bill'1el included manapmont consulting, real estate appraisals, economic tiam'bility,
and real estate .ales.

AWILIATIONS

Cerded Appraiser in. Idaho, Oregon and Nevada
Accredited member-- American Society of Farm Manapra wt Rural Apprailll'I, Idaho
State Chapter and Treuure Valley Local Group
Mombef-Varlout Committeoa for the ASFMRA
Put Prettdent, ISPMIA
Directot- Piones Dix!e Ditch Company, Upper Center Point Ditch Compay
Member- IAwer Boile R.tver Watershed Adviay Group
Member- Caldwell United Methodist Church
Baste Scout- Boy Scoutl of Am.mica
PERSONAL JNPOJlMAnON
Ap: 59. matr1ed 36 years, one dauaJiter
Own md op«atl a 375+ head cow/calf operation in Idaho ct Oregon
BUJ 100-300 calvealyearlinp am111aJ1y; feed ct graze these ycarUnp in. Idaho & Oregon
Have 200-400 head of ltoors ct heften ouatom f'ed to slaughter aumually
Hobbiea include camping. filhina, and woodworldna

o·ec.

21. 2012 9:37AM
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QUALil'ICATIONS

or

KENNITB BRUSH. A.JU..
1.

OCCUPATION

Real Batato Appralaer

Idaho State Ccrtiflcd Appniler #42
Oreaon Certifted Appralaer #C000287 .
New.da CoJtifled General Apprai• #00540
2.

ADDRDSIPBONB

3.

COLLEGE

19724 Dbdl lllv• Rold, Caldwell. Idaho 83607 208/454-9090
FAX: 208/45'·9890

Baohelor of Soienco in Apiculturo, 1975

4.

EXPERDNCE

Univeni~ of Calltamla. Davia

Self employed Iha 1985

Jomed WOltcm Farm Manapment Compllly in 1'76
Western Plml Maupment Company and Doaea Aplcu1tn1 Servtcel,
Inc., merpcl In 1981

Completod Amorloan Society of Farm MlnlP"I and Rural Appraiaen
Counet-F1rm Apprafaal. Advanced Parm Appralaal. Rach A.pprailal.
numerou llJDinarl
AocnditodRml Appralaer(ARA) ofAmerican Sooiety ot'Parm Manqa
and Rural Appra1aera and Member ofldabo Society ofParm Manqen and
llun1 Appraiser, Certified u oumnt on oontinuiq education with
ASFMRA

.!.

fiPECAL ASSIGNMINTS
Prepared appraiaala on rural and qr:lbuainea properdea iA ldaho. ()rep.
Waahinaton. Utah, Nevada, Montana. and Califonda fbr corporatiom,
aovemment apnciea. lenderl. and individuals

6.

CLD:NTS INCLlJDI lntermoumain Community Bank (a divilion of Pubandlt State Bank)
JP Morpn Chui (formerly Wubinpm Mutual Bink A Wflltem Bank)
Baak otthe Cucadea (formerly Parmen &: Mmcbam State W) .
US Bank (formerly Wut One ct 'Idaho Fint Natioul Bank)
Wolll l'up Bank &: Wolla Farp Al Cmllt (formorty Pint lntentate A
Fin& Seourity Baab)
.
Banner Bank
Ciu.m BUIW:l1 Bmk
lC.ey Bank of Idaho
D. L Bvam Bank
USDA-Farm Service Apncy (formerly PmHA)
Parm Credit Servlooa
Harvat Capttal Company
Amerlcan Parm Mortpp Company
NOl'W'elt Aariou1tunl Credit Ino.
Zlom Aarlcultural finance &: Zions Bank
Rabo-~inance Cformmy Lend ta. Alli·Buaiaeu)

Tri.State Llveatock Credit Corporatton
MUtUil Un liii\li'iiiCi compiiiy of Ntw Yori
The Church ot Jesus ChriatofLaUCr-Day Saints
Varioue lndividuall, Accountantl &: Attomoya
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Joe Borton [ISB No. SSS2]
Victor Villcpa [ISB No. 5860]
BORTON LAICBY LAW OFFICES
141 B. Carlton Ave.
Meridian, m83642
Boise. Idaho 83702
Office: (208) 901-4415
Fax: (208) 493-4610
Email: victor@borton-laby.com
A.Ito,.,,,,,for Dl/indant

IN THI DISTlUCT COtJRT OJ THE JOURTB JUDICIAL DISTRICI' or
THE STATE

or IDAHO. IN A.ND FOR THI COUNTY or ELMORE

JAY BROWN and CHR.ISTJNB HOPSON·
BROWN. Husband and W1te,

CASE NO. CV 2012-3!3
AmDAVIT or VICTOR

VILLEGAS IN SUPPORT OF

DEFENDANT'SOPPOSI'nON

v.

TO SllMMARY JUDGMENT

AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
ORE!NHBAR.T, an individual,

Defendant.

STATBOFNBVADA

)
)u.

County of Ada

) .

VICTOR VILLBOAS. beina duly sworn upon oath depolCI and says u follows:

1.

I am an attomey with the law ftrm of Borton Lakey Law om.cos representing

Defendant Aupta Oreenheart ln the above-entitled matter, and have personal knowleclp of the
facts set forth heroin and can testify tharato.

AFPIDAVJT Of VICTOR. VlLL!QAS IN SUPPORT QPlDBFENDANT'S OPPOSmON TO SUMMAltY
ruDOMBNT • 1
3 7

..

~ec.
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Attached hereto u »xbibit A ia a true and correct copy of an email dated Aupat

11, 2003 tlm is contalnecl in the !9COtda of the Idaho Department of Water Relourcea. The email

relatestowaterdghts numbcn 61·7151and61-2188 that are the aubjectmetta"ofthis Utlptlon.

SEAL

'

CEBTDICAD OF RBVJCI

I HEREBY CER.TIPY that on this~ day of December, 2012. a true and correct copy
of the foreaoinl document was served by first-clus mail, postqe prepaid, and addressed to; by
fax transmlulon to; by ovemiaht delivery to; or by peraomilly deliverlna to or leavlna with a
person in charge of the otlice as indicated below:
Michael c. Oeamet
Tbomu B. Dvorak
GJVBNI PuilSLSY LLP

601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 13101-2no
Telephone: (208)388-1200

rxJ U.S. Mail

[ ] Fax
[ ] Ovemip.t Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Faclimlle: (208) 388·1300

AmDAVIT Of VICTOR. VILLEGAS IN SUPPOllT Ot.DEFBNDANT'S onosmoN TO SUMMAR.Y
JUOOMENT • 2
3t 8
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REO!t' !D

JAN-2~

M!MOAANDUM
TO:

A1c11veo
oepnntrtdWir-.. AW zt -

Cynthll Clark

FROM:

DllWln Vind• 8t11t, PNP1N1'

DATE:

11-Aug-03

R!: Jay I. Brown. Appkatlon 101.... I Water Alaht rN* Bank)

--

Aece1veo
DEC 3 o2003
~·

The 1pp11oant h• ohaneed hll flrmlnll opn11on ... no Iona• contJnuoualy tmma the
320 . . . for which ,,. hM wlflr ..... Hfl CUITll1t ptllCClot " to fal1'n about 180 . . .
and allow thl remaining 180 acr. to rmlln falow•. Aacordlngly, In order to Mid
faffalbn of tht un.-ct-.. rlQhtl.. at diminution of the ftowl he ha hlltorlolily \Md,
Ht wtlh11 to pl~ the unUlld wats In the ~r banlc.
Attached n coplel of tu bllll 1hawlng 1ppllcant1 r'llmt aNI a legal deecrfptlon, and
BABA l'llCIOf'da for the water rfghtl 11•7151 ll"ld 01·2188. PIHM !tit me know If you
need more Information. Thenkll

t!xHIBIT~

. . Dec. 21. 2012 9: 43AM

ut Carlton
. Ave
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Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552]
Victor Villepa [ISB No. 5860]
BOllTON LADY LAwomCES
141 B. Clrltoa Ave.
Meridian. m 83642
Bol11, Idaho 83702
Ofllce: (208) 908-4415
Fax: (208) 493-4610
Email: victor@borton-laby.com
Attornl)'I/or Dtj'lnllant

IN THI DISTRICT COURT OJTBE FOURTH IVDICIAL DISTRicr OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND JOR THI COUNTY or ELMORE

JAY BllOWN and CHRISTJNB HOPSONBllOWN. Husband md Wife,

CASE NO. CV 2012-353
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
SHORTEN TIME TO BEAil
THEIR MOTION TO STRIKE
POR'l10NS or AnIDAvrr or
JAY B. BROWN, AND TERRI

. Plaintifr..

v.

LaRAE MANDlJCA

AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GR.BBNHEAR.T. an ln.dividual,

Defendant, Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenheart, by and through her attorneys of record.
Victor VWeps and Borton Lakey Law Offices, moves this Court. pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Pnx:cdure 6(b) hereby move tbia Court for an Order shortenlq time to allow their Motion
To Strike Portions Of Aftldavit

ot Jay B~ Brown md Terri LaRae Manuca to be heard on

January 7 2013 at 3:00 p.m. TblJ motion is critical to the hearing on the parties' cross motions

OSFENDANT8 MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME ~ 1

320

a

.,
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and documentary evidence inttoduced by way of afttdavit by tho Plaintiff in support of their

motion tor summary Judgment.

DATBD this _11_ day ofDeoember, 2012.
'

BORTON LAKEY LAW .OPFICES

CIBTlllCAD or SIBYJCE
I HER.EBY CBR.TIPY that on this ..i.L day of December, 2012, a true amt correct copy of
tho foregoing document wu served by fint·clus mall, pomp prepaid, and addressed to; by tax
tranmdnlon. to; by ovemiaht delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person
m. chirp of the oftlco u indicated below:
Michael c. Craemet
Thomu E. Dvorak
OMNI PuuLIY W
601 Welt Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Bobe, m83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200

[iJ

U.S. Mall
[ ] Fax

[ ] Overnight Delivmy
[ ] Had Delivery

FIClimlle: (208) 381-1300

Victor Villepa

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME • 2
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t=fLE[;
2012 DEC 21 AH g: 49

Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552)
Victor Villopa [ISB No. 5160]
BORTON LADY LAW OPFICES
141 B. Carlton Ave.

. c~~CR~f
~LJr~LE
DEPUT~\ RT

Meridila. m83642

Boi11, Idaho 13702
Offtct: (201) 908-4415
Fax: (208) 493-4610
Email: vlotot@borton-lake)'.com

Attornqafor Dlf,,1dtmt
IN THE DISTRICf COURT OFTBE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICI' OJ
THE STATE or IDAHO. IN AND FOR THI COUNTY or ELMOU

CASI NO. CV 2012-353

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON·
BROWN, Husband and Wife,

DD'ENDANT'S M0110N TO

STRIKE PORTIONS or
AFJ'IDAVIT or JAY B.
BROWN, AND l'ERRI LaRAE

Plaintifts.

v.

MANDUCA

AUOUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
ORBBNHBAR.T, an individual,
Detendant.

Defendant. Aupta Sayoko Mimoto Qreenheart, by and through her attorneys of record,

Victor VWeau and Borton Lakey Law Oftices, moves this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of
~"-~~.

CIVD PiiX:idUre' 12tf) 'tcr'ltt!B p0ttlotti li1d the Aftldavlt ot 1ay JJ. Brown lllttTerrl Lalbe
Manduca u well as csxhibits to their mpectlve aftldavits.

CliFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE • 1
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Defendant'• motion is made and based upon the pleadlnp on file with the Court, together
with the Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike and Deftmdant'I Memonmdum
In Opposition to Plllntltrs• Motion fbr Summuy Judgment

DATBD thia -6!_ day of December, 2012.

BORTON LAKBY LAwomCBS

By

y~y~
Victor Ville

gaTD'JCAD 01 SIRYICI
I HBRBBY CBRTIFY that on t1Us l:!. day of December, 2012, a true and eomct copy of
the toresoina ~ wu aerved by ftnt..clan mail, postage prepaid. and addteued to; by fax
trammilllion to; by ovemisht delivery to; or by penonally deliverlna .to or leaving with a person
in charge of the oft1co u indicated below:
M1cbu1 c. Creamer
Thoma B. Dvorak

[X] U.S. Mail

[ ] Fax
[ l Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

OMNI PUl.sLBY W

601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Telephcme: (208) 388·1200
Facsimilo: (208) 388-1300

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE • 2
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Joe Borton [IS8 No. 5552]
Victot Vll1epl [JSB No. 5860)
BOllTON LA.DY LAwomcas
141 B. Carlton Ave.
Meddtan, m83642
Bo1le. Idaho 13702
Oft!oo: (208) 908-4415
Fax: (201) 493-4610
P.mall: vlctor@bortml·Jakey.oom
.tl.ttonllYl/or Dl/mdlmt

'1N THI DISTRICI' COURT or THI JOlJRTR JUDICIAL DISTRICI' or

THI STATE. or mARO, IN AND POR TBB COUNTY or ELMORE
. CASI NO. CV 2012-313

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINB HOPSON·
BR.OWN, Husband and Wfte.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
or DEl'ENDANT'S MOTION
TO &TRIXI PORTIONS OJ
A.FJIDAVlT OJ JAY B.

v.

BROWN, AND TERRI LIRAE

MANDUCA

AUGUSTA SAYOK.O MJMOTO
OREBNHBAR.T, an individual,
Defendant.

Defendant, Aupta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart ("Greenebartj, by and tbrouah her
attorney of record, Victor Villegu of Borton Lakey Law Oftices, submi~ this Memorandum in

Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Aftidavit Of Jay B. Brown, 81ld Terri Larae
Manduca a well exhibit.I attached to the afftdavits.
INTRODUCl'ION

'Ibe partlea have ~cross-motions for summary judpient and o~ arpmeat is set to be

PlaintU'fs Browns have attempted to introduce

~nsic

evidence to explain the tenns of the

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY 8. BROWN, AND TERRI ~ MANDUCA -1
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unambipous Warranty Deed. The extrinsic evidcnoe is oomalnod in statements made within. the

ddavlts In support of Plaintlfr1 modon for IUID1IJll'1 judgment and or dowmenta auacbed to
each respective ddavlt.
ARGUMENT
The Idaho

~

of C1vil Procedure require that affldavits ht support of summary

Judplent be madl on penona1 knowledp and ... forth flcta u gd

la admlllihlo lg

OYJ.dme..." I.ltC.P. S6(e) (underlinfns added).
Generally, the pam1 mdenoo zule pnwidea that where preliminary neaotfatlou an
consummated by written apmem. the wrltina supeteedes all pmioua undentandfnp and the
Intent of the part1ea must be ascortained ftom tho writi.q. Yallq Bank v. Chrln1nnn, 119 Idaho

496, 498, 808 P.2d 415, 417 (1991). "If the written agreemem i• complete upon i11 face and

unambipm. no hud or mistake belna allepd, extrlnsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous

aqodatiom or eonvenatfons it not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to or detta¢ from
the terms of the written contract... Id.
In the context of whether a water riaht ii tnmalorrld In a deed. the Idaho Supteme Court

has held that a deed that contafna appurteaance Janauago. effective to tl'IDl'fer a wats rlaht and
abael1t hud. or mistake. parol evidence ii not admiuible to explain that the parties Intended

sometbm1 different. Koon v. Em]JIY. 40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097 (1924).
Empq involved a lawauit to ~ufet title over 600 1nches of water and to e!Vofn the delivery

of that water. EmJ111 at P. 1098. The ipeciftc facts and procedural history of the ease are u
followe:
The deeds by which Olive conveyed the lands now owned by respondent did not
apecliically mention any water, but they contain the clw: "Together with all and
ifiliUlit tBe umemems, lrmedftamentt a nJlltr=eu tArrmto IWanaJna or In
anywise appertainlna, • • •" which respondent contends effected the transfer of all
the water appuiteDani to the land.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANl"S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE
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On the contrary, appellants contlnd that when the deeds were executed and delivered,
tlm pattiet agreed that the water appurtenant to the land WU to be retained by
appellant Olive; and mmetkml ettmzmted to est@llah "AA rwmtlon 1w porol.

The court refused to pemslt tho lntroductlon of ora1 evidence for IUeh purpose, and
the actlon of the court ls usiped u envr.
Id. Cunderllnina added).
The EmIJ'Y court held that "[lt] ls an elementary Nle for the constn1Ctlon. of deeda, the
1anpp of which ls plain and wwnblpous, that, in the absence of hud or

mistake. the

Intention of the pll'tin mUlt be ucertained &om tho instrument Itself'••• .Parol evidence ls not
admissible for such purpose.... Jd. The EmJHY court recopJzed t1m the use of the expieulon
'"tcpther with all and siqular the appurtonancea thereto belonaina and appertalnins,' or one of

similar purport, •• " in a deed is etreotlve to transfer an appurtenant water right unless there is a
speclilc reservation in the deed. Id. at P. 1099. tntlmately, the EmIJ'Y court aftJrmecl the trial

court's refusal to permit extrimio evidence because the appurtenance lanauqe wu
unamblauous. The court held "[t]ho Janauap of the deeds is plain and wwnbiauous. From the
deedt the intent of the

anmtcr to convey the Janda, tggetbar with tho &mmttl!DftO•· plainly

appeam. There was no allegation of bud or mistake in the execution of the deeds. Ind no fraud
or miBtako is olalmed." Id. {underlfnina added).
In this case, the pettinont parts of tho Warranty Deed to Ms. GreeMcart from the Browm
reads "TO HAVB AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said
Orantee.. ••.. 811 ExldbU D to Complaint; Exhibit B to

~t

of Augulta Grt1nhlart In

Support of Motton For Summary JudgrMnt. The deed contains the typical ..appurtenanco,.

lanauage and per the !mpl)> decls!on it is not ambiauous u a matter of law and theref'ore

contradict, vary. or alter the plain laquaao of the Warranty Deed.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE
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Based on the argument above. Oreenheart requeltl that the followlna pll'l8flPhs ·and.
mdliblta to the tollowiq afftdavita be stricken becauae the information ii only used to try to
explain the pat1es bl1ent, lacks ad.equate foundatJon. to be ldmfaible u presentld or is irrelevant
In light of,,,,,.,.
Aftldayft of Jg a. Bmwn

• Parqrapla 18: "The per-aore price in 2007 for the Oreeaheart Property W11
commenante with prices notmally paid in southern Idaho at the tbnt of the u1e for nonirripted llDd which hu no water rights"
o Statement ia ma purely to attempt to demonstrate that parties undentood water
rlahtl were exo1uded from the Ille of the Oreenheart Pn>perty and. therefore ·
violates parol evidence rule.
• Exhibit r to Compllblt Notice of Tax Appeal

o Mr. Brown incorporates Exhibit F u if iUlly set forth In hit afttdavit. Plaintitia
use this information. reprdfna Oreenheut'a written statement in the appeal notice
u extrinsic>" evidence in attempt to demonstrate that the pll'tfea understood wu
excluded. i'tom the we. Evidence submitted for that purpote violatel the parol
mclerD ru1e.,,,,,., .rupra.
• Parqnph 22: "Based on that authority and pursuant to her direction, on July 6, I
apparecl Wore the Board of Equalization and repreMDted that the Oreenheart Property
Wll dry land and had been purohued and conveyed u dry land without lr:lption water
riPta and would not be lnipted 'unleu at such time a water riaht ia· purobued for the
property by Mn. Orecmbeut.' A true and comet copy of a letter I sent to the Board
conveyin1 mch representations is attached to the Comptamt tl1ed In tis matter u Exhibit
Q ml fncludld hereia by reference. At the time I sem the letter, I sent a copy to Ma.
Oreeaheart...
.

o Statemeni and related exhibit arc made purely u an attempt. to demonl1rlte that
tho parties understood durina ti. sale that water riahta wen· .acluded tom the
sale of the <lreenheart Pioperty. This cMdence therefom violates paml evidence
rule. Empl)' supra.

.

• Paraanpla 24 ud ED!blt I: 11••• Defendant Oreenheart responded to such ofter, and
copied mo on her e-mail respondfna. lndicatfna, amona other thinp 'at the time of
· v aware that the
111
grazlna only due to a lack of m
in:igatlon 8)'ltem and DO water ri.ghts.' A true
correct copy 0
'

327
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS Of THE
AFFIDAVIT OF JAV B. BROWN, AND TERRI LaRA! MANOUCA • 4

·oec. 21.

2012 9:42AM

st Carlton Ave

No. 5005

P. 40

e-mail 11 attached to the Complaint flled in tblt matter a Exhibit 'I' mid incozporated
herein by tbia reter:ence and reltated a lt set forth ln tull"

o The quoted Janauaae Statement md telaled exhibit 111 made purely as an attempt
to \?)' to demcmatratt that the pmties undlrltm\cfina durfna the nc:aotfatlon of the
Ill• that water riahtl Mii uc1udecl !om the OrMnhell1 Property. This evldance
tbetetore violatea parol evidence rule. Empq-lllpl'Q.
Mlclayjt of I p LaRy Mn4p

• Paraanpla ll: "Therefore I am of1he opinion that 1he price ofSt.333.33 an.acre paid by
Ms. GnMmbearc at that time in 2007 wu more in line with the value of comparable real
property at that t1mt in 2007 for ICl'eaP In that area that did not have water ri&hta of d:IC
type dRcr1bed in the IDWR: letts UIOClated with it. I 'believe the Siller would not have
been wilUna to loll comparable property to that purchased by Ma. Otecmheart and tramfer
the asooWed water rights at that time for lea than S2JOO an acre."
o Ml. Manudca•s opinion tettimony in Parqraphl 11 and 12· of her affidavit la
extrlnslc evidence made solely to establiah that the. pardea undentood no water
rlahta were beins transferred because the price paid f'ot the Oreemheart Property
WU allepdl)' lest than what the propalty would bave sold for if it bad water
rlaha. Tbla mdenoe is aa attempt to add or vrt'/. the plain lanan•p of the
Warranty Deed·water was Included ln the oonveyance. Empq- rupra.
DATED th.ii lJ.. day of December. 2012.

By
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P. 41

CIBDDCATI or SD\TICI
I HBRBBY CBR.TlFY that 01l tbil jJ_ day of December, 2012. a true and correct copy
of the f'oreaolq dooumeai WU semcl by flnt-clan mail, .pottap pepaid, md addreaed to; by
tax trannillion to; by ovemiaht delivery to; or by personally deliverlna to or leaving wlth a
penoo in cbarp of the oftlce 11 indicated below:
Mlcbul c. Creamer

[X] U.S. Mail

[ ] Fax

Thoma B. Dvorak
Ol'VBNI PUuJ..BY LLP
601 Weat Bannock Street
P.o~ Box 2120
Bol11, m 13101-2120
Telepbou: (208) 381-1200
Pacsimfle: (208) 388·1300

[ ] Ovemiaht Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
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GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

601 West Bannock Street

BARt3ARA STEELE

CLERK Of THE COURT

Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300

DEPUT~

1617061_1 (11S43-3)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the
"Browns"), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby submit this
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
It is undisputed that in the present case, the Defendant never believed there to be any
water rights associated with her property or that she was to be conveyed any water rights with
her purchase. All of her actions are consistent with this. The Browns, on the other hand, had,
until the last year, understood that the water rights had not transferred with the property, still
remained with the property under which they were in possession. and all of their actions are
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consistent with this understanding, including maintaining the water rights in the water bank and
contemplating transactions involving them.. This case fits within the general rule recognized
throughout the United States that those in actual possession of real estate are never barred by any
statute of limitations from seeking to quiet their title, and such is the case with the Browns
seeking to confirm what water rights are appurtenant to the property retained from their
conveyance. If indeed a statute of limitations applies, it is the 20-year statute of limitations
found in Idaho Code § 5-203 for claims for the recovery of real property. Further, even if any
statute of limitations applied, basic principles of estoppel, waiver or similar equitable principles
would bar the Defendant, having in the past taken a position which would reasonably lead the
Plaintiffs to understand that she was not only not making any claim to a portion of the water
rights that are associated with Plaintiffs' retained property, but in fact relinquished any such
claim and waived any statute of limitations defense against a quiet title action.
Additionally, the law cited by Defendants to the effect that the use of the words "and
appurtenances" in a deed automatically carries with it water rights is a misstatement of the
applicable Idaho law. Instead the Idaho decisions on this question state that a clearly shown
contrary intent of the parties overrides any presumption that water rights, appurtenant or not,
were conveyed.
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS
Plaintiffs take no issue with the statement of facts set forth in the Defendant's Statement
of Undisputed Facts as being accurate. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs assert that those facts are not
material. The material undisputed facts are that the allegations of the Complaint are based on
quieting title to the Plaintiffs' retained real property and the water rights appurtenant and
beneficially used thereon. Plaintiffs would further incorporate by reference the Statement of
Undisputed Facts that they filed in support of their own Motion for Summary Judgment
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANT'
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previously in this matter as material facts in dispute preventing the entry of the summary
judgment as requested by Defendant. 1 Most notably among that Statement of Undisputed Facts,
and specifically with respect to the Defendant's pending Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Plaintiffs would commend the Court's attention to the following facts which constitute
statements by Greenheart to the effect that she knew she would be purchasing her property
without water rights:
1. June 10, 2007 Notice of Appeal of Assessor's value, indicating
that Greenheart knew the land was dry at the time of purchase;
2. July 2, 2007 letter to County Commissioners regarding tax
appeal, indicating she was aware the land was dry at the time
of purchase;
3. Dry Grazing Land Lease, prepared by and initialed by
Greenheart on 7/23/07;
4. November 8, 2009 e-mail to Elmore County in which
Greenheart stated that at the time of purchase she was "very
aware" that the parcel was dry grazing only due to no water
rights; and
5. June 9, 2009 letter from Jay Brown to the Elmore County
Commissioners acknowledged by the Defendant in her letter
dated July 2, 2009, indicating that she would have to purchase
a water right before she could irrigate the property.
ARGUMENT

1.

Under Idaho Law the Intent of the Parties to a Deed Controls Whether Water
Rights Pass with the Deed and the Water Rights Claimed by Defendant Were not
Appurtenant to or Beneficially Used on Her Sixty Acres
In response to Defendant's recitation of the law, Plaintiffs at this point would merely

incorporate by reference and direct the Court's attention to the Idaho decisions cited in the
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 2 These cases stand

1

See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed in this matter by Plaintiffs on December 10,

2012 ("Plamtins MS)
2

"at pp. 2-IO.

See Plaintiffs' MSJ at p. 13.
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clearly for the proposition that evidence clearly showing the parties did not intend for the deed to
pass water rights will operate to prevent passage of the water rights even when the deed conveys
the property "with appurtenances." In other words, as a matter of law, use of the words "with
appurtenances" is deemed as a matter of law as ambiguous with respect to water rights. Further,
as argued in Plaintiffs' motion, these water rights were not beneficially used on the sixty acres
transferred to Defendant, but were used elsewhere on the retained real property or had been
maintained by the Plaintiffs in the state-operated water bank and not in use. 3

2.

De Genenl Rule is nat a Statute of Limitations Is Not Applicable to A Penon
Who is Simply Trying to Quiet Title to Property Which They Have Possession and
Title To.
Defendant, in support of her motion, cites no specific Idaho case that applies a statute of

limitations in the context of quiet title in the manner in which she alleges it should be applied
here. There is, however, a general rule under common law with respect to quiet title actions and
statutes of limitations that is applicable and on point in this instance. As a general proposition,
those in actual possession of real estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from seeking
to quiet their title. In the Utah case of Condor v. Hunt, 1 P.3d 558 (Utah App. 2000), the Utah
Court of Appeals stated the proposition thusly:
[W]e recognize the general rule is that those in actual possession of
real estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from
seeking to quiet their title; See, e.g;, Riddick v. Streett, 313 Ark.
706, 858 S.W.2d 62, 64 (1993); Mulctarin v. Barmby, 63 Cal.2d
558, 47 Cal. Rptr. 43, 407 P.2d 659, 660-661 (1965); Ankoanda v.
Walker-Smith, 44 Cal. App. 4th 610, 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 39, 42-43
(1996), review denied; Peterson v. Hopkins, 210 Mont. 429, 684
P.2d 1061, 1065 (1984); Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 138
(Okla. 1963). See also, 65 Am. Jur.2d Quieting Title Section 55
(1972). While no Utah case cited by the parties specifically adopts
this rule, a number of cases seem to assume that Utah adheres to it.
See, e.g., Rodgers v. Hansen, 580 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 1978);
Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 352-53, 81 P.2d 374,
3

See Plaintiffs' MSJ at p. 12.
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376-77 (1938). However, a definitive ruling on the question must
await a case in which it is more squarely at issue.

Id at 563 (citations in original). That anticipated case where it was squarely at issue came
around before the Utah Supreme Court in In re: Hoopiiaina Trust, 144 P.3d 1129 (Utah 2006).

In that case, two similar trust agreements had been prepared in 1974 for the settler of the trust.
These trust agreements were subsequently recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office in
that year. Both conveyed title to real property to the trusts. One of the trustees for the trusts in
their will provided for the property of the trust to pass through their will. When that trustee died
in 1997, the beneficiary appeared before the probate court and objected to the will being
probated in a manner inconsistent with the trusts. After that hearing, the beneficiary spoke with
the attorney for the estate, who told her that no trusts even existed, that the trustee who had
passed away had disinherited her, and that she had no interest whatsoever in that estate.

In 1998, the personal representative of the estate deeded the real property held in trust to
herself and to the attorney for the trust. The deeds were recorded at that time in the Salt Lake
County Recorder's office. Nothing further of note occurred in the dispute until August of 2004
when the plaintiffs were contacted by a private investigator hired to locate them by their current
counsel. That investigator informed them that they were in fact the beneficiaries of the trust and
put them in touch with their counsel. This was the first point at which the parties had confirmed
knowledge that the trust actually existed. On appeal, the court held:
We conclude that no statute of limitations applies to the plaintiffs'
claims seeking to quiet title to the real property held in Trust 1 and
Trust 2 because the relief plaintiffs seek in these claims is simply
to quiet an existing title to property of which they are already the
equitable owners against defendants' adverse claims.

Id at 1135. As support for this holding, the court stated as follows:
In American Tie"a Corp. v. City of West Jordan. 840 P.2d 757
(Utah 1992), we updated the framework for determining statute of
MEMORANDUM IN OPPosmONTO DEFENDANT'
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limitations issues in Utah. There, we again stated the four-year
catch-all statute of limitations applies to all causes of action, legal
or equitable, "in which affirmative relief is sought" or another
"more specific" statute of limitations does not apply~ Id at 760
(citing Branting, 153 P. at 1001).
Under this framework., it is clear that all actions, whether legal or
equitable, are subject to a statute of limitations in Utah. Id . . .
However, suits brought to quiet title to real property have always
been an exception to this rule. A true quiet title action is a suit
brought to "quiet an existing title against an adverse or hostile
claim of another," and "the effeet of a decree quieting title is not

to vat title. but rather to perfect an existin1 title as against
other claimants." State v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah
1979). Thus, the question becomes whether a claim is a true quiet
title actioa or whether the claimant really seeks other relief; if it is
a true quiet title action it is not subiect to a statute of
limitations. Courts must proceed cautiously when applying this
rule, however, for parties should not be able to void the statute of
limitations on other claims by simply disguising them as claims for
quiet title relief.
In re: Hoopiiaina Trust, 144 P.3d at 1137 (italics and citations in original, emphasis added).
Idaho appears to have adopted this kind of reasoning in the context of a void deed. In the
case of Argyle v. Slemaker, 585 P.2d 954 (Idaho 1978), the deed was allegedly void on the basis
that the description or some other aspect of it had been inserted after execution. In response. to
an argument that the statute of limitations prevented a quiet title action, the court rejected the
same and said as follows:
A statute of limitations is one of repose designed to put an end to
stale claims and was never intended to compel resort to legal
remedies by one who is in complete enjoyment of all he claims.
. . . Nor may it be used to transfer property from the true owner to
a stranger simply because the void tax deed was not challenged
within six years of the date of the recording. . . . Courts in sister
states have adopted the same principle, . . . which is reflected by
leading text writers ....
The logic of such review is inescapably correct. For otherwise the
recording of the deed resulting from such a proceeding would
transform the owner's absolute title in fee simple into a right of
action oiily, the exercise of which is subject to ttme Itm1tation. The
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANT'
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tax deeds constitute a cloud on plaintiff's title which should be
removed. When void tax deeds are attempted to be made prima

facie evidence of the regularity of the proceedings, equity will
interfere to permit removal as a cloud on title, ... which right may
be invoked by the owner in possession at any time as "such a right
is never barred by the statute of limitations. It is a continuing right
which exists as long as there is an occasion for its exercise." ...
The action to quiet title and to set aside the alleged void deed was
not barred by J.C. § 5-218 nor any other statute of limitations and
summary judgment on this grotmd was improper.
Id at 958 (citations omitted).
In the present case, the Browns' action to quiet title fits squarely within the language of

the quiet title provision in and of itself. Idaho Code § 6-401 provided, in pertinent part:
An action may be brought by any person against another who

claims an estate or interest in real •.• property adverse to him,
for the purpose of determining such adverse claim, provided that
all actions to adjudicate water rights and obtain a decree as to
water source, quantity, point of diversion, place of use, nature of
use, period of use, and priority as against other water users shall be
brought under the provisions of chapter 14, title 42, Idaho Code.
Id at 6-401 (emphasis added).

First, as a preliminary matter, this action, even though it involves a water right, does not
involve the adjudication of water rights as described in 6-401. The elements of the subject water
rights in this case (i.e., source, quantity, point of diversion, etc.) were decreed in the SRBA in
2000. Here the Browns seek confirmation from the Court that they are the owners of 100% of
the two water rights.
Second, Defendant Greenheart is making an adverse claim to Plaintiffs to a portion of
Plaintiffs' water rights based on a claim that she received them when she received a conveyance
of a certain portion of the property. Defendant Greenheart only recently asserted any claim to
the subject water rights when she acted to cause the Idaho Department of Water Resources to
state (on a non-binding basis) that the portion of the water rights at issue had been transferred to
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON TO DD'ENDANT'
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her. Thus, this is a classic case where the Browns are defending their title to their property and
the water rights appurtenant thereto against an adverse and newly asserted claim of title. The
undisputed facts are clear that when the Plaintiffs became aware that the record was unclear or
could imply that the rights had been transferred, they contacted the Defendant about it, and that
was the first time that the Defendant raised the issue with them or anyone else. The Plaintiffs
reacted promptly thereafter to bring this quiet title action.
Accordingly, this is a situation involving an adverse claim to real property owned by the
Browns, occurring in the present, and not one to which any statute of limitations should be
applicable.

3.

Defendant Has Picked the Wrong Statute of Limitations, as Idaho Code § 5-203
Would be the Statute of Limitations to Apply, If Any Apply
The Defendant claims that Idaho Code§ 5-224 or Idaho Code§ 5-216 are the applicable

statutes of limitation in this instance. Defendant ignores Idaho Code § 5-203 in her arguments.
That provision says:
No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of
the possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it appears that the
plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or grantor, was seized or
possessed of the property in question within twenty (20) years
before the commencement of the action; and this section includes
possessory rights to lands and mining claims.
Idaho Code§ 5-203.4
This statute is not found in any special section of the Code for "adverse possession", but
it is found directly among the statutes of limitation continued within Title 5, Chapter 2 of the
Idaho Code. As Title 5, Chapter 2 is organized, it first sets out the above-cited statute of
limitations for the recovery of real property, and then goes on to state:
The periods prescribed for the commencement of actions other
4

A water right is ''real property." Idaho Code§ 55-101(1).
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than for the recovery of real property are as follows [referring to
Idaho Code Sections 5-215 to 5-248).
Idaho Code§ 5-214 (emphasis added). The two statutes relied on by Defendants are within the
range cited by Section 5-214 (i.e., 5-224) and therefore, among the periods prescribed for the
commencement of actions "other than for the recovery of real property." However, in this case,
the recovery of the water rights at issue which Plaintiffs allege were not transferred is an action
for the recovery of real property and subject therefore to Idaho Code§ 5-203.
Although Idaho Code § 5-203 typically is seen as the basis for an adverse possession
claim once the 20-year prescriptive period has run, on its face it is the statute of limitations
allowing an affected land owner to bring a claim within the requisite time period to stop an
activity that otherwise would be deemed adverse possession. But by its terms it applies to any
"action for the recovery of real property." This statute is, therefore, plainly applicable to the
present situation and more specific to the issue at hand than the statutes cited by the Defendant,
in that it actually applies to actions for the recovery of realty. The claim in the present case
clearly has been brought within 20 years of when Defendant first made claim to the property at
issue (in 2012), regardless of whether the delivery of the deed or the Defendant's recent
statements asserting a claim to the water rights are considered to be the adverse claim. It is clear
"[w]here two statutes appear to apply to the same subject matter, the specific statute will control
over the more general statute." Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 419, 196 P.3d 325, 337 (2008).
4.

The Defendant's Conduct in Acting as if No Water Right Conveyance Had
Occurred Creates an Estoppel or Other Equitable Bar Against the Defendant Now
Raising Any Statute of Limitations.
Statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional and are therefore subject to waiver, estoppel

and equitable tolling. Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 48 P.3d 636, fn. 1 (Idaho 2002)(citing Zipes v.

Trans WorldAirUnes. Inc., 455 U.S. 385. 102 S.Ct. 1127. 721 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982).

MEMORANDUM IN 0PPOSmON TO DEFENDANT'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 9

338

The Defendant's conduct in this case was such that during the period of any potentially
applicable statute of limitations, she represented repeatedly and consistently to the Plaintiffs and
the Elmore County officials that she was not claiming any water rights had transferred to her.
Under such circmnstances, the doctrines of estoppel, waiver or other similar equitable doctrines
would bar her from now raising the claim.
It has been held that
a waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known
right and 'the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in
reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his
position to his detriment.'

Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323
(2008) Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006).

It has been noted in Idaho that:
The only non-statutory bar to a statute of limitations defense in
Idaho is the doctrine of equitable estoppel . . . . [T]he elements of
equitable estoppel [are] as follows: (1) a false representation or
concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive
knowledge of its truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not
know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false
representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be
relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the representation
was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and
acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice.
Equitable estoppel does not eliminate, toll or extend the statute of
limitations period; It merely bars a party from asserting the statute
of limitations as a defense. That bar does not last forever,
however. It lasts only for a reasonable time after the party
asserting estoppel discovers or reasonably could have discovered
the truth.

Ferro v. Society ofSaint Pius X, 149 P.3d 813, 816 (2006)(citations omitted, emphasis added).
In the present case, if the Defendant actually believed she owned the water rights, then
she made several false representations or concealments of that material fact with constructive
knowledge of the truth. Specifically, she indicated to both the Plaintiffs and the County after the
MEMORANDUM IN OProsmoN TO DEFENDANT'
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sale that she did not have a water right. From these statements after the fact, it is easily inferred
that she intended not to obtain a water right at the earlier time of sale. Cf Pflueger v. Hopple,
156 P .2d 316 (Idaho 1945) ("constructive notice" of fact ordinarily means that person knowing
other facts, from which it is concluded that he knew or should have known fact in question,
should be held to have knowledge of such fact). Her statements that she owned no water rights
were entirely consistent with the Plaintiff Browns' understanding that the water rights had not
been transferred. Therefore, the Browns did not know the alleged ''truth", i.e., that despite her
statements to the contrary, the Defendant actually considered the water rights to have been
conveyed. Th.ere was no reason for the Plaintiffs to investigate the matter. Where would they
have looked to discover the Defendant's contrary intent or claim? Would the Defendant have
given them a different statement at that time? It was also foreseeable that the false representation
or concealment of the truth would be relied upon in that the Defendant was attempting to gain a
tax benefit by making the statements to the effect that she had acquired no water rights. Finally,

the Plaintiffs had no reason to believe they would need to file any lawsuit to confirm their
ownership and thereby relied and acted upon the representations that the Defendant was claiming
no water rights to their detriment. Accordingly, all elements of an equitable estoppel are present.

In this case, the evidence of equitable tolling permits only one conclusion. As the Idaho
Court of Appeals noted in Mason v. Tucker & Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App.

1994):
Th.us, estoppel would operate to toll the statute of limitation on
Mason's claims only until Mason or his attorney had acquired
knowledge of the facts or gained possession of sufficient evidence
from which either of them reasonably could have discovered the
deficiencies in the transcript.
Ordinarily, a question of when the falsity of the representation or
concealment should baye been discoyered is a Question of fact for
the jury. Nonetheless, when only one reasonable conclusion can
MEMORANDUM IN OProsmoN TO DEFENDANT'
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be reached from the uncontroverted evidence, the issue may be
resolved by the court on summary judgment.
Id at 851-52. See also Tingley v. Harrison, 87 P.2d 960, 965 (Idaho 1994)("Estoppel may

prevent a defendant from asserting the statutory bar when his representations or conduct dissuade
a plaintiff from prosecuting a cause of action during the period of limitation").

In the case of Anderson v. Anderson, Kaufman, Ringert & Clarie, Chartered, 775 P.2d
1201 (Idaho 1989), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a district court's ruling that a partner in a
partnership was not equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations against his
partner's claims that he had misappropriated funds that had been paid to the partnership over the
years. Specifically, the court noted that the mere fact that firm members were charged with
knowledge of what was in the corporate books and records and that they could have discovered
the failure to report the excluded fees by examining daily time records was not enough to avoid a
material issue of fact of whether they could have discovered such information by looking at the
firm records. Thus a jury trial and jury verdict against the party seeking to rely on the equitable
estoppel was appropriate.
An analogous example of constructive knowledge sufficient to potentially evoke estoppel

is found in the case of Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho
1982). There, an architect's statements on several occasions that the separation and cracking in
the mortar that was the subject of the lawsuit was allegedly due to normal expansion and
contraction and should be of no concern, when in reality the problems were caused by the
architect's own failure to provide proper expansion protection, resulted in an inference that the
architect who had designed and supervised construction of the building "had actual or
constructive knowledge of the failure to provide the necessary expansion protection and the
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[plaintift] had no architectural expertise, and cannot be held to be required to discover the
absence of expansion protection." Id at 347.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, material issues of fact preclude a grant of summary judgment in
favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs believe that summary judgment in their favor is in fact merited.
DATED this

..21

$t"

day of December, 2012.

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Thomas E. Dvorak
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown

CER1!~ATE OF SERVICE

this~December,
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Victor Villegas
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Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610
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Michael C. Creamer
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Attorney1 for Defendant
IN THI DISTRICT COURT OJ THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT or
THE STATE or IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or ELMORE

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, Husband and Wife,

CASE NO. CV 2012·353

REPLY IN SUPPORT or
DEPENDANT'S 'MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintift's,

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
OREENHEART. an individual.
Defendant.

Defendant, Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenhcart, by and through her attorney of record,
Victor Villesas and Borton Lakey Law Offices, submits this Reply in Support of Defendant•s

Motion for Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT

I. The Groundwater Wu Tramferrecl To Greenheart Throup The Warranty Deed and
Therefore The Statute of Limitations Applies.

Drown ltlUft that the aroundwater was not transferred to Ofeenlieart Via the Warranty
Deed because the parties did not intend to transfer the water. In support of this araument Brown
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 1

'343

Dec. 28. 2012 9:57AM

st Carlton Ave

No. 5020

P. 3/7

reincorporates their arguments in their motion for summary judgment that the phrase 'with

appurtenances' is ambipus and therefore Brown is permitted to Introduce extrinsic evidence of
the parties alleaed intent. From this, Brown argues that the statute of limitations does not nm

aaainst party who is in poaaeaaion of property, and therefore, since Brown still hu possession of
the aroundwater, the statute of limitations does not apply to him.
Brown' 1 arguments on this issue misapply established Idaho law in an attempt to fit the

facts of thia case. The facta show that the Warranty Deed conveyed the groundwater to

Oreenheart by operation of law. More importantly, the extrinsic evidence Brown attempts to
introduce in their motion for summary

Judament

is prohibited by the parol evidence rule.

Greenheart restates and incorporates her arguments set forth in Dlfendant 11 M•morandum In
Oppo1ltlon To Summary Judgm111t paaes 1 tbrouah 7 and briefly restates her araument herein.

First, where a deed. contains the typical appurtenance lani1JIP, it is not ambiguous as a
matter of law as Brown hu araued. S11 Koon v.

Em~,

40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097 (1924). On the

contrary, Empey specifically holds that a deed containing such lanaua&e is not ambiguous, and
therefore the parol evidence rule prohibits a party from introducing extrinsic evidence. "[It] ls an
elementary rule for the construction of deeds. the lanauaae of which is plain and unambiguous,
that, in the absence of fraud or mistake, the intention of the parties must bo ascertained. from the
instrument itself••..Paro! evidence la not adml11tble for •uc:b purpo1e." Id. (emphasis added).
Second, it has long been recognized by Idaho courts that "a water right is an

appurtenance to the land on which it bas been and will pass by conveyance of the land." Russell
v. Irish, 118 P. 501, 502 (1911 ). "[A] division of a tract of land to which water is appurtenant.
without segregatina or reservfna the water right, works a division of such water right in
.proportion as the land is divided." Hunt v. Bremer 216 P. 964, 965 (1929). Idaho courts also

rec:ognize that evon when a warranty deed fails to mention "water rights.. or "appurtenances" it
REPL.Y MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT• 2
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does not prevent water rights appurtenant to the land from being conveyed with the real property.
Baglq v. 'Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 803, 241P.3d972, 976 (2010).
In 1his cue, the Warranty Deed did not reserve any around water

riahts. but instead

contained the typical appurtenance language that had the legal effect of transferring the water to
Oreenheart along with the land. Moreover, Brown bu not alleaed bud or mistake that would

allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence to chanae the express intent in the Warranty Deed.
In the end, these two legal conclusions establish that it is Oreenheart who is actually in

posseuion of the aroundwater and hu title to the land u well. Since Brown is not in possession
of the aroundwater and, in fact transferred title to Oreenheart throuah the Warranty Deed. Brown
cannot apply the rule of law that the statute of limitations is inapplicable to a party in possession

.

seeking to quiet title. Based on this analysis, the Browns' reliance on the holdiqs in Condor v.

Hunt, 1 P.3d SS& (Utah App. 2000) and Arl)'l• v. Sl1maker, S8S P.2d 954 (1978) is moneous;
the cues are distinsufshable and therefore have no application to the case at bar.

D. ldabo Code S.edon 5-203 11 The Wrona Statute Of Limltatlon1.

Brown argues that the statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code Section S-203 allows
Brown to maintain this action within 20 years and therefore this action ls timely. Brown
misapplies Idaho Code Section S-203 because (1) that statute is the adverse possession statute
and is therefore inapplicable to the facts of this cue; and (2) even if it were to apply Brown has

not complied with that statute.
Section 5-203 is the statute applicable to an adverse possession case, which is why there
is a perquisite that a plaintiff be in posaessiott or seized for the statutory period of time. The
cases applying this statute deal exclusively with establishing title through a period of occupation

for a requisite time petjod. AlthouP Brown styles their case as a quiet title action. the gravcman
of this lawsuit deals with a request to this Court to interpret the Warranty Deed and Purchase and
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFeNCANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 3
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Sale Agreement to determine whether water was conveyed via those documents. Tho counts set
out in the Complaint ask for declaratory relief to interpret the documents. not to determine

whether either party hu established title through adv~ possession. As a result, Section 5·203
does not apply to this case.

Second, even lt Section 5·203 did apply to this case. Brown has not complied with the
requJrements of the statute. Section S-203 states in pertinent part:

No action for the recovery or real property, or for the recovery of the
possesalon theteo£ can be maintained, \mlea it appears th!t the plaintiff. his
•nm1tar. Pmtm1sor or cantor. WM aeizesi or ao•Mued of ihe PfQ'RWlY in
auestion within twenty (20) years before commencement of the actign; and
this section includes possessory riahts to lands and minfna claims.
Idaho Code § 5·203 (underllnlna added). The underlined language and the cue law applyin1 the
statute requires that the plaintiff have wrongful or adverse possession of the property for at least
20 years blfml commenclna an action. This 20 year period cannot include any period where the

plaintlif may be in rlahtful possession of the property.
In this cue. Brown is the plaintiff and bu not adversely possessed. the disputed

groundwater for 20 years prior to brinaJna this action. As discussed above. the Wammty Deed
conveyed the gr0undwater to Oreenheart because it was not reserved or otherwise exempted in
the Deed. Greenheart currently is, and has been in possession of the water for over 5 years now

whereas Brown has never been in possession since the execution of the Warranty Deed.
Therefore, Brown has failed to meet the requisite 20 year period of adverse possession of the
aroundwater prior to commencing this lawsuit.

m.

E1toppel And Other Equitable Prlndplet Do Not Apply To Bar The Statute Of
Umltadon1.

Brown provides no reasonable argument why equitable estoppel should toll the statute of
limitations. Brown also misapplies other equitable principles to the facts of this case.
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In Oreenheart's Memorandum In Support of Summa1)1 Judgment she argued that
equitable estoppel can only toll the statute of limitations for so lona u the party could not
dhcover tho truth. "[T]he application of equitable estoppel to preclude a statute of limitation
defense may be made only for so long u the plaintiff did not know and could not discover the
truth." Mason v. Tucklr and Al.roclat11, 125 Idaho 429, 433-434, 871 P.ld 846, 850 • 851
(1994). The party relying upon the acts of another who is to be estopped must be excusably

iporant of the true facts. Alder v. Mountain Stat11 T1lqhon1 & T1l1graph Co., 92 Idaho 506.
446 P.2d 628 (1968).

Hen, Brown has provided no lfiUMtm refb.tfn1 Oreenheart' s analysis that Brown could
not have 'discovered the truth' on both the written Ianauaae of the Purchase and Salo Agreement
and the Warranty Deed. Brown has not pointed this Court to my action showina that durina the
.11111.Oreenheart misled Brown, made statements to Brown or prevented Brown from readina the

· plain lansuage of those document! before they signed them. Since Idaho law requires a party to
expressly reserve water from the deed, Brown could have easily seen that at the time the parties

sianed it, there was no reservation language in the deed with respect to groundwater. It simply
cannot be said that Brown could not discover the truth at the time they sipd the Deed. As a
result, there is no material issue of fact whether Brown could not discover the truth so as to toll
the running of the statute of limitations.
Brown strains to focus this Court's attention to the post sale closing conduct of
Gteenheart relative to her tax appeal with Elmore County, but those actions have no bearln1 on
the application of my equitable theories to bar the statute of llmltatiom. After the Warranty
Deed wu sip.eel and delivered, the groundwater was already transferred to Oreenheart. The post
sale representations by Greenheart to Elmore County did not prevent Brown from knowina the
truth. The

Ianauaao in the Warranty Deed did not change after the sale.

The Wmanty Deed
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lacked languap resel'\ina the groundwater. and Bro\\1' could ha\·e easily discovered that this

lanauaae \\'U lacking after the sale u well as at the time the)· sianed the Warranty Deed.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the undisputed facts and the arguments set forth above. Greenehart
mpectfull)' requests that the Court srant her Motion for Summar)· Judgment.

DATED this 2:l_ day of December. 2012.

BY•

Victor Villep.'7
Attorneysfor Dtfandant
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Michael C. Creamer
Thomas £. Dvorak
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Michael C. Creamer (ldoho Stace Bar ID# 4030)

Thomu..B. Dvoraldldabo·Statt.aar U:>,. S0-3)

Telephone:

Facsimile:

BA:tGAn, .....f'"

.

OIVBNS PtJRjJ;£y r..~:
601 We..<Jt Bannock Street
i>d*t Oftietf'Sol'272.0· ....
Boise, Idaho 83701-2110

CLERK

~·...., ->

t ·~LE

u-..._

Of THEC~
DEPUTY

208-~8Sw1200

·2081ot~gs..1300

1~9...1 (0543·3)

Attorneys .for Plaintif!s .Ja~ and· Christine Brown

IN

ma DISflUCI' COUKT OF1"HB· POUR.TH JUDlCIA,L DISTRICT FOR THE.
STATE.OF. IDAHO, IN AND FOR THB.CptJNTY OF .BLMORB:

JAY BROWN·and CHRISTJNB.HOPSON·
BR:OWNr husband Ind win\.
Plaintifft,

Cao.No.. CV'-2012.3·53
.

REPLY IN· SllPtoltT OF
PL"1NT1FF.St MOTION FOR

StJMMARY JUDGMENT.

.

v.
AND
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
OREENHBART, an indi'ViduaJ.

RES.PONSE IN ·OPPOSmoN·To

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

O~fendant.

STRIKE PORtlONS OF
AFFIDAVIT OP JAY JI. BROWN
AND TERRI LaltlA MANDUCA

Ptaintfffi, through their attorneys Oiv"1ll

Pursl~· LLP

aubmit this. Reply in Support of

Plaintiffs' Motion fot· Summary Judgment- ~d Rcspot\$8 in;OplJQsitkm to °"fenqant'~· M~tion «i
Strike·Porth;ma. of Affidavit·of ~ay. :a. Bf9wn ~Tani Lal\ac·~~duca.

lNTRODVtTt'ON'
Oc~dant . argues:

1) the-subject watetrlabtt .were.~enut to .th«:l'.Oreertheart Property

as of the. 2007 .c6n.\toyance;. and therefore, the. deed's htclusion. of th~ words "together

~ith.

appurtenances" ncocssarily included \\'.ater rights; 8.l'd 2.) extrinsic c,videocc cpncem.ing..the
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riahta were appurtenant to the Oreenhcart Property aa of the

conveyance. and. solely-and exclusiyely-in reliance. on Koon v, &rpyt 40 Idaho 6, 23 J P.
1.097 {1924) araues. that the.Ule oflhe word '•appurtenances":in the deod conveys water rlll\tl.by
~tion ~f'taw

and hence extrinsic evi~· showtn1 the partiol•· fntont. that no water ri~ta

woultr l;e conveyed

cannot

bo eohildett!d. Th• «rgumentJ fail to account· for· the. Idaho

deciaiona.·(ihd in· Other weatem af*tea) hc)ldlnfthat ~lns·"topther with appurtenan~;, in a deed

<Joes ~at (a) cott~ey water· riahtt ~at .... not ~t wh~

t!:'.• deed i1. ~~~.. Of (b)

~vey illl)f a.pp~~t wat~ ti~~ .thaf ci~~cea ~ .the. time· of execution ,,bow wore.not

fntc>ndecJ· io bo ·con~· .Olvon .th• undiaputecl relevarit· racts and ldliho C4ae 1aw, Defendant l•
wt.ons. on bQth.coUl\tlj.and.-9\m'lmal'y ~u.dgrnent should.be :arantod as .requested· by Phunti~
nn11.telated Motiorr t~ Strike- it ~ solely 9n pefendant'~J.~ .rell~cc;t o~. ~"JJ!<IY

for ~ P.J'OP'?~O~ that eyt:denco ~f ~c .p~~cs• i~~ eon.cem~g. ~eih~· !tlter rlP,l\9 ~ere
int~dQd
ro. be con~. by a deed that. ts silent as to
.
conv~ying

Water rights. but inch.ides tatlpat

the.'Jaftd wwgether with appttttemtnc•" may taot ·be cou.idcred ·by tho.court. Rather

than clutter·up the nrcord an IUimnMJ judgment with.yet anr.1ther·brief, Plaintiffs haye elect~ t~

combine thei.r btjeftng. on that. point with this reply in support o.r tummary judgment. Tho fact
that the holdfu.1.ill Em,,_,. is not ~ Ia~ likewise provides grounds to 4eny Dofendant11· Motion
to Strike in its entirety•.
ARGUMENT

1. Whetbcr a Wgter Ri&ht Passes in a. Land Conymncc Jlemmds on Wbetber the Water
Riahi it Nm,wtenant. llld Abmm& DD Emm grant m: R§Crvatiim s>! Wiler Riahts in the·
Deed· on Whether the Parties IDtended Amrurtenant Watu Biabll :be Conveyed,

m

Defendant•.s sole reliance on Empey is misplaced because the Empey is incons.istent with aU
prior and subsequent decisions of the Idaho Supreme .Court on the issue.. Those Idaho decisions

comport with tlie ;majorify of ttie prior appropriation stateS on. me lcg&l issues presenfe& h~. In

'/ °'!"' 31 ~12
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includes the words "together with

appurtenancea." absent~ ex.press racrvatfon or grant of'watcr riahts•. the issue.of whother ·water
rights.J*I with the·Jand ·turns.on: 1') wbetm;r.1ho.·fishtt·at issuo are inf~ appurtenant to. tho.land

at inue; ~·~) ·u;e.parttoa~ iDtcnt.
A. DlD·&bi@i water dghtl were.not mta\1tlADIDt to the Qreenhcaa bopert)!.

Jn Idaho,.a ·water
right .exist&·.solely. by referonco·to
the boneftciaJ uae actually made .of the
.
.

water. Idaho Const.i. art. XV,

t

3; Idaho Code • 42·101. Whether a water

right ts an

aptNrtenance to. l'mid. hinges on whether it is a neceesary i.ncidfn,'lt.'O( end beneticially. ~ed. in
I

I

c0Mection with, theJ~d. ldal'lO Coclo f 42.. JOl, pl'O'Yfd.• tha~
•...• the. right·~.~. ·U~',of ~Y .gf~e . ~bile watert,.wliidt have heretofore been or
may heteaft~·~·i.llomd t1r bfttidatly applied.. stun trot. lSe.c:ongidtted as..l*n1
a property risht .in itself,. but 1uoh right ahall become ·a .complement ·of, or one .6f
the lppun~ce.: of, flier lll'ld or ;Otlier . thing. to which, ·through netebtfy, .said
water right 1$ being *Pplled.
·

(Bmpbaiit added): U.nder thia.tWUte,. a w.atcr right is .appurtenant.only to J.anb u~. which it js,
of netesaity, .aPRlied to \xnl~~al .use.
C9~i.~ont.with 1.a~o. Code§
addrassln1
. 42··10.1,. f~9"QOurt.decisions
.
.
.
. whetli«·a·walltt·riaht

is. a~urtenant· to lllld all hinge on whether. water aclVilJy· is.. of nt)Cf$ity, used ·to benefit ihC
land. ~' e:g;;· Jod1?1' v.· Dal!; 15 Idaho 137, 9~ P. 65$ (1908) .(~though a

'Y••

right~·

originally appurtenant· to whole·mnch, ''the.inquiry,~ to ~c-par_tl~rar lat;ld1 ~ wbich.w~ ~pt
ia·ap~ant.must. tum upon the :uso and applh::ation.of water as the same existed af thc.dime•the

[mortgage] was executed.');. RuueJl. v. Jrula, 20 Idaho 194, 118 P. 501. (191 l) (water right. is

appurtenant to the land on which it actually is used. and on1y·that portion of the ~tet which.had
been continually used on the land up to the time of ·the conveyance was

lend);. Empey, 40

I~o

transf'~

y.'ith the

at 9, 231P.at1099 (where evidence showed that water. was necessary

tbr am µse of the land, mid ;11.aving been used· to :inigate.the fauds.at:the tin>ePofcen+eymee encl
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sevoral years prior, the water bocamo appurtenant to the land"). Plaintiffs are aware.of no Idaho
decision holdin9 a water right to be . app)ll'tenant to land b_. solely on a ,prior decretf, or where
it .may have. been·used in the past. or where it..may· be uaed in the.filture. Rathert l~aho decisions

and

~t~ 1iase ~ppurten~

on. ~al '&eneftdal use on tpee(flo. land at· the ·time ·of

Jl.'cl8Hll'll. .Jri&ht alsa held thlt..IdiihO Cbde § 35-603 (fQrmotty Rev.. COd'e f 3'1 H). des:cri~

tho·txtent.to· :whid,t wttw :righta are. ~t ~·~to~ in a I~ ~nv~ct .ab~t
ovid~qf.~.fn~t. Id., 2~ 1a·~at.·%~, qs.i;.. at SO), ld.aho·Code f s~.staies:

A. lnn'.lsfOr. of' real property passoa ·ail .casements Jiltaehcd thereto, and areutos ifr
favOt 1h&'e0f awi ~ent to
other real properiy of ~e person whose estate Is·
transfarred, Iii· tlie.taflle ittari•er aud ta di• 1ame atcin.fd.:mell property w11·
.obvl.Oa91y ·and .permanentlf·used by dte penon whose estate Is transferred,
tor th' ~ileflt thonof, •t die :ume. ,Vh'en the vaster wu· ~greed upon ~r

'*'

compteted1 .

(Emphallis added). 1 Paddock v. Clafk, 22 Idaho 49'84.503, 126·P. lOS3,.10S6 (1912.);;held that a

water right "is.an appurtenance to.thcdand irrigated by the U$o.of·~ch "'!atcr;» The Court, citing
to .R~sell, restated the rule tJJat onc:e water becamc·an . appumnancc. to the lant4.'"the·convcy.ance

of tho tan~, 'togeth~ witb tho appurtenances,." would convey not. only the land, but tho· wa~
right ·at>Purtenant .t'.Q said Jand. unleu .if appeared .by tbe terms of the conveyanc• that .such right
was reserved or tltat it II cleirly lhoWD by the evidence that botb parties tntondad

~OC

to

lndude..sald water J'.'laht by. nch eonve)'ance;•'· Ifj. ~2 Idaho.at s·o4, 126 P. ~· 1054 {Emphasis
added).
Here it .is undisputed that none. of .the. water :that' ii- thi int~j~ of the1e water rights' ha. ·been·
benefiaatly .used ol'l the 60 .acres purchaeed by Ma. Oreenheart since. at. l~t 1986.~· Priq.r to:·an<t

s.,,

Joyce L/.ll(tllt.oek y, rJnllM Statt1. 144 Jdlbo 1. 1Jr j 56' p;3d. 502 (2010) (acknowledsfn1.tlnlt·by. att11oU; :water
rlabtund uwnent1·1pr!l'. wffici@tly ahnilar to hawuyiieyont low •m»isulo ta euemon11 gRPIY to appyrtnntwatot
1

1rights.

.. .

"

"
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at the time of tho conveyance by,Brow.ns i.n 2.007, the Oree,nhoart Property wu dry, undeveloped

araztn1 land with. no access to ·water or a means· to .apply water·to ~Y beneficial uso.. No .water
right wa necetsarY. to the ~

or· ~e Oreenheart: Property., wbioh &oth Plain'tift' aild Ddfet1dant

Indisputably understood .was .beiha conv.eyed u dry land. Siftce .the con~eyan~ the Oteen.heart
Pfoperfy·ha1· .,._held ai\d leucd by the Defendam as· dry

represent:ed

arazina land only. Defendant h~

ta J.ilm.ore County that ahe .purch~ the land ~th "no JcaaJ water, ri'ahtt~ .-strictly

~. amtna ~..... and.~ ~ M~• ·n.ot ~d will ~t ~e l~a,ated

ript
. . l•. .purchaaed
.

unleu at such .time a wat~

tor ·:the.~
by [l>.rerkiairt].'J ·Ddfelidlnt aJso. represented
.
.

Countr onlcbU'• tbat''''it tl1~· tltrio of· the purchaae. I

w• alao vsr.r aware

to

mmoro

that.~· p,~el. ~· da:Y

s;razh:ag dnly. .due to lack of irrigation syatctn ~ n.o· water ti. .;• Tho irrlgati0n
water
.
. . .rlght:I
. at
.
.
i..-U~ ha rfimpJy·~ ~ot ~ o~ f:ltl in.cid~ ~f,. or· n~ary .to the uso of. tho .Oreenheari.
Property ~ ~vcyed'.

Under U!OSCt undilputed tacts and .Jd~ law. the- gUbJ«oCt water rlghta

w=-o
. not appurtaanttn the ~eatt P~y·at tho.tid of'.cot.rVeymc,.
.
Tbc.2000 SR.BA Court.decree. fot water ril&hts.:61·21.88.and 61-71':1 authorized Pl~ntiff$ ~

irrigate no .m~ .than 2~7

ICl'CI· Within. their
•

not, however, determine or direct wbi9h.
thereb~inalcc their

!

entire. original 320~acro property. the decram did
•

act•

water rights appurtenant to.

'

~c

•

o'

I

•

00

I

Browns could elect to cultivate, itrl.gato ·llld·

Attlidilgh the.d~ pennitmd the divenian and

use of,water somc'Whb·within the 320 a~ property, nowhere in. the decrees do they .QOnflrm
that the water rights were !lppurtenant to specific lands ;ivithin. the .3-20 acres, lat aiono to lands

upon which the water riFts were.not, would not,. or~· not.bo beneficially used. &111 JOl3lyn
>Elc.hibit 0 to Cornpl.U.t.

• E:xbibtt 1 to Complalnt.

Defendant, .who hu pmChaed otbernlll property .in ~.aric:t...prlot apptopdation stata.ot
Idaho ind NeYada, u..u that.she did not"wtdentand the 1ep1 import or.tbi..tmn ~ rtahtt.. When W'tlsole to
use. tho lem1in.hot1evwa1· reptoeontationt lo Elmore.dounty .~tffcfala that w·~ .thct Jud a'I <Jty 1a'nd 'without
water rflhts and would haw to purchase ..V.tot ri~1Q ltripte ft, Sbl dOOS,nq&.'drt,.~. tbat 1~'dicf.ft0t'
••
·10 I le of:ln·itrl don· . ,. u·~ a1io re ..-nWd thcr
subject property .to be 5Jmore County. Defendarit'I ~ pOlt · tltioni mition· ·
·
:
or IGpl lom1• Mo ohoac.\Q uae l19bjectively W11'8asomh1o.ltt Ught .ofihe r.indfspUti«l £aota:in .the~
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v. Daly, 15 Idaho at 14.5,, 96. P. at S70 (in determining if any water rights orisinally appropriated
for entire ranch p~ as. an appurten.an~. at ~ime of co~ce. .tho tnquiry :tum& on tho use

IUld

applicati~n of water on a portion of' the original ranch as il existed· et the titne of . ,

conveyartce)~

Wid lf'ater Rlg!W .in ni. Wat1r.n Stt11#$.· 3d ed., §~2; p. S.88 (19U) .(Ii wi.ter right

is ._,pwunattt .only- to such Janda of a large tract. u had been actually irrifiated from it, and a
water dght ls incidenW or appurt~rumt co the land w~en by ·right used ~ith the land ~r its
bencftt).
In any
' .....
. ~ent.
..
.$R.9A. p~l}l
. ' decrees
.
. (l()flfirm. the .exJatence,. natute and extent of water

ri'ghta ~n.Jy ae ~f'fhe date the partial ·d~ it i..Ued, Wh'icb ·ltl thi• cue was se.ven. years before

Dtsfon&nt pUfdined the 60 a~·of desert liutd. '*A partial decre.e·i•·not,.conctusive·as-ta any
p<>st..adjudicatJt;m· circumstanCOJ ()'/ ~t."luthOri~ chanps

Ruerv. :D#t. 1'{o.. ~ ~' fDWR, 14~ Jdah.~:S'G~~
lda.lu:Y~·s.·requirement
'Of'a~·
uso
.
.

m. ~ta· 'lSl~cnt~.~i

~':t!frit:an .fall~·

•:71, t.~4~,3d ·0~.;. ~7· (2007,).

and .necessity for a. watcr·rijlt
to.
. tb bccX>tn.c apptinemant
.

land is consiatcait wUh· the neta.i.1:i of appurtenanel!$ gcmendty1 and With detj$ions throughout.the:

prior appropriation. states. See FJl,:ii/l- v. Leaky. 14 P. 19.8, 199 (Cal . .188·7) (water ,itght
a~rtenant ·\yhen· ad'Qally us~ to irrig~· ~~:1'114 atJd ri~~ to land'$
\JSe);
.
. . Pet)7*e

v. .

Cummings~ 80 P..626,. 622 (Cat; 19'0S)·(~afa:obtained: speoific&Jly tor use on iand . and·neceilwy
fur itl.uac becomes part: and parcel thetetO);.Brlgg.t

v. Mutrap.. 69 P. 76.5; 17·1 (Wash•. 19()2)

(emuil and w.ater. right found appurtenant to "mill. property wh,m canal

comtru~cd

and always

used to benefit mm property and mill wholly ·dependent on can.al and water ·right to be operated)~

81"0olta, ~· W.ut, 69 .P. 630, 632 (Wash. 1902) (~othing passes by tho word '.•appurtcmance~~ except
such· rights .as arc strictl~ necessary and essential to ·the proper cnjoyriicmt of· the estate granted);
Crawford v,. Minn. and Montana Land & lmpr. Co., 38 P. 713 (Mont. 1894) (water right. and
canal oot appurtenant to lands conveyed where at. time··of'purchase. canal was not connected to

the en3oyme11f .6r .use Of me

land, and no Water was being Used on are land through t21e· canst),

35~
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Sl.mmoM v. Winters, 27 P. 7 (Or. 1.891) (where. water rijbt was being use:d to irrigatcl~d.at time

of conveyance and without water land w_as of.little. value. the water .right was .appurtenant .to the
extent of actual ~·and n.ecenity)...

B. ft:uardlm af tbt Ua of the WJ>td.I ::Tolitbm:· With APJ)Utlemln._., in .... PeecL tho
Ougtion ·ot Whethet Water Rights PW<Tums· Eit.bcr pn Whether They m Bxpregly
Imtgd ill bl Dud•.nt u: l')ot £ipq11Jy Tr,ated. l'hc;n, All tba P1rties, Intent Based
on Circumtianoes et the·Timo gf tb; Conveyance.
Defendant cftcs exclusively to Empey to argue that the parties'· itJtartiona and

circumstances surrounding their transaction arc inadmissible to establish whether water rights
pass in a conveyance of real property. Defend.ant ignores ·the. numerous· Idaho decisions to tne
contrary both befOl'."·and after Empey.
In Empey, ~11ich was a 3.."2 dccisiort, the water right! ·hid been appropnuted for .and

continually \lied .on land· conveyed by appellant Olive to Respondent Koon up until the time of
the 1905. conveyance. Thereaft~ the-rights .continlied to be used on the .I.and by Koon. Id., 14
Idaho at 9...lJ.

In Koon's suit to quiet tide to the water- rights after Olive .attempted'

administratively to move them elsewhere,. Olivo asserted ownetship throu~ c«:tvel'Se possession.
Id~ 40 Idaho at·

Jtt Oliv.er never dlspUtcd the ~urt's

findings tb~t·the water right$' had been

bel\Oficially used to· grow crops on the. land prior to its conveyance, that tho land

wa~

contin\10U$ly irrigated by his grantee to ~w crops: thereafter, or ~~t wa~er ~as necessary .to

~o Jfmited

issue. bcrorc .the .Empey coutt wu ..whether the trial court should. h1\Ve allowed

evi~ce.

ahowina the deed was not intended by either party to include those water

wc.trittsi«l

riQhts ac;tu~y u!IC!d to irrigate, the .land before and after the conveyance. Id. at 14. In concludfua
that O'.nly an C't~.
reservation.
withholds
water right
'
. .
. .. ' an. admittedly
.. .. appurtenant
.
~

'

'

'

tur.ri.Y .tt1fr.Pi.At~ttr'F'j.M'or10N 1()1\ St11~(MARY.JUOGMKl'ff
AND
M01'J()NTO
.
'
. J)KJ!ltNDAN'i''s
.
' .'
. .STIUKE.
. . 7
'
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anomalous decision in Idaho and elsewhere. Tho two dinenting justices. in that .case. after citing

to the rule expressed in· Ru.r1ell v. lrlsh (th.,. same rule. recognized a recently as 2007 ~Y the
Idaho Supreme Court, an irifra) were ..of the opinion that the Jowcr «Ntt'1 decisio.n "ihoutd be
~era~ an~ ~~ed. wit~ in.muctions fo
extri~~io evidence

a,ranf ~· new .trl·al .and permit the introdUction 6f

to show the real transaction tiefwcetl' the parttes." Id.

at. 1,

23.t P. at 1J00

(WUUiatn· A ....IM and Budge, JJ. dinenting).

Rralell· ,.., /rlilt.

'1JfJ.IJ.I, .d~dC!(I

l1lrte YG$1'$ befo~ ~y. l~oJved tl'.te q':leati~ of

wl\~ a water
the.Jand
conveyed~.
. . rlgb.t:~·ttppurtenant:to
..
..
,. and
.

if'·aa. to wh-.t extent the right
'

wa oonvoy«i 'by a deod lttcJudfog ~'togetlier wit11 appurtenan•A- lti.hl\iilp. The Court held the.
deed· included oilly "the Wa.ter·rlgh1: apPurtCl'l'.ant 'l~ tho- land o.t th~. tim.c of the ~nveyanoe ~l~
it wes·specitlcally ~ervcd in. the ~ o' ~t c.~ (?t clearly 1howu dla~ .~t

"1••· ~~wn. ~o ~~th

partl" f:hat.tll• w~~r r . .t:~•' ~~.,tate•~~ to ~ conv~~~ Id~, 20 Jdaha ai ~·9s;: l 18 P~·ai

502. .(cmphuis
added)'. Und~ Rus~ell•. pamcs. may..preseni; and ·tti~ ..trlal c6Utt·mfiy. consider~ ·all
'
facts and clrcum.stances bearlttg

on. Uid. i'UimtS~ intent coticeming watot rights when:, a deed

irioludes general "together wi.th appurtenilrlces" language.. Other .Idaho decisions compo~ w\~
this.

If Emp«y, indeed rcpre.scntcd a

~hange

in the law ftoJ'.l1 Rwsell posited by Defendanrs-

counsel•. it took scarcely two months for the Idaho Supreme. ~Utt- to implicitly ov.crrule it.

Molony v. .Davta,..40 Idaho 443, 233 P. 1000 (1925), ~sued two months•fter Empey,,held a water
right becomes appu1 tenant to .land when used. on or in. .connection t~th, and passes with the
realty to which it .is appurtenant unless there is intentkm to .the contrary.

Id., 40 ·Idaho 449;:-233

P.. at 1001.' Likewise, in Bothwell v. Keefer, S3 Idaho ·6S$;. 663., 27 P.2d·6S, 67 . (1933), which
analyzed the decisions in Idaho and other western states,. the Court. held "the correct rule
s Citfna W'Jet, 'fValu Rights 'lit tM 'Wutmt Slota, 3d ed., .fSS2, p. S89 ( 191 l)(quoted ir(frtu.t: p. J0); Cooper v.
$halmo11~'36
. .. . Colo. 91•. 8, P; 175 (1906)•
REPLY· RE: Pl:iAil'4TJPF~s MO'TION FOR'SUMMARY JtlOOMoo AND Dl:PEM>i\N't'ts MOTION" T(J sr~nu: . . 8
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ded.uciblo from an anal~is of the statute& and decisions treatin& of the nature of water rights is

that.ulal. It af'fltmatl\tei)' appean to the coJlttlry, directly or by lmpUcattou, a. ';\\'a.tel' rigb.t
ls attached equally with thd land to which it. is. app~~ thouah tho land ~tone:is.,specilied' in
~writ or·ret\ltn.of~~~... (~p~aai,s. a~ed).

''.fw{cein
has again. repeated the ho1ding itt Ru1JeU.
.
. recent times. the Idaho :Supreme.Court
.
'•

making lt clear ·that mttiinsic ·circUmttari.Cd iniy be .offet«t to thow what the parti~ trt~
with ~·to watetlighta when hand ii deed$d.. In J9~ LJ.vutoek"V, Unlt~tJ $~~' 144' Ida~

t, JS~ P;~d 5C>2 {2QO'n, t~..Court.rei~t~·"(il water·riaht:appu~~i·to·~l pro~ la
collyoyed ~~ ~~ ~ p~pert~ tn\10$• {Hs·qxprcssty ~ed or the parifes.cleat'I~ ttiwna«t itiat
tJlo·~nveyance.would'noHno1udttth.o\¥al'et·rlgbt

Id., 144 Idaho at 13; J4, U6 P.3d at $14,41.S.

Se.e 4/30, Bagt1/y v. Tbomoso11; 149 Idaho 799-, 8Q3, 24 J PJ.d 972,. 976 (2010) (appurten1mt Wart«
rlghh pus.with the lat'.ld unl~•·they are express1y m~ in tho deed ,OJ'.· ids :gloarly·sh~-:~·

the·parties intended. ~at t~ ~tor WOU;ld"reset_"Ve t'.h'"'1);.
Ali ·~pplicable Idaho decisions other than EIHP<'Y,hotd tharin· tfi~· ab&ence of:an .expre"
grant or reservation; the parties' intent as .to whether appurtenant Wat~ :rights' would.pau.,tn a
conveyance is .matter of. evidence .and proof.. The .Idaho rule .specifically oontcrnp~ates sif.uationa
where a deed contains- •-iogetber with the- appurtenancest' language. SH e.g., Rswe/I; ·supra.

'The Idaho.rule is consistent.with other western sta:tes. See e.g., Haya v.. Buzard, 77 P.
423, 426 (Mont. Jg{}4) (wbat-water rlghts:plaifltiff may have acquired under deed conveying land
together with appurten'ii\\ees to be .determined Jn light of tacts existing .at.the. time, and by parties~

subsequent behavior with reference.to the deed up to·~mencement of the.action); Bessemu.v.

Woolley, 16 i;, 1053, 10S4.(C01o. 1904) (whether deed conveys water ri-ght depends· on grantorrs

RF.PLY
. ., REI· PLf\lNTIFrt+S
.
. !\ttmON P01l 8l.JMMA1t:V JUOOMINT AND DEPENDANT'S' MOTION .TO STRIKE.• 9
'
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intent,& gathered from deed's express terms as to water rights. or when .deed is silent, from
presu~on. arising from

tho.circumstances and Yt!hethcr right is ·inci.den.t to ,and necenary: for the

beneficial enjoyment of.the. land.). The abov~ holdin&1.are. aumm~ by·~amuel Weil:

rt it woJ' settled dl~ a water-right ma' pan with ·the land um appurtenance
or at a p&ttel thereof, buf.not net:a1arlly so;· and whether a water-right

th~<>.

pas.aea 11 an appurtenanee irtvolves tWO question-. viz: .(a) Whether the waterrlgbt is an &ppurtenanc~, .and (b) whether, being such, it·was intended ·to pass • ~ •
The water-right ia not necessariJy:appllrtenant to.or p~ of·any land;.and
w~cr it:it ~ ~ppurtenan~ .or p~I is • q~t~~ ~f. fa~ resting. chi.efly upon
whether it·wat'used~alJffift.the l*eflt t)fflic Jtiitd jjtquesflo't1 •••
The word 41appurtenancc" does not mean inseparable..• It depends.on wliac the·
facta •how
tbe partlea to the .1alo meant to do. lt ls a qu~Ot1 Of ~nterttion•.
ta be d.riWn ftbm.the.aeed; .or, if the.d•ed 11 silent, to be drawn from tile
sui'rOundlua dr'eamltu.cta. th~ 1c:~ df.tlie partlti·•nd patot evldena
gene.,.tly. The,·party asserting ·that it was intended io pamrhas the burden. of
pt'QOf. ·but ·a di.~~n'i .tha~ '1te. watcr-~sht·~ appurtenant~ ~occs~ tl! .tho.
beneficial enjoyment ortne .land'hu usu'ally. been beld .St;iffsCient'proof of
i~entiqn to pass it .hi ~ absen~ of an Pip~,.r".l~tion in tho deed, o.- ot'he,

••t

nfcltn.ce ~ tlla ·e0atraf1.

·
..
Weil. 1upro. at §§; SS()'-~52, pp. S8~S90 (boJded emphasiii'.~ded,:citatfomr omitted).

~Cl'C't the CC>'1rt:m~t consider the drcum~~ and parties' intent in the sa1c ofthe

Oreenhcart Property. inclUdi'ng: whether Plaintiff$' irrigation. watcr riglitl'W~ U$ed on; jncidettt
tot.or necessaryfltld S'Pecffioally used for the benefihJ'fthe Orecnheart.Proporty at the .~itne.of

conveyance; the: 'tenns .of the purchase ·contract and other .transact.i~ documents con:cer;ning·
whether irrigation water,.or aeces1 to an ·~trigation system would be included; and all actions of

the.parties·up
to
inclUding Plaintl'ffs' corttiftlled poSHSSton.
..
. the time of and .after.the .conveyance.
.
'

and control ct all wtter·rights,1 '.Dcfendtmtl..several .diStinct representations ·to Elmore County that
th& ~cart Property: had ·rt.0 water rights or .irrigatioo syst~ 8:nd ~f~dant1 a faiJure for tlvc

years to:notjfy IDW~-01at she ofaimed ownership Of'Vatef .rJght$ through her d~w.hich
l.Jvuiock '"• Unllad Statea,:.144 Idaho . It l'S6'P,3d 502 (2007).
Aft.ldtvit·~t Jny.Brown in Sttpport .ott(.fotton. tbr Summary .rudgmerit At:125;

1

.
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notiflcation was prompted only by Plaintiffs request that. she.confirm to IDWR. that she did not
purchase.the Grnnh~ Property with water ri.ghta~' Th~. undisputed evidence.clearly sho~·no

water rights were appurtena1'HO the .Ore.enheart Property ~d none·~n.intended b.Y either.party
tQ 1?e conveyed.

·z.

Ih•··fltrcbaa.md Salo Aat.Mment'lAm•~ntirma NS> Watet,RiaJ>ll. WWlld
be Included iD tho Sale .of1be Clmnhart pmperty.

Detet:sdant argues that if'th.c Court does look at the surrounding cittUmst'.aticcs and ~-·
intent ·iil the sale·ti'ansaction, it will find that the purchase and sale agreement .("Purchase and
Sale Agrecment")9 'indicates water rights were.intended to be conveyed. Defendant points to
Section 16 of the Agreement, which requires th~. parties. to identify any water: .fi·ghts,. weU~:watcr
S)'Stems, etc. "tbat·are .appurt~ant thereto that are now on or used in coMcction with the

premiSel. ~·and which the parti~ .Jrifencl to be httluded iil the ·$ale. No water rights, wells, water
sy&t~ms. :Cle. -6·described.

The .space provided after the. semi-Colon 'Vas· left. blank. Defenda{lt

would bavc..thc· Court conclude that a· ftdbu:e to fill in ..thia ~tonk so as to ;deseribe any water nabts
that.the. parti~ intended ~o bf!·includcd in·thc salc·i~i~es the parties .intended that water rights

lnl.Y.14 be included in thc.sate~·10 This turns tbc.provlsfon eompletely on it$ head by frifetpreting it
to .operate to include ·watet dghts ·whether iJ.is completed or not. 11
~ . Affida'vtt of Jay Brown in· Support of Motton for Summary Judamcn~ ·1 ,.16-27..

l:!xhlbjt' A: to Grµnlflal'I Af/idavlt :tn Swpport ofMotimr for Sullflf'UU')! Jut:f.m.cmt ..
tf 'fh'Ac~ the'cU&. S~tlon 16' dealiq with .W&ter rlghu would have beCn drafted the samo as Section IS dealing
wl~ll mintrll ri*ht". which statea "Any. and a1r mincn.I rithts which are already included wfth the property wm be
inchidit.l'in the salc·of this~ ®1•.otherwiao stipUlatod.~.
.
·
11
The Defendant has ciffe.red statements Qf Andy Enrico aUcpdly purporting to atato tho legal effect of the· 'form real
~a:tc ~ontract "aed in ~~·tnauer. Under 1.daf?o la\¥• an opinion .of. an expert th8t.C411s,fo~.a legal .conolu'°*'.J•..ub.\
admisiible. Nakurv: Hackwmth.,.12.7 .Idaho 68..896 P.2d 976 (l90S);,Hawki1t1 "· CJumdlu, d Idaho 20i396.~.2d
123 .(1964), SH a/.n,-comm•lft·10 l.R..B. 1fH by :R.ttport '1/Jdolto SIQI• ,,,,,. Evl~ Ct,mtttt(tttttt1 C 706, p. 2 (lOBS)
~If l1'le expert'' oPimon ·ia·purely a 1ogal conchiston or concerns tho law ofthe~ it is ffledmiaaible •. .DecisiOh'i·Oil
the J.w ~.not decl8ion.s·that tho jury, tlte t.ot finder, make. The)' a.re for the Juda,e to make in bit (or her} ca\)actt)r
as Jegi) officer ~ ..."). Aecordingly. P.1aintitr..object.to the consideration of tho aamo .in oonneodon wJth ttie pemdiJ:lB
summary Judaincm.modons. Sa..,,,,, G• Slat.fl·/M. Co. v.. Hwtch18tm, ti4;'.ldabo l O', I 75 P.3d 172 (2007) (No
fut mal ntotkm .10 Stl ikc: itt l\ClCl01!."4f1 te tMIB Jetitftftate el9jeetle•l to e ;l'fd111~ etl'- ~ WMNP)' j\irillMIM. aft.41
ob~tion maybe made even as.late·u the bearina·on 11umrt'lary JudamentJ (citins }{«la Mining Co. 11. Siar-Morning
77~. 782-83t. 839 P.2d 119~, t 1'96-97 (1'992))...
. ..
.. Co.,122Jdaho
.

IJ

10

Mi"'"'
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Defendant's argument also misdirects attention from the fact that i~ every imtanoe where

wat«. watcr.riahts, water shares. ot water S)'ltemJ·were.addreued in·the Purchase and Sal•
Agreement. the Setler'• Dl1elosute1· or the . property listing. those sections eith~ .were .~pleted
11
with."NIA"
left' blank.
Section
"NiA'
, ot were
'
.
.
.S·ot·tbc·Purchuo.·and:Sale Apeement.def1ncs
.

~ an.abfnviatfon of"noi ·appUcabl•/' ·which "shall be. ev.id.end; .thii.t.th6partiee have

eofttmrtplati!ld· etwtah'l racsta or eqnditiol\l .and hive detenrd~ such fact• or ccmdition•:do not
apply'to·lhe a~ertt« tht·trans.aotioti .J;i~n. • ln. other·w~ hutb p~ have aF,eed that
aft~ deJ{~~nsideration
Q.f waar,,
systema,.etc;,...they
. ~£'the iaaues
.
. water riahts,.
. . .water
.
..
. have..

det~ined th~ydtd. not ·~J)l?lY to Ute Oracnhcatt·Prcperty.

tblit·predudes·Dc;fertdant•s . argnment :that ·she-did :not kn'1w '.thete'Mfalttbo· a :atou.nd
wator·riil\t with resp¢t tQ~·OntenheartPto.peny, that ~h;o "was n.,~er~n~cxh!Url~S·tl'.l~~o
that~ Wat.mm.a.~ ~~t~ ~gtlt and that

't

WU exglucf~· ~JP ·~f) sal~;~ ot .wflat' she aid

or did
·riahts"' to lilmore Cowiy• Opposittott
. .not intend
.. in. .her statements.
.
. about
" ••water
.
'•

Mem.orandi.lm aUl•l l'. u Aside &om beittl:PtlChided. by Df)fondant•s agr,oancnt·with Plfti:tltiffs,
thiS· argutnent..aP.n incotrectly..d88Umes that thero."wu ·an·appurtenant ~ator .right~ It 11$0

incorrectly assumes that Plaintifti ha4 an:atllrmativo duty to disclose .anythi11g .conocmlng water.
'

rights beyond ·thofr ~eatcd written disclosures that.no ~ator right& were applicable to .tho sale;
or beyond.what De~es own inspection .of the property wcmld,havo i'~ealed had she C'\1'.CD

la 0(,courM, ~ munol'OUI and COftlialent indicadOD9 in. aJI of \M lnntaotion documcnfa chat water ripts We!O Dm
~ fn tfto·lale tcbuts Dt~s blrt.-aJlqation at pap 9'.of her OppolitionMOlllOfan<hnn that."the
P.urchue'and Sale Aareeinent1n1Ull:riPQP.ly a1atod ihat :water 'Mlll part of tho puteha•.".

u Pefondlftt'l·ibtent ahOuht bcr'detenninod objectively :in liaht of her :worda and aotfons ai. the time of the

conveyw:o·anc:f hareffom~ cbull' tb4l tax oltuif'.'ca&fon.~fthe:O~ Ptqi~. lO "dry srQ{ttg.~ Ois4tt.1>.

CddttpClubSpor#i'/~;.llC>litaho·189, 794..·718P.2d 1227, t232.(14'86)(coutfdetennlnedpll'ties"lntemion
butd Oft olrcumaUH'lCet •·they.-txfatod to conclude whether surrender .of lcasehokl oocurred); Stnl F1m118, lnc. v.
Croft & Reetl, '/~,.2012:WL24'671, 1l (Idaho) (court to look to pattios111objectivo inteint"·ia dctermimna.wh~
briptlon equ{pmfllt'IMCIMd u Rxture to·h!ttl pl'OP4'rty)~ Por .the same raeoo, tlw ~ llhould dJarcprd
ae&mdmrt11.,.rtieft that t'flrindffJay 810 ..•t;•m 1 pheM oatl te tw in .aela Nid thlt
•illtall• whM
he iold mt the ~«ir.righ.t." ·Greenheait.;fj/(tktvlt in Oppo.tition .Jo 'Summa,., Judgnrcmi.ai:, 10. Plahttim
df.~181""'.th~Uuch ~ IJt~ "Nftl tmkie! or t"-t it \Wfe made, that it waa an ae¢ufllt0. IUltomont ott'acfl Ot law.

t.••• .,. ,. •.•
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visited the property b.efore purchuing.it-..n.amely that no water was, used on, or was capable of

being delivered to. the Oreenheart Property. Defendant never saw the Oreenheart .property
before.she purchased it. even though Socti~n 6 of. the P~ and: Sate A:areement. stated.
~~spi~u~{y that'.

avv1ais STRONGLY ADYISID'TO INVEST.IGATB TIUt'CONDmON

AND'SVITABJLITY or ALL ASPECTS or TliE PROPERTY AND ALL
.MATTERS Al'FICTJNG THi vALUE .oa J)ESJRABll,,TY·OI' THE

PROPUTY INcLVDING BUT.NOT L•Mltm:To; THE· FOLLOWING:
.... •. (E) .UTILITIES~ IMPROVSM~ ~ cm.tER ata~. SELLER

tepte!ients.tbat the j>roperty·does liave tlicHbllOwingjrtfttti• Jmpnivanenu,
service. wt Qtbs d·llm a\tai1ablo (dcacribe availability): NIA... (underlined
emph4)is :added).' · ·

3.

·

· ·

·

·

Defendant is B!llD;Sl By.J!ltollpel. Waiyw·and.I.tachel'!mm Aumina Qlvnenhip of the
SW2tm Yf stqr RIJJh{l.;liQ»:.

Plaittti:tn ineorpora.tc:hctein and re~ the argµmonts

sc~

forth ~ their .M~tn,o~"4u~ In

Suppo.r:t Qf~m~1:Y...ft1t/gmen.t prey{f!.U~.Y ft~~ ·with th.e.Cou!1· oonccming ·the ·aP,Plicabilit~ of

0$ppel, .w:atver and lac~es ·~ ·oar Defendant•s rcccnt1y· assertirig mtitteaf Jn tho '®jeot water·
rights.

Plliimifftw6uld notha\tti.sold th~:Greenheart PropcrtY'to:. Dcfcnd.ant iftta'O.y ~~~
that.despite.the disc1osures1.n the Purchase and Sate.Agreement and otlier transaction documents
•

t

..

•

•

..

that no water.· or water rights were included ·in the sale·of sixty aCJ'CI of dry, desert l&'itdi,
Defendant would assert owner&bip of P.laintiffs'·wa:te:rrights. Or presumably they would haye
demanded a.higher purchase price.. Bither way~ thoy.baye·been sorely prejudiced by·the

Defendant's .attempt to .reap a. windfal~ now. In.the meantime, they have remained in. possession
and controf..of their water rights, and taken. all legally required actions to maintain their benetlclal
use on ~cir land·and·protect the unused .portions ftom.potcntial forfeiture by maintaining them in

the Idaho Water RC$0Ut'ces Board Water Ban.le.

REPLY JUI ri..AINTJFF'SMO'llON f'OR.SUMMARYJtJDGMENT ANl>DEFIND~Sl\fqT~(,>JllTOST.Rl~.~.· 13
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CONCLUSION

The undisputed relevant facts clearly show that no water rights were appurtenant to the
Otwnheart Property at the time of conveyance. that Plaintiffs understood that water riaht• were
not inQludod in the we, and that Defendant understood she would not be getting water rights.

Based on the undisputed facts and appUcabJe law as aet forth herein, and in Plaintiffs• Motion f'ot
Summary Judgment and supportins briefa and affidavits. summary judgment should be granted

to PlaintiftS es requested.

Dcfondent•s Motion to Strike should be denied ae it is based solely on the holding in
binpq, which holding 11 inCQnsietent with and implicitly overruled by all prior and subsequent

14aho cases deciding the issue. As noted in Plaintiffs' initial Memorandum. In Support of
Summary Judgment, thf s Court whon servin.g as it does here as the finder of flot has discretion to
resolve competina inferences on summary judgment. The overwhelming weight of the ovidenc~
on these crou-.motions for summary judgment would CftUSc any reasonable person to conclude
that no intent was present to transfer these water rights.

RBSPECTFULLV SUBMl'ITBD tbia 3 Jst day of December, 2012.
OIVBNS PURSLEY u.P

REPL V RE: Pf,AJNTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY Jl!OOMENT AND Dgf'ftNDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE• 1.4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of December, 2012, I caused to be served a tnie and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:

Vjctor S. VIilegas, ~·
Borton-Lakey Law Offices
141 S CUiton Ave.
Meridian. ID 83642
victor@borton-Jakey.com

Rl(PL

v Rg1 PLAINTIF,.8 MartON

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Ovemight Mail

Facsimile (493-4610)
B-maU

FOR SUMMARY Ju.DCMP..NT AND J>ttnm>AN'l"I MarroN TO STR.IKI • 15
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Ja.t. 18. 2013 3: 18PM

ast Carlton Ave

No. 5066

P. 2/4

CfLEC
J'oe Borton [ISB No. 5552]
Victor VDleps [ISB No. 5860]
BORTON LAKBY LAwomCES
141 B. Carlton Ave.
Meridian, m83642
Boise, Idaho 83702
Ofl!ce:(208)908-4415
Fa: (208) 493-4610
Email: victm@hortoa.-lakey.com

2ul3 J!1N 18 PH J: 23

J.nomq1 for Dlfindant

IN THE DISTRicr COVRT or TBB JOVRTB JUDICIAL DISTRICI' or

TD STATE 01' mABO, IN AND JOR THE COUNTY or ELMORE
JAY BR.OWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON·
BROWN, Husband ml Wife,

CASE NO. CV 2012-353

DDENDANT'S DISCLOSURE
Plaintift"s,

OF LAY WITNESSES

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
ORBBNHBAR.T, ID individual,

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant Aupsta Sayoko Mlmoto Grecmheart, by and through her

counsel of record Victor Vlllesu of Borton Lakey Law Officea, and pursuant to the A\liUlt 28,
2012 Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning hereby provides Defendant's disclosure of those
persons expected to be called u lay w11nellel at the trial of this matter.
1. Aupsta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart
c/o Victor VWeps
Borton Lakey Law

omcea

141 E. Carlton Ave.
Meridfan. m83642

Ms. Oreenehart is the Defendant in this aotion. She may be called to testify regarding tho
purehuo of the Oreenhelrt Property and that the Purchase and Sale Apeement and Wam.nty
Pip I of3

,; Ja-t. 18. 2013 3: 18PM

No. 5066

ast Carlton Ave

P. 3/4

Deed did not exolucle around water rishta that are IUbject of this litiption. She ID&)' also be
called to rebut 1D1 evidence presented by Plain1ifti.
2. DmylRhad
Daryl Rhad Real Bltlte

HC85Box20
Mountain Home, m83647
Mr. Rheed wu the real estatt apnt for both parties. He may be called upon to teatlfY
that the Purohue ad Sale Aareement and the Warranty Deed did not exclude around water
ripu that are subject of thil litiptlon.

3. Any individual Plain1ift'I have clisaloaed or any Individual bavina knowledp ot the
tacts nJat1n1 to this cue, inoludina but not limited to, all penona ldentihd m
P1atntiff'1 Disclosure of Lay Wltneat1.
Dtftndant relel'Vet the right to call my witness identified by Plalntlft's, without waivins
any objection to Plalndfts' witnesses. Defendant intends this diaclosure to include witneues
who have been previoualy idmtified by my party, or any wi1neal who ia m:eded to lay a

foundation for any exhibit, u well u any witncu for the pwpo1e of Impeachment ~ nbuual.
Further. the Defendant reserves the

riaht to amend or supplement this witneu lilt for reasons

indudfnl without limitation court rulings on pending or future modons.
DATED this 18ta day of January, 2013.

BORTON LAKEY LAW OFFICES
By
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Ii , . Joan. 18. 2013

3: 19PM

East Carlton Ave

No. 5066

P. 4/4

CEBTJllCAD OJ SIBVIQ

I HBl.EBY CERTIFY that on thll 18* di)' of JamJll')', 2013, a true 1114 correct copy of
the foregoing document WU served by flnt.clut mail, poltap prepaid, and addresud to; by fax
tnnaminion to; by ovemiaht dellva')' to; or by penonally dellverlns to or leavins with a penon.
in c:harp of the otlice u indicated below:

c.

Michael Creamer
Thoma B. Dvorak
GIV!NS PvULIY LLP
P.O. Box 2720
BoUt, ID 83701-2720

[ ] U.S.Mail
[X] Pax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ l Hand Delivery

Telephone: (208) 381·1200

Faoshnlle: (208)388·1300

VicitOf Ville~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,
Case No. CV-2012-353
Plaintiffs,
ORDER DENYING SUMMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNT I AND
GRANTING IN PART SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT ON
COUNT II

vs.

AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Michael Creamer for the Plaintiffs
Victor Villegas for the Defendant
The Court heard arguments on cross motions for summary judgment on January 7, 2013.
This case arises out of a dispute of whether a deed for the conveyance of land executed by
Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") in favor of
Defendant Greenheart (hereinafter "Greenheart") operated to convey the water rights appurtenant
to the described land at the time of the conveyance.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On or about February 5, 1988, Plaintiff Jay Brown acquired approximately 320 acres of
land in Elmore County. 1 As part of the Snake River Basin Adjudication (hereinafter "SRBA''),

1

Verified Complaint, filed 4/3/2012, Ex. A.
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'
the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho decreed Plaintiff Jay Brown
2

water rights 61-2188 and 61-7151 on or about October 26, 2000. The decreed water rights were

limited to the irrigation of a total of 287 acres in a single irrigation season, which water rights
were also limited to being used on the combined total 320 acre parcel owned by Brown.
The Complaint alleges neither of the water rights has been used to irrigate any portion of
the property to become known as the "Greenheart property" since at least 1986.3 Idaho Code §
42-223, Exceptions or defenses to forfeiture, was added to the Idaho Code in 2000. On August
28, 2003, Brown applied to lease 160 acres of the total 287 acres of water rights to the water
supply bank, those rights were idled in that manner, and the lease continued until the filing of the
Complaint.4 The Plaintiffs allege the idled rights include the land subsequently known as the
"Oreenheart property'' which the Plaintiffs allege had been "dry land" with no irrigation system
for at least 20 years before the purchase by Greenheart.'
On January 29, 2007, Plaintiffs executed a warranty deed which conveyed 60 acres of the
original 320 acre parcel from Plaintiffs to Greenheart. 6 Significantly, the deed contained a clause
purporting to convey the land with its appurtenances. 7 It is also undisputed that the deed was
executed in fulfillment of a real estate contract which was executed prior to the conveyance. 8
About five months later, Greenheart made a series of representations and caused Plaintiff Jay
Brown to make representations to Elmore County that the conveyed property was dry grazing
land without water rights. 9 Some of these representations were made to the Elmore County
Board of Equalization in an attempt to reclassify the conveyed land as dry grazing land, which
had the effect of reducing Greenheart's tax burden.1°
It is undisputed that Greenheart never attempted to apply any water to the land by any

method or file any paperwork with any government agency regarding the allegedly conveyed
water rights from the conveyance until early 2012. In February 2012, Greenheart received a
2

Id, Ex. B-C. Exhibit Bis.water right 61-2188 allowing irrigation on 164 acres within the place of use described
as T04S ROSE 824 with 320 acres total; Exhibit C is water right 61-7151 allowing irrigation on 123 acres within the
of use described in the same manner as water right 61-2188.

r•ace

Complaint, ,15, Brown Aff., 12.
Complaint, ,16, Brown Aff., 13.
5
Brown Aff. ft 15-17.
6
Greenheart Aff. (11/1612012), Ex. B.
7
/dComplaint, Ex. D.
8
Complaint, Ex. A.
9
Complaint, Exs. F-1.
10 JJ..; lix& i H Qyhjhjg H, the mip11tes, reflects the chjef appraiser stated an adj11ghpept had been made "h•ck to
dry grazing ... " so it is unclear whether the property was assessed as dry grazing before the sale to Greenheart.
4
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phone call from Plaintiff Jay Brown regarding the ground water right allegedly appurtenant to
the conveyed land. 11 Several days after the call, on February 17, 2012, Greenheart filed with the
Idaho Department of Water Resources (hereinafter "IDWR") attempting to change the ownership
of the water rights into Greenheart's name because they were still listed as owned by Plaintiff
Jay Brown. 12
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed this quiet title action against Greenheart based on
theories of contract interpretation and estoppel, seeking to quiet title to the water rights which
Greenheart now asserts were conveyed to her by the warranty deed and which are the subject of
the paperwork she filed with the state. 13 Greenheart answered without filing any counterclaims. 14
Greenheart moved for summary judgment asserting that Plaintiffs' quiet title action is barred by
the applicable statute of limitations. 15 Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment on their quiet_
title action. 16 Greenheart opposed Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, arguing the quiet title
action fails as a matter of law. 17 Plaintiffs opposed Greenheart's motion for summary judgment,
arguing the quiet title action was brought within the applicable statute of limitations, if any. 18
Both Plaintiffs and Greenheart filed reply memoranda in support of their motions. 19
These motions came before the Court for oral argument on January 7, 2013. Regarding
Plaintiffs' motion, the Court considered the Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting
memorandum, the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendant's Statement of Material Facts in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment, the
Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and the affidavits of Jay B.
Brown, Terri LaRae Manduca, Thomas E. Dvorak, Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart
(12/21/2012), and Kenneth Brush. Regarding Greenheart's motion, the Court considered
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum, Defendant's
Greenheart Atf. (12/2112012), t 10; Brown Atf., ,,25-26.
Brown Atf.,,, 25-29; Verified Complaint,,, 21-23, Ex. J-L; Answer, filed 5/9/2012, ,, 21-23.
13
See generally Verified Complaint.
14
See generally Answer.
ts Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 11/15/2012; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment (Greenheart's Memo. in Supp. Sum. J.), tiled 11115/2012.
16
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 12/10/2012; Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Plaintiffs' Memo. in Supp. Sum. J.), filed 12/1012012.
17
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Greenheart's Memo. in Opp. to
Plaintiffs' Mot. Sum. J.), filed 1212lt2012.
18
Memorandum in Opposition w Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Plaintiffs' Memo. in Opp. to
Greenheart's Mot. Sum. J.}, filed 1212412012.
19
Repl;i jn Suppgrt of Defendapt's Mption for Symmazy Judament (Greenhean's Reply MemO.). filed 12128/2012;
Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Plaintiffs' Reply Memo.}, filed 12/31/2012.
11

12
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Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Reply in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the affidavit of Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart
(11/16/2012).
I

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings,
affidavits, and discovery docwnents ... , read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 131 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002)
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). In cases such as this where cross-motions for summary judgment are
filed in a case that will be tried by the judge instead of the jury, special summary judgment
considerations apply. The Idaho Supreme Court summarized as follows:
The fact that both parties file motions for summary judgment does not necessarily
mean that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Moreover, the filing of
cross-motions for summary judgment does not transform the court, sitting to hear
a summary judgment motion, into the trier before the court without a jury,
however, the court may, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, draw
probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts. Drawing
probable inferences under such circwnstances is permissible since the court, as
the trier o:( fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at trial.
Conflicting evidentiary facts, however, must still be viewed in favor of the
nonmoving party.

Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 123-124, 206
P.3d 481, 487-488 (2009).
The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, and then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Id When the nonmoving party bears the
burden of proving an element at trial, the moving party may establish a lack of genuine issue of
material fact by establishing the lack of evidence supporting the element. See Sanders v. Kuna

Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (1994). "Such an absence of evidence
may be established either by an atlirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by
a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element
is lacking." Id. at fn. 2. The nonmoving party "is not required to present evidence on every

etemem or his or lter case at tltat ct111e, bat tadrer 111ust esl'dblish a ge11ai11e issue of 111ai:e1ial :fuct
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regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party's motion." Thomson v. Idaho

Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994). A party opposing a motion
for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." l.R.C.P. 56(e). Such evidence may consist of affidavits or depositions,
but ''the Court will consider only that material . . . which is based upon personal knowledge and
which would be admissible at trial." Harris v. State, Dep '1 of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,
297-98, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (1992). If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material
fact, then only a question of law remains on which the court may then enter summary judgment
as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443, 445, 65 P.3d 184, 186
(2003).

ANALYSIS

Motion to Strike
Greenheart moves to strike specifically enumerated paragraphs of the affidavits of Jay B.
Brown and Terri Larae Manduca as wetl as the exhibits attached to the affidavits pursuant to
Rule 12(t) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 20 Rule 12(t) gives the Court discretion to strike
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters from pleadings. I.R.C.P. 12(f); James

v. i\Jercea, 152 Idaho 914, 277 P.3d 361, 364 (2012). ''An affidavit is not a pleading and, [t]hus,
by the plain terms [of] Rule 12(t), the rule cannot be use [sic] to strike an affidavit." Utley v.

Continental Divide

Ou~fitters,

2009 WL 631465, *2 (D. Idaho 2009) (interpreting the analogous

federal rule of civil procedure). Thus, the motion is not properly before the Court under Rule
12(t). However, since Greenheart's memorandum asks this Court to make a legal determination
that the parol evidence rule bars certain extrinsic evidence from being considered, the Court
considers the substance of the motion as an objection to the adrn.issibility of certain evidence and
addresses the admissibility in the opinion below.

Zl

The Court DENIES the motion to strike.

20 Qefegdan''a Mption tg
21

Strike Portions of Affidavit of la¥ B Browna and , . erci
See generally Greenheart's Memo. in Supp. Strike.
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Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
I.

Counts I and II - Quiet Title Based on Contract Interpretation or Estoppel.

Plaintiffs seek to quiet title to the t\vo disputed water rights, 61-2188 and 61-7151.22
Plaintiffs' quiet title action is based on two separate theories: (1) contract interpretation and (2)
estoppel.23 Greenheart contends the quiet title action is barred by the applicable statute of
limitation. Even if the action is not barred by the Matute of limitation, Greenheart argues

.
on other growids.
Plaintiffs' action fails under bvth alkged tlu-ories

a. Whether Plaintiffs' quiet title action is barred by the applicable statute of
limitation.
The parties dispute at length which statute of limitation applies to the facts of this case.
Greenheart asserts either the statute of limitation found in Idaho Code §§ 5-216 (5 years for
contract actions) ot 5-224 (4 year catch-all) applies. 24 Plaintiffs assert either there is no
applicable statute of limitation, or, if any, it is found in Idaho Code § 5-203 {20 years). 2' The
Court's query begins \;vith when a cause of action accrued in this matter.
'"(U]nder Idaho law, a cause of action generally accrues, and the statute of limitation
begins to run, when a parcy may maintain a lawsuit against ru1other." Western Corp. v. Vanek,
144 Idaho 150, 151, 158 P.3d 313, 314 (Ct. App. 2006). Actior.s to quiet •itle, such as this one,
"may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real or
personal property adverse to him, for the purpose of detennining such adverse claim." l.C. § 6-

401. Real property includes water rights. LC.§ 55-101(1).
Here, Greenherut argues that ?1aintiffs" quiet title action accrued on January 29, 2007, the
day the deed allegedly transferring the water rights was executed. 26 Greenhea..-t reasons the plain
language of the deed transfoned the water rights, so Plaintiffs could ha·•e filed to quiet title the
very next day to seek to undo the transfer. Plaintiffs contend their quiet title action fits squarely
within Idaho Code § 6-401, and the plain language of that section indicates a quiet title action
accrues at the time an adverse claim is made and no such claim was made w1til February 17,

2012, when GceerJ1eart filed with the IDWR attempting to change the ovrnership of the water

22

23
24

Verified Complaint, ~er 25-J4.
Id
Greenheart's Memo. in Supp., p. 2.

Memo

Opp to Greenheart's

25

p!aintiffi;,

26

Greenheart Memo. in St~pp. Sa:n. J., pp. ?-4; Gn::crheart Aff". (11/16 12012), Ex. B.

ip

Mot

Sum I p 2
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rights. 27 Applying the plain language of Idaho Code § 6-40 l, the applicable statute of limitation
did not begin to run until Greenheart asserted an adverse claim against the water rights by filing
with IDWR. There is no evidence in the record that Greenheart made any claims in any form or
degree to any alleged water rights for the land she purchased from January 29, 2007 until
February 17, 2012. So, filing with the IDWR was the first instance that Greenheart asserted any
ownership in the water rights

advers~

to Plaintiffs. Therefore, this quiet title action filed on April

5, 2012 is well within all of the statutes of limitation asserted by the paliies.
b. Whether the disputed water rights were conveyed to Greenheart.
In actions regarding the interpretation of a deed and its associated real estate contract, if
any, the Idaho Supreme Cowt summarized in Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence the
applicable law as follows:
Under the doctrine of merger, any recitals in the real esta-.:e contract were merged
into the deed. When a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of the
contract to convey, the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of the
deed may vary from those contained in the contract, tne deed alone must be
Jooked to determine the rights of the parties.
143 Idaho 704, 710, 152 P.3d 575, 581 (2007). 28
The parties signed a real estate contract prior to the conveyance of the deed. 29 Thereafter,
the parties executed a warranty deed to convey the subject property from Plaintiffs to
Greenheart. 30 Thus, in the absence of fraud or mistake, the Court must look to the deed to
determine whether water rights were conveyed to Greenheart if the language of the deed is
unambiguous. The language of the deed is undisputed. The deed conveys the subject property
from the Plaimiffs to Greenheart using the following recital:

27

Plaintiffs' Memo. in Opp. to Greenheart's Mot Sum. J., pp. 7-8; Brown Aff, if~ 25-29; Verified Complaint, !ft
21-23, Ex. J-L; Answer, !ft 21-23.
21
See also Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 382, 414 P.2d 879, 884 (1966) ("the acceptance of a deed
to premises generally is considered as a merger of the agreements of an antecedent contract into the terms of the
deed, and any claim for relief must be based on the covenants or agreements contained in the deed, not the
covenants or agreements as contained in the prior agreement") (emphasis added).
29

30

Greenheart
Id, Ex. B.

A ff ( J t /I 6120 12),

Ex

A
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TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said
Grantee and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does
hereby covenant to and with the said Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in fee
simple of said premises; that they are free from all encumbrances except as
described above and that Grantor will warrant and defend the same from all
lawful claims whatsoever.
(emphasis added). The only encumbrances described earlier in the deed are "Subject to: Taxes,
easements and restrictions of record."
Greenheart contends the phrase "with their appurtenances,, is unambiguous as a matter of
law, and thus this Court must look to the terms of the deed and not extrinsic evidence to
determine whether the parties intended to convey water rights with the land. 31 Plaintiffs contend
this phrase is basically per se treated by Idaho co\ll'ts as ambiguous, then requiring this Court to
examine all extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties actually intended to convey
water rights with the conveyance of land. 32 Plaintiffs attack the Idaho Supreme Court's holding
in Empey and rely on several other Idaho cases in their reply. Plaintiffs assert that, regardless of
the use of the words "together with appurtenances" in a deed, the question of conveyance of
water rights depends on whether they are expressly treated in the deed, or if not, then on the
parties' intent based on circumstances at the time of the conveyance. The Court considers
Plaintiffs' cited authorities below.
First, the following three cases cited by Plaintiffs do not address facts wherein a deed
contained language conveying apputieaances: Botlmeli

i;.

Keejer; 33 Joyce Livestock Co. v.

U.S.,3 4 and Bagley v. Thomason. 35 Alfaough these cases address using extrinsic evidence to
detem1ine the intem of the pruties, it was under circumstances where ·there was absolutely no
indication in the cii.!ed of such intent, including no appurtenance clause, so these cases do not
address the issue before this Court.

-------·---

31
Greenheart's Memo. in Opp. to Plainnffs' Mot. Sum. J., pp. 4-6.
32 Plaintiffs' Memo. in ~ ..1pp. Sum J .. p. !3.
33
53 Idaho 658, 27 P.2d 65, 67 (1933), holding water rights "pass with the land though not mentioned as such or as
afpurtenances[,] ... unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary, directly or by implication."
3
144 Idaho I, 14, 156 P.3d 502, 515 (2007), holding "[u]nless they are expressly reserved in the deed or it is
clearly shown that the parties intended that the grantor would reserve them, appurtenant water rights pass with the
lagd 9"111 fhp1igh they are p9t mentioned in the deed and the deed does ngt mentigp 'appurtenances"
3
' 149 Idaho 799, 803, 241 P.3d 972, 976 (20 l 0), citing Joyce, supra, but construing the term "bare land."
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Second, two additional cases are the subject of great disagreement: Russell v. lrish36 and

Koon v. Empey. 37 Uoth cases involve the conveyance of land by written deed from one party to
another, which deeds did not expressly reserve or convey water rights except by use of an
appurtenance clause. The court in both cases looked to the intent of the parties to determine
whether water rights were conveyed in the land deed because of the presence of an appurtenance
clause. Thus, Irish anJ Empey agree that the intent of the parties cor.trols. Ho\.vever, Irish and

Empey appear to c0r.l1ict 1.m which evidence can be used to establish that iment under facts
similar to this

1.:as~.

The co mt in Irish used extrinsic evidence to determi11e the intent of the parties regarding
whether a deed with an appurtenance clause conveys appurtenant water tights. The court
reasoned such a "conveyance would carry with lt the water right appwtenant to the land at the
time of the conveyanc-e, unless it was specifically reserved in the deed or it could be clearly

shown that ii was known to both parties that the water right was not intended to be conveyed."
Irish, 118 P. at 502 (emphasis added).
However, U1irteen years later, .:he court in Empey consioered a set of facts very similar to
those

addre~scd

in lnsh, but .readied a different conclusion. Spccificaliy, the court in Empey held

it was error for a district cowt to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties
when a deed wit.ii an appurtenance clause conveys appurtenant water righi:s because the
appurtenant clause was plain and unambiguous as a matter of law. In Empey, the court held:

It is an elementary rule for the consuuction of de.eds, the language of which is
plain <"ml urmnhigurms,
that, in the ahsent·e l~f fraud or mistC'ke, the
itself.
Parol
intention of the parties must be ascertained from the instrument
evidence is not admissible for such pu.cpose. It is where the language of a deed is
ambiguo11s
that the intent of the parties may 1Je ascert:t.ined from the
surrounding circumstances.

[I]n tht>

abs~:-ice

of any

re::1~rvation

to the contni.ry, a C•:!Cd to land effects a tnmsfer
of such \Vat~r and w::lter rjghts as are appurtenant tn the lard when the r.onveyance
is made, where the deed contains the U'mal "appurtenance" clause.
Id at 1090-J 099 (citations omitted)(empha3is added). Based on this hw. the court concluded
"[t]he language of the deeds is plain and unambiguous. From the deeds the intent of the grantor

37

40 Idaho 6, 23. P. l0~'7t I J?~j.
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to convey the lands, together with the appurtenances, plainly appears. There was no allegation of
fraud or mistake in the execution of the deeds, and no fraud or mistake is claimed." Id. at 1098.
Thus, the main conflict between Irish and Empey is why the court determined in Empey
that an appurtenance clause by itself was unambiguous as a matter of law and thus the court did
not consider extrinsic evidence, while the court in Irish did not address the issue of whether the
appurtenance clause was ambiguous and instead considered extrinsic evidence. Additionally, the

Empey decision clearl)' exce:pted from its holding cases lhut involv.;d fraud or mistake. While
this deed appears unambiguous or. its face, the matt.ers

prc~entcJ

by both sides in support of the

motions for :.urnmury judgment raise the issue of whether there was a mistake which is a
question of fact thut pr~cludes sununary judgment.
The pleauings in this CJ.Se and evidence submiti:ea m support of the motion for summary
judgment raise the issue uf mistake which would pem1u. extrinsic evidence to be considered.

Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 527 P.2d 1252 (1974). Therefore, this Court finds there is a
material issue of fact related to whether there was a mistake in the deed and whether the court
may consider extnnsic evidence for that purpose. None of the cases cited by the Plaintiffs or
Defendant address ::he issu.e m:' rnistat<.c in the.! deed as a precursor before the determination that
there is no ambiguity. 1 his court denies summary judgment for either party since the issue

of whether a mu.tual mistake in the deed exists is a factual i&sut that moves this case out of
the realm of the Empi!y de\!ision.
However, aosent a 3howing of mutual mistake of both parties by "clear and satisfactory
evidence" al tnat (id.), the Coun, since it is the nier of fact in
related to

th~
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case, will address the law
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Pursuant to Empey, if mistake is not proven by competent evidence, the Court cannot further
consider pre-conveyance extrinsic evidence as to the water rights. 38 The contract was merged
with the deed and can no longer be considered. The clear appurtenance language in this deed
indicates the intent was to convey the water rights appurtenant to the land conveyed and the deed

did not purport to reserve any water rights to the contrary.
Having a<l<lresse'1 the intent to convey appurtenant water rights, if the Plaintiff does not
meet its burden of proof showing mistake, the Court mu.:;t next <letemune what water rights, if
any, were appmtenwrt t0 the lmd at the time of the conveyance. In Idaho, title 42 chapter 14 of
the Idaho Code sets forth the statuto1y provisions relevant to the adjudication and decree of water
rights. Idaho Code 42-1402 reads in pc.~1tincnt part:
The right confirmed by such decree or allotment shall be appu..ienant to and shall
become a part of the land on which the water is use<l, and such right will pass with
the conveyance of such land, and such decree shall describe the land to which
become so appurtenant.
such water

snan

Also, Idaho Code 42-220 reads in pertinent part "all rights to water confirmed under the
provisions of this chapter, or by any decree of court, shall become appurtenant to, and shall pass
with a conveyance of, the land for which ~he right of use is granted." (empha')is added).
The Idaho Supreme Court, addressing facts similar to those of this case, heid that water
rights decreed on land were appurtenant thereto in Crow v. Carlson. 39

Specifically, in Crow, a

water right's adjudication (the Rexburg decree) granted a water right fot two parcels of land
owned by a single person at the time of the decree. The two parcels of iand totaled 240 acres one of I60

a1:rc~

and th; other 80 acres where -L-ie water rights

w.~re

ne\'t;r used. Regarding the

appurtenance or· the water right, Uie Idaho Supreme Comt concluded the decreed water right was

This analysis and '"esult ?.''>o co'.1forms with modem recitations oftre general mle regrr~ing interprP-ting deeds
such as is found in Benninga v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006).

38

39

The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court as a
questbr; •)t' ':!w. !I h1:\\t'"~r. t::e in~trum1::.:1 of con~e}am:t. is u~r.btguou.;, nll.erprtt.ition of the
instrument is a '!latter of fact for the trier of fact. In interpreting and construing deeds of
conveyance, the primary goal is to seek and give effect to the real intention of the parties. If the
language of a deed is plain l!Ild uncmbiguous, the intention of th(' parties must be a..«certained from
the deed itself and extrinsic evidence is not admissible. Uncertainties should be treated as
.1mbigu;::u; St.id. ~1nbi6u;tit.:> arn ;,u!Jjec: to <ie dt:ared l•i'.' by (':!So<t lu ~;-.e i1:tt::'tk·1 ,y/ the ,Ja;iies
as gathered from the deed, from the circumstcrnces aLtendmg and leading up to its execution, from
lb@ 1 ubj·>ct mq"°'<' •r 4 'l?C trqn"' r(;i• sjtn3tit)p qfth.~ p•jttjes qt i\Jf• tj1ne
109 Idaho 46 i. 690 P 2d 916 (i 984).
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appurtenant to the .:ntirl.;'. 240 acn::s, n0t just the 160 acre parcel where the right had been used.40
The court reasoneJ the Rexburg decree was "conclusive proof of diversion of the water, and of
application of the water to b'!neficial use [on the entire 240 acre parcel], i.e., the decree is res
judicata as to the V'.ater rights at issue herein."

41

The court then quoted Idaho Code§ 42-220 and

held that such appurtenant water rights pass with the conveyance of the land to which they are
appurtenant. ld. at 466, 690 P .2.d at 921. Based on the foregoing, the court appropriateJ the water
right for both pa:rcds. ld.
App'iyin~

;.;t~tUh!S

tht:

J.nd Ctuw tu the facts vf this case,

it is u.idisputed that prior to

the conveyance of land from Plaintiffs to Greenheart, Plaintiffs owned a pa.reel with a combined
total of 320 acrcs. 12 It.:; also un<lispLted that, as part of the SRdA., the District Coui-t of the Fifth
Judicial District of the State of Idaho decfced Plaintiff fay Brown water rights 61·2188 and 617151 on or aoout Uctober 26, 2000.

4

'.l

The decreed water rights were limited to the irrigation of a

total of 28 ;· acr.::s in a single irrigation season and '(hese vvai:er rights were also limited to being
used on the combined tuta1 320 acre parcel. 14 Pursuant to the authority above, the effect of the
water rights decrees at issue was to make the water rights appwtenant to the combined total 320
acre parcel.

·r has,

vvt"1en 00 ac.res of the combined

:.no a1.:res

were conveyeu. from Plaintiffs to

Greenheart, the water rights v.hich were appurtenant to the 60 acres were also cvnveyed. 45 Like
40

Id at 465--466, •S9'.i P.2C: al 92U-92 I.
Id at 465, 690 P.2d 'lt 920. Plaintiffs argued int.his case that "SRBA partial decrees confirm the existence, nature
and extent of water rights only a.:; of ttie date tlu: par;,al decree is issued, which in mis case was seven years before
Defendant µ11rch?.sed t}J.;; 60 .icrt> ..; of Jes~rt !·:ind." Plain~iffs' Reply Memc·, p. 6. Plaintiffs SL pport this argument by
citing to American Falls Reserv. Dist. No. 2 v. iDWR, 143 Idaho 862, 877, 154 P.3d 433, 44 7 (2007) for the
proposition tha• "[a~ partial <!i:ere·~ is not roncl11si1,.e C'S to MY post-;c,djud.~r,tion circ1;1mta11ces or unauthori.~ed
changes in its elements." Plaintiffs however leave out the context of this conclusion. Specifically, the conclusion in
American Falls regarae<l me J1n:ctol's aoility ''to, in e!.sence, 1e-adjudic.1te water rights by conducting a complete
re-evaluation of the sccpe an<i efficiencies of a decreed water right in conjunction with a delivery t·all." ld Here,
there is no re-auJUuicalio11 ai issue. Further, Plaintiffs also cite Idaho Code§ 42-101 and seveml Idaho cases which
Plaintiffs argue ~tand f,;r the rnlc t'.ia! wh.:.:thc;· a wat1:r right is an appur,cri<llK.: h) ~und hir·g ..:~; 1m whether it is a
necessary incident ot: <Jml bcne:i:iall:r u::,ed in connec1ioH with, the land. Pl&mtifrs' i:lepl~ Memo., pp. 3-7. The
Court note~ ti1i:!L, J1111k<! {Jr;'1, ,",nt 01' Fl:J.r.• if'!~;' at;Lil•Jritics <-ti.dress ,,akr r:i,.;hu dt:c:r1;._J a~ j!-:JI'; ufaa :t4iu.dication.
The court in Cm,~ mal•.-:s dear. th;; adjudic<~tion ilseif rnak•.!S ihe determ inat;ou 0f v. hat water is !Jeneticially used on
land for t11e put P·~.,es '·" "J.JtHii""'in~ wut;r :igltb L.1 tlli<t ii;nd, and ld1J10 ~utr-t~ tl.ereiti,...:1 <J;\:t:pt the decreed water
rights as condusi\t plth1f f!i'be1w1k1al u~t:.
42 Verified Complau1t, Ex. A.
43
Id, Ex. B-C.
44
Id
4' The Coinplamt ;;(\ ;r'. tht aJ1uuk.n,·J v.ak: r1,5hts 1\'t:fl' !IC\ el used or· .. ti,· 0:1reeni1,;:ifi prupi;:r,y. rhe Court has
considered the iss.1e 01 f, '''"~ i ... rt: (•f the rights a tier 1iv.: ye<tr3 'Jf nnr-·1se. lfowcvcr, id:iho (ode § 41-223(5) was
enacted after lh<. v,i:!:!i ~.£; «l~i Ver-! d..lJllUlC«•i.!d "Ile. i1~i:,r.: 1;1c suit" vf t ·,._; ;:,;,)~tny l.d l,1,:u.J1td1't llai :;£.'!lute
41

provides a tY:Jter npht ')
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the court in Crow, :his Court will not re-litigate tnose issues, including the use of the water rights
to the land \vhich are conclusively proved by the decrees issued as part of the SRBA. Therefore,

if no mistake

i~

shown at trial by the Plaintiffs, the Court wilt go ahead and analyze at summary

judgment the law related to the apportionment of the water rights decreed on the combined total
320 acre parcel was convey·~d with the 60 acr·~ parcel.

111e Idaho

~)uprrnK·

Court addrcs.5cd this issue in Crow. holding

''Lal div-islon of a tract of

land to which wat..: r is appurtenant, without segregating or :ic.serving the water light, works a
division of suc:1

wul.\.!i

r.gi.1t

~.1

prop0rtio11 us the land is divided.'' 109 Idaho at 467, 690 P.2d at

923. Since the water rigi.·1ts .vere not scgre.gatcd or t;;;.;erved. before the saie, the court must
apportion ih(;

wa(~I

rights. Here:, .:h..:. 60 acre pared is 18.75 percent of the 320 acre parcel. It is

undisputed the decrcc<l wa:er iiglus a.rt: for 2~7 acres of fo~ c0mbin.:u total 320 acre3, with water

right 61-2188 aHO\ving

irrigatio~1

on 164 acres within lhe total 320 acres uescribed, and water

right 61-7151 allovving irrigation ·::.in 12.3

acr~s

within the total 320 acres. Apportioning 18.75

percent to the total decree.:.; 'Water rights of 2~7 acres yields \Vould yiela a total conveyed -water
right of 53.8125 aaes as the propomoned. 5hare for the Oreen1.1eart propcrty. 40 Therefore, unless
Greenhean is otl1cN.1se barred rrorn a5serting her tights. 5he received 53.8125 acres of water

rights with the conveyance of land.
\Yhether Grecnheart is
«<Jm·eyecl vnth'r r\,i,ht.

c:.
Plai'1ti:ffs

a~.sert th~1t

Gr.':en 11emt ;s estoopt.>d or

to the convr.'cd ·' J!cr r'ight h<1st'd on
and waivcr.

47

otherwis~

th~

barred from asserting any dghts to the
otl:e1wi~ie

b:irred from .:s.:;erting aDy rights

th.::or1cs of (tlKi:;i-e.,toppd, :ql'i!ahlc

~stoppel,

Gr;.>enhcar• responds that ea.ch of these fails a> a matt.;r of !av., and quasi-estoppel

and laches are .;. ffim1:1tive defi."!lses th:it cannot he as.;e:ted bv Ptah\tiffs

47

!aches,

1.mrl~r

these

3

PlaintirlS M.,;mv.

,;1

S..ipp. Sur11. J., pp. 14-:7.

0''
., r. !''•
! 11· .• '\:' i· ,, . cu· 1' 1AT) \'
l'\.
1~Lt\.\;)_J1¥.J'.. J1 v1'10 ·L;,_,·;
1\1,v
~
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circumstances.'18 Regarding using quasi-estoppel and lac hes as causes of action, the Court agrees
that cases usually refer to these doctrines as affirmative defenses. However, there is some
indication in the cast:: law that it is proper for plaintiffs to asse11 quasi-estoppel and !aches,
especially in actions regarding determining rights to land and watcr.

49

Therefore, the Court will

consider each doctrine below to the extent they have been ~xopcrly raised.
i.

Qua.sl-estoppel.

Quasi-cstoppd ·•pi events a pru.ty from asserting a right, to the deuimcnt of another party,
which is

incons~stem \\.itll

a position previously tak1.:n." C & U, Jae. v. Canyon highway Dist.

No. 4, 139 Idat..0 140, 144, 75 P.Jd 194, 198 (2003). The rl!qui;cmems for quasi-estoppel are
explained in Atwood

1-·.

Smith:

(1) the offendmg party wok ~ di'.:I.:r~nt position than his or her original position
and (2) either (a) the offendi"lg party gaine<l an gd•1antar;e or caused a
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change
positions; or (c) n would be unwnscionable to pe1mit the offonding party to
ma;ntain an inco1r.i ~cent positi0,... from O!'e he or sht~ has nlready derived a benefit
or acquiesced in. To prove quasi-estoppel, it is not necessary to show detrimental
reliance; instead, there must be evidence that it would be unconscionable to
perrrjt the cff;:Pding party t::- ~s~e,·t ;lle:5edly contrl:lry positions.

143Idaho110, 114,
Plaintiffs
conveyed

133P.Jd:l10,31~(2006).

ccnt;~r~d G;·~cnhe:'rt

wa~er ri;~n;s

'.•hould be

~<>topped

frem

ass·~rtinr:

any rights to the

b;:caus;.: ::.hi: .ilkgedly pre-. :ou.sly dcnkd having any water rights as a

result of th~ conve:;ance. 5'' 'Plaintiffs support their contention v.ith the following allegations:
'~..:.)

Greer:..'.1;,u;: ·:; iwv.r as.':e:ting that ;,}.c ol..:tained

w.;i~er

::ighrn by virtu.;;- of the deed to the

6u ac.n::s of property;

tha~

(c)

she

t; ..uch&scd

Gr~.:.rJ.J.;iirl

Hu<.ing the

Jr_,: prop";:tj

v~ithoat

\.Vater ng,11•5:

rcc·..:.v.;:J a11 actL\iltage in the fonn of reduced tax liabi•.ity by previously

p0.:;i1.~on

thc..i she pUidmscci Jry property without water rights;

(d) C1recni1eart's new a5sertion that she purchased the 60 acres with water rights is to the

d1sadva.ntdge

~); Pt..l111utls;

-----·· ...... -· -- .

·----- -·- - 48
Greenheart's Memo. in Opp. to Plaintiffs' Mot. Sum. J., pp. 8--11.
49
See ~for,'c,nfit "• ~· ;),, .i,1rt ·.Pitl~;· (j1,'.Ar. ( 0 . . -.~'.,' ldaLc. 437 . ?~>5 i:.Jd Ji': \_2fi !tl). ,t~ir.".,!\':J11tl.lu,..a>~-'i.;fr;n
Homeowners'Ass'n, lrc. v. BulottiConst., Inc., 145 Idaho 17. 175 P.3d 179(2007): Hillcrest Irr. Dist. v. Nampa&
Meridian Irr. Dist., j~- ;Jahu ~(JJ, t6 f'.1.J • t 5 U9J l ;, Jolmsm1 "· 2>t~ong Al,,. J(t:.u.1-vuir irr. /Ji~t .. 82 Idaho 478,
'"t1P.!d<Yf(l'486) "' u.' ,Q"'J.:. .11, IQI ltlnio!o:Rn.e23 P.:A8 l"110l!I).
so Plaintiff!.' Memo. in Suµp. Seim. J., pp. 14-1).
1
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(e) It would be nnconscionahle to permit Greenhcart's contrary positions because she
would gain a windfall by claiming water rights for which she never paid full value.
Greenhcart re.,punds with two argumer.ts: ( l) Plamtiffs incorrectly focus on postconveyance corniu,,;t instead of the conduct during the sale of the prop-:rty; and (2) Greenheart's
representations and her reduction in property taxes did not harm Plaintiffs or cause Plaintiffs to
. . re t l 1e1r
. d
.
~I
• etnrnem:
takea d1'ft'er~nt pos1t1011
As aircJ.Jy uiscusscJ c<4!licr in this decis1011, the Court ~an only look to the ianguage of
the contract e,{C(.Uk.d pnor •o the <~ecu to acalyz~ this daim il the Plaintiffs meet Lheir burden for
sho~ing

mistake. Part of that burden is an unconscionable result from the mhlake, if any. Given

the factual issue Lhat r~if1aias on mi~tJ.Ke and ur1couscionuuilitJ, rhc C0utt DENIES the
Defendant'J request fur sur..1mury judg111ent on Piaintiffs' quasi-estoppel theory at this time.

EquitabJe estoppel.

ii.

At summary judgment the trial court "must examine the pleadings to determine what
issues are raised in the case (because] [t]he only issues considered on summary judgment are
those raised by the pleadings." Esser E/(;'c . . Lost River Bullis1ic.\ Technologies, lnc., 145 Idaho

912, 919, 188 P.3d 854. 861 ('.2008). further, "[t]he trial court must also examine the pleadings to
determine whether nil or only s0me issues raised in the pkadings have been placed at issue by
the motion for

~urnrnary

in the moving

par~y·'s

judgmem [because] [t]ht: trial colt1i may not •f\:c1de an issue not raised

motion for summary judgmem:." Id. Plarn•iffs' Veri:ned Complaint does

not raise a claim fr1r ~q11it.1blc cstopp~J! 2 It raises a claim for promiss.:Jiy \!Stoppel, which is a
substitute fot· corE,ideration w1tkr Uaho .bw,
judgment. Le/t1111ich v

Kt.)

~Ji.lt

foat daim 13 n.::1t b.;cn rnised on summary

Bank 1fo,' Ass 'n. 141 Idaho 3>S2, J67, 109 P .Jd 11 J:t, 1109 (2005).

Therefore. this Court will 1·wr rull' a, thi;, time on tl-.c

argu~d

cLiim tor t.:qunab.e estuppel which

was not plec.. or thl' plej daim ic;· pl'\>r11is.;nry estoppcl which v.as not
L;;ich~s

equity and is a s1:(.,;,1;:;s uf equita.ok

art~acd.

and wah·cr.

1.:~topp 1~L"

Sea1 s

i..

Be;·t.,ml!.n, IO l Id:ihJ 843, 843, 623 P.2d

455, 460 (1981 ). L 11de1 !aches, "long and continuous knowing ·.icquicscence in another's use and
enjoyment of a prqc.r i.y 0r privilege ,1;ay prech.Je ,)ne flr1m :mbst:quc.11Uy asserting his claim."
SI
52

\',

See genera/Iv Verified C~Mplaint.
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Id To establisi1 i;;stc_;>p:! by !a..:hcs, "ff)aps1.: of ·dme is not alone sutlicient :o Jefeat a right ...
[but] [i]t must be shm\11 that the (claimant) has been miskJ. to his injury, by the failure of the
(holder of the right) to assert its right earlier." Id. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court in
Hillcrest Irrigutimz District v. Nampc. & Meridian Irrigation District held that a party was

estopped from asserting their water rights where they "stood by, with full knowledge of all the
facts, and fof mon:: d1w. tv.t.:nty

)~ars ;1;;.,•<J allow~d

[the clairnantj to proceed OIL the theory that it

had valid title tu thc.:se watc1 rights and a legal right tu have the wat\!r Jiverte<l ... ; and in the
meanwhile has incmTed large in<lebt.::dnes!i un the strength

or .:.i:.3. title." 5 i' Idai1c 403, 40&-409,

66P.2d 115, 117 (193;).

Regarding wai•.:er, -ihc ldaho Supreme Court summarizcJ th.;. <loctrinc of waiver as
follows:
A wcivet is the iml!r.Lional relinquishment of a known rignt. It is a Yoluntary act
and implies election hy a p~:ty tf) dispense with somf'thi'1<? of vr.lue or to f0rego
some right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party's] option have
demanded and insisted upon.
A party asserting waiver must have acted in reliance upon the waiver and altered

the party's position.
Waiver is nn eouit::ihle dortrine bas·::d upon fairnes~ and justice. Trf:' e:vistence of
waiver ordinarily is a question of fact and is furemost a question of intent. In
order to eswblish ·waiver the mtention to waive must clearly apperu, aithough it
may be established by conduct.
Hecla Min. Co. v Star-Aiorning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992).
Here, regarding iaches, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs were injured by any of
Greenhcar.:'s re.;:.in.:sentz,tiors

~o

Ellm;:-c County. Similariy,

rq~,arding

waiver,

~;;ere

;:; no evidence

that Plaintiffs altered the:r position in reliance upon any alleged waiver. The court does not
address wrether '\l.ry ?"3razing" was a proper classification of the property :onsidering the idled

rights in the water supply bank. As explained above, absent a showing of mistake, the most that
can be

s~K\.'11

i'> tk·t

Crcenb~art 111<.t~~ rep~escn1a1iom

af:cr c'cquiring th.:

no water righ'ts a!ld. ma.y ha\c r~c1:fr.,ed a tax benei'it from a

trii1J

nrop~rty

that she had
1

part) as a icsuH.: Plaintiffs

53 Again, in rear.Jing tht. "11inc7es at Comp taint. Exhibit H, tne chief appraiser ~tated an ao_iustment had been made
"ba£k to dry ~··zing ' ' t ·s unr'e"lr 1ubctbe- roe property >y3s assessed as r 1ry trazir·; tefure the sale tq
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)

ha\i-: not pwvitkJ Lh.::. Cuu!t ,, :th

UH) ..:1.

ti

th.: possibl:. t:ii,!tadilig

~1~nc.:·'.1<.".:'.

tw~L•;

this w:.1:> ,b.11.· n
from the day

..iL It :.l ,I

li1Jl

tk:) , • ..:tL n:!:;kd tJ:, tl.c:-.c ::.tJh:mc1~t..; lo thdr

lari:c debt i!l t:\p..:r.Jing: signili.::Ul!

injury. Such a.. lfH.:,inmg

they hav,;

dt!nCt'

,\_'th·ug'.,

<1~.i,J1t.,, :1..~l· ;;:d t\1

r•;.i.d,;~Y5

;-r.:i.intain

~urns

GI mone;. o,1st:J in part on

a;:;, . . rt in their

1.iw \\.:t 1CI

r·~pt~ r11~·,11orz.fo..1um

that

rii:,hh, '11·~ l'I.: is n0 :·.iJcncc that

i01:t::. n c;,..:t11n~a:t'~ pc:;t-.;...1..- :..: 1.::rc~·~ ·: ... t:,,.1~.'' !., !°;11;1. 11 i:, ,:;;~:,.;puled that

._1::;:,. v as ;-;ig11::..:

lJ!h'.arJ,

Plai;.jffs ah.Jy', bdie•:ed Lh;.:y

l)'>\l'll,.'t

t!·.c w1tcr r;ghts

an<l ha\ c t:(1ns1stcntl; u;;senel.i ·m..11 (Jr;.:\!nheart tir~t asserted water right-; in F-::bnuiry 2012. To

the extent Plaintiffs rely on the fact that tile) ! ~c:~ed f1c disputed water rights tc· Lhe Idaho Water
Resource~.

BozuJ V1at ..'r

Su~·p.)

!Jam.. they

~dmittcd~y

hu\.c been <luing.

~o ~.i1:cc

August 28,

2003. abou; l;,'ur .'e:irs btfo;-e JllY c•. we subjc..:t n::prcs<!nt:.ni0n::;, making it 1mr0:;s:blc ihat such

actions wen: the r·:suit uf ar.y rcp~es.;::ntations made bv Gr:i.:nhei.1.rt. 5' rhen.:f:•r~. P!uim1ffs' laches
and \\·aiver theorit>.i foil as a math::r uf law.
Crnv u:sm'.li

The ('uurt Dt ~~!E 'l rn;--,unary .:1.:dgment in favor of either party on the issue of mistake as

it relates to i. J«rlt L
Count

lhe C\\urt c..iR·\\TS summary juJgrnenl in fa\\)r

n 1.Jf th.;; Verified Complaint for quiet title. except tc

1

(11'

(HC«:nhcart against

the ;.;xtent Count \l states a claim for

quasi-esh)ppel or promis~.ory e.stoppd.

benefit t•1 ( irl'.:ni c'.•r( s re;;iestntati;m that ti.id lut been previou~!y rccc!l>•':d hy rre Flai.1riJ1s lhnugh ic1lmg tho:
\\rater ri~lw.. 1n ihc "· atcr -;upp1y Pank.
4
'
Ph int; f':c,
Mernn . ii. ; \
Pr,J11,:· \
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AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
ORE~T, a individual,
o.t.ndant.

D•tmdam, Aupta Sl)'Oko Mimoto ~ by and through her attomeya of record,
Vi=or Villegu and Borton Lakey Law Offlea, moves this Court. pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(2)(B)

of the Idaho Rula of Civil Proc:edvre, b'
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of thia Coun'1 Ord.. Denylq

Summary Judgment Oil Count I and Granting In Part Summary Judsment For Defimdat on
Count II Bled Jammy 21, 2013.
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A.no,,,.,, for Dll"""""
IN TSE DISTRICT COtnlT o• TBI l'OtnlTB J'tJDICIAL DISTRICT or
TSE STATI or mABo, IN AND FOR TSE C01JNTY or ELMORE

JAY BR.OWN ad CHR.ISTINE HOPSON·
BROWN, Hmbaad ml Wf.fe,

CASE NO. CV 2012-353

MEMORANDUM IN SVPPORT
or DD'ENDANT'I MO'nON
roR RECONSmERATION

Platndta.

v.
AUOUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
ORE!NHBA.l.T, ID ind.Mdual,

Detlmdant.

Defendant, Aupata Sa)'Oko Mimoto Oreeahlart, by and tbroup 1- attorney of record,

Victor VWeau and Borton Lakey Law Offices, submita this Memorm:lum m Support of

Defendant•• Motton fbr R.ecomideration.
JNTRODUCDON
Thia cue involv• a quid title and declaratory action ftled by Plaintiftk lay and Christine

Brown (hereJnafter collectively refirted to u ''Browm") wlring 1 declantion that

De~ant

A..- Oremlltmt E'~ 1- ae rJaktt . . er im..e te _ . sremcl water riPtl
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that are appurtant to approximately sixty (60) 1Cre1 of real property that Orembemt ptll'Cbue4

in Jl1mll')' 2001.

Both parties moved 1br oro•motiom In summary judpent and thia Court illUld ita
deciaion titled OrrJ.r /Jaylnf Sramna1)' Judpnt On Count I and G"""'1W In Pan ~
~For Dtfadant On Count 1l (-summary

J\Jdament Dects!on") on Jamllf)' 31, 2013. Al

part of tbia Comt'• Summary Jud.pent Deoition, tbia Camt hl1d " ...the matterl preeented by
both lfdel In support of the motiom ix lmllma')' juctament raise the 1-e of whether there wu a

miltab wbfob ii a question of taot tbat precludes summary judgment." Sramna1)' Jr.uJrtnat
Dt#:lllon pa. 1o.

On:mehart nspeattblly ukt this Comt to recomider that portion of itt decilion because.

u explained mote ft.illy below, Ptafntiftfl did not plead mistake and more importantly Grecmhl8rt

throuah 1- various aqumems on IUlDmlZ'Y judamont aid her motions to strike did not conaent
to try the matter ofmiate either through expreu coment or by implication.

Lutly, Greenehart ub thil Court to recomid.er it8 analyais and application of the facts of

thJs cue with respect to the statute of Jtmftatiom raiMd by Greenlteart'a motion fbr IUmllUlr)'

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 1l(a){2)(B) of the Idaho R.u1ea of Civil Procedure allows a party to aoek

reoomidendon of 1 decision on an interlocutory order prior to the entry of bl Judament, or
within 14 days offlnal,ludament. There bu been no ftnaljudpieat emend ill thia oue.

The decision to arant or deny a motion fbr recomidll'ltion ia reviewed fbr an abuae of
diac:ntion. Co,,,_rdal J'llllw'a, Int:. v. Ra M. •Lynn LMa Family nwt, 145 Idaho 208, 216,
177 P.3d 955, 963 (2001) Abue of dilcndon is determined by a three pat test which ub
whether the district comt (1) comictly perceived the issue u one of discretion; (2) acted within

No. 5188

st Carlton Ave

· .Feb. 15. 2013 4: 47PM

P. 4/13

the outer boundariet of its dilcntion and ooDliltently with the lepl ltlDdards applicable to tbl
apecifio cbabta available to it; ad (3) reached itl deoiaion by Ill ex.ercile of reaoo. /d.

ARGVMINT
L Brow111 Did Not Plead Miltalat.
Bfowm did not plead or otbawile allep mistake In tbeir Complaint with partimlarity 11

requind undw the Idaho llulel of Civil Procedure which ii why Oreenhellrt DIVfl' addreaed the

ilu of miatlke in her Allrlls. diloowry or motion Ix" summary Judament. Moreover
Onablrt did mt try the iaau of miltlb

OD

summary judgment by implication. but rather

made a fi)nml objection to the tact that mlltlke wu not pled. P!amtia lbovld not be permitted
to tr)' I claim that it did not ask fbr, DOI' did either party &rpe mistake

fn their respective

summary J\ldamem pleedfnp.
L

Bl'OWlll dlcl aot meet LR.C.P. Rvle 9(b)'I reqalnmeat to plead mlltlb wltll
pardlllllrlt)'.

Tho pneral po&y behind the curnnt rm. of civil pmcedure ii to provide every litipnt

with hit or her day m court. Carrillo v. Boll• 1h Co., Inc. 15.Z Idaho 741, 7'1..752, 274 P.3d
12.56, 1266 • 1267 (2012). The purpose of a complaint ii to iDJbrm the defendant ofthe material
f4cts upon which the plalntU!' bull his action. Id. A complaml need only contain a conciae
ltatllll.ellt of the fictt cmmtitutint the came of action ml a demand fbr relief Id. In eome cam.
a~ pk!4in1 ~may be imposed by rule such u

acdom llleainl mistake

a

tlul'ri>remust be ltated withpll'tioularity. Id.; I.R..C.P. 9(b).
Rule 9(b) states

mperdnent

part: "Ia all avermmts•••m9take•..tbe circmmtancel

comtitutfna...mistake...ahall be stated with particu1arity." 1.1..C.P. 9(b).
In thia cue, neither the Factt, Count I nor Count II ofBrowm' Complamt ub this Court
to rend• J\ldameat baled OD I mistake. More Importantly there ii nothing in the Complaint that
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ii plead with particularity that would put Oreeaheart on notice what kind of mistake ii beina
soupt. Ia it mutual miltlb or a unHatcnl mistake? What wu the imstake? Althoqh this

Court*• Summary Jucfament Decision ltat• that then ii 111 umeeolvld 1i.ctual i8IUe on "mutual
miatab" the relief sought in Browm• Complaint newt uked to relCtnd or modif.f the contnct or

deed which ii the common remedy

armed by courts tbr a mutual mistake.

Su '·I· Mtcalaa

v. Bl'Otldway Ford, Inc., 280 P.3d 176, 181-182 (2012) (raciaaion ii a remedy fbr mutual
miltake).
It ii ol• tom the alleptions Jn the Complaint that Browns newr aouabt to litipte the

isiue of mutual miltlke.

Por example, the Browns allep amnl post Ille activitie• that,

according to Plaintiff; "... demonstrate and clearly show that it wu known to the Browns and

Drimdant that no por:tkm of the Water RJghta were intended to be conveyed to

Oreeahmt," Complainl , 19, There is nothiDa in that alleption that

Browm or Oreenheart made a mistake. Browns'

CIUIO

D~

IUgcstl that either

of acdcn and request fbr relief ii belt

tummarized in puasmph 27 of the Complaint that reads:
27.
The facts and ~of the tnmaction by which Defendant purchucd
the property tom Plaintift'a, and the part!•' subsequent conduct thereafter, establish
that any preaumptton that any portion of the Water R.fahtl paned to Defendant
Greenhemt under the pmn1 appurtenantoy clause of the Wln'l11t)' Deed is
conclusively rebutted by ~ clearly demonstrating that it wg 1mpJYD to both plJtiH
that no portion of the Water RJab,ts wen intended to be conveyed, and compel an
into:pnltation of the purchase ml Ille aareemem and Warranty Deed to the efteot
that the Oree.ahart Propmty wu purchued and conveyed without water right9. but
rather u dry Jmt.

Sid Complaint, 27 (underlinfna added).

NothUla in that paraaraph alleps one of the parties made a mistake. Havma failed to
plead mistake with particularity, Browm• abou1d not be allowed to present evklcmce of mistake

which ii an exception to the parole evidence rule u dilcuaed Uld applied in Koon v. Empey, 40
Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097 (1924), Oreenbeart bas aim.ultaneoualy tiled I aeparato Motion In Limine

· .Feb.15. 2013 4:47PM
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with this Court eee1dng to limit any ml all u.trinaic IYidance of ID .Uepd contrary la.tent
between the partite becw Dltlke WU not pied.

b. Grealaeart ud/or Brown &1111 not try the lane of wlledler mataal mlltake
alut la ddl ... tltbtr tlaroqla apna or lmplled eon1eDt dlll'lns.......,.

J•.....t.
Gemrally, isa\111 not railed in the pladfnp ~tried by expre11 or implied comem oftbe
pmtiea are to be treated u if u

thouah they w

been railed

m•

pllldinp. Collini "·

Parldnlon, 96 Idaho 2M, 527 P.2d 12$2 (1974); Sn al8o LR.CP. lS(b) ("When illuea not
railed by tbe pleaclina are tried by expr• or implied consent of the ptrtill, d1ey aba11 be treated

mall reapectl a

it they hid been raised in the plewlinp"). The requirement that the unpleaded

luuet be tried by at leut the implied eomont of' the pardel UIU1'll that the pardel have notice of
the illues 'befOre the court IDd ID opportunity to addrea tho• - . . with evidence ml

qumant. M. X. 7"uuport, Inc. v. Growr, 101 Idaho 345, 349·350. 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 • 1197
(1P80).
The ease of Collini v. ParldMo" wu a quiet ti't!e action where appellant arped that the
trla1 court erred in refbrmina a quit claim deed due to mutual mistake. Collini at Idaho 296. The

buil l>r appellant'• atpmlllt wu that mutual mistake wu not pracmted by the pleadmp. Id.

n. Colllna court held that the partiea tried the ileue 'by implication because the appellants did
not object: "The record indicates no objection to the inquiries u to the iuue of miltab

m

preparation of the quitelaim deed. Therefbre the issue wu properly raised at trial." Id. Basad on
the Collini couzt'• reuoning. it is reuonable to conclude that had the appellant objected to the
mquiria 11 to the ialu• of miltake, then the il8llO would not have been tried by Implication.
In thll cue the parties have not

aone to trial yet, but ~ Gramheart bas not

coDSentid tO uy ttii iiiiil of miitBi it lriil nor ma Griiiiia&art ti')' t1li raue of mlltikii iipiiiily
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oppolldon to Browm' modon l>r 111mmery judamcmt and pleldinp OD i. motion to strike wn
premiaal OD the fact that the Browm did oot allege hud or miatlke m:l thcel>re the extrlm1o

IYideoco oifend In support of Browm' motion l>r IUmmllY judpwnt wu bmed by the parol
evidence rule u .. tbJth in Ewqw/.

Oremhemt'• arpmem that hud or mistake wu oot plead by Browt11 eau be l>\md in
Oreenheart'1 memorand\1m oppolina Brown1' smnmary jvdpwnt. In the context of applyina
the EwqwJ decision and the parol evidence Nie to the fa.ob of this cue, Grecehlrt'• oppotiq

memorandum 9tated:
Mote Importantly, the exc:eption to the parol evidence rule (hud or miltlke) that
would padt the introduction of extrimio evidence bu peyc Wn pied \y Browm.
Brown•• Complaint doel not allep had or mistake em s;crtainly dop POt mut
I.B..C.P. 9()) ramiriDI tMt bud or miltlko be plod with wtfsulm. At a result. the
extrimic evid8JK'll Brown a.ttempta to introduce (which Oreenb.eart currently
ch•11cmpa in her motion to ltrib filed com.DTCIDtly) u the l>undadon tbr theh'
motion cannot be I basil tbr grantiq nmmll')' judgment.

S. Memorandum In Oppolldon to Plalntljfl 'Motlon/o1' Summary Jwlpat pp. 5-6.
The quoted argument above ii a ~ expreuion by Greenhelrt that mistake wu not pled by the
Browm nor wu miltab pled with partfcularity. More lmportamly, tbr purpoHB of this motion

ilr recomidcntion, tho quoted 1anpage above cannot be comtrued u either expre11 or implied
consent by Oreenebart to try the iuue of mistake. If anythiq Oremheart'a argument ii

111

objection that would defeat a 1!ndlq of'tryiq 111 lslUO by implieation.

Moreover, dl1rinl oral arpmcmt on tho parties' =u-motiom fbr summary judgmant,
ccn:mael tbr Oreenhmt specifically lll'gtlCd that hud or miatake wu oot pied by tho Browm and

therefore the extrimic evldenco offered by the Browm abould not be considered. Counsel tbr
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Ommhelrt a1lo ltated that while then a nit.. and eue law that allow partiet to try an unplead
illua by expre11 of impliad coment. Greeaheart wu not comentina to try the iu1ie ofmistake.

P•hapt the most tollins argument directed to ti. fiat that neither party litiaared the lslUt
of wbClther then wu a mutual miltlke ii the 1adt of qumem tom the Bmwm that thn wu a

mf•lke. ti.. is nothiDa contained in the Bmwna' ptM«tinp mbmitted on the cro•motfom
fbr summary judgment that 1 miatab had been pied or that a mistake bad oQC\JmlCl whieh would

allow a departure tom the parol evidence rWt. Tht Browm' Reply brief in IUppOrt of their

modon fbr summary judsment tddrelam the

incomiltent with other Idaho

CU.

E,,,,., decilion only ID the comm that: (1) it is

both bdn al after the deoilion; (2) then

WU DO

appu.rtcmmt water npt; (3) the Purcbue and Sale A,areement confirmed no water wu beins

sold; ml (4) Qreenheart is bmed by atoppel, lachet and Otha' equitable deftnses. At DO time in
their brief1na or clurlna oral qument did the Browns •sue that their extrimic evidence should
be considered becauH it met the mistake meption to the pmol evidence rule.
Bued on tho analyail above. Oreenheart respecttUUy uks thia Court to nconaider ita

Summary Judgment Deoiaion ml find that mrithar pll'ty tried the Issue of mtsttke on summary

IL The Statute of IJmttadom Bu Ru In Tlalt Cae.

Thil Court held that the BfOWDl' lawlUit ii timely undlr any of the statute oflimitationa

cited by the pll1ies (Le. I.C. 15·216, 5·224 and 5-203) because accrual' of the Browm' cue

beam when Oreenhean filed with the mWR. Oil February 17, 2012.

s. Sunmtar.Y Jflllgmat

Dctrton pp. 6-7. Clrembeart respecttblly dilasrees with thla Court'• IDll)'lis oftbe acorua1 date
u well u any co111ideration that Section 5-203 ii applicable in this cue. Orcmhelrt requests that
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ldlho Code Seetloa 5-20311 not tile appleable rtatate of llmltatlou.

The Idaho Supreme Court hll let i>rth apecitlc princlplel that pidl
~of a atatute.

1

court in tbe

"Stamtmy intapntation bepa with the literal lanpaae of the ltatUte.

Pnw111oat ...... not bt nac1 Ill llolatloa. but 1DU1t be interpreted ID the contat of the adre

documeat. 'l1ll ltatate llaoald be eomldered 11 a whole, and words ahouJd be aiven tbelr plain,
usual, and cm:liDary meamnp," SltM v. ScladJ, 151 Idaho 8631 866-867, 264 P.3d 970, 973 •

91• c2011> (bo1dina added>. "It should" notec1 that the eoun DllC

am eft'egt to all the won11

and proviaione oftlw atatute ao that none will be void, IUpCrlluoua, or red1mdant." Id.

Here. the Jaaauaae of Seodon 5·203 when reed in ltt eatnty, and sivina effect to all the
words Ind proviliona of the ltatute do m support the application of thia statute to the fActs in tbla

cue. Idaho Code Sec:tion 5-203 rads in ita entirety:
No act.ton fbr the recoVll')' of real property, or 1br the recovery of the
pos•li>n thereo( CIA be maimdppb PPM it ..... tMt the pJamti: hil
mpolQt. pdpggr Of D"UJt• WM aflCll or gplWlld of tht mm1Y in
;uMicm pithm twRY Qql na bdp qmmvmgmymt of OJC actiop; and
thil MOtion. inoludet poueuory ria1U to Jada and mintn1 daimt.
Idaho Code f 5-203 (underliniq and

boJdina added). The plain Jaquqe of Section 5-203

requh'el that the pl1tnturbe "seized or poaeaecl otthe property in question within twenty (20)

In thil cue, thia Court hu ruled that unless the Browm can prove miltlke, the water

rfahts wen tnmterred to Oreeaheart via the appurtenant laapap conWned in the Warranty
Deed. S.. Sununary J""'"'1tl D1t:lllo11 pp. 11·13. Thie Court'• conch:Won ii important

wu trimflrncl to Orembmt via the hmp11e of the Wlt'lltJty Deed on January 29, 2007, there
wu an fmmediate brelk in owmnhfp; the Browm no

Jona« aeized or po11e111d tht around

water. It maka :no difference if or when Oreenheart oomacted IDWR.. Theo ii PA Jaw In Jdahq
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eft'ectlve uptil the pntM gall1 the

mWJl On the oonuary. the holdma• of Empq and Irllll ate that water ii trwfelred with the

deed

un1111

it ii uprmly fllll'VllL Tbm, tba Browm cannot proceed und« Section 5-203

becau11 they have not ldvmely pot1e11ed the pound wets tom Oreeahmt 1br 20 years.
'b. AeeruJ ltlrted at tile Jatelt oa neon11a1 tilt Warruty DMd.
Thia Court'• recognition that the ground water wu tramferred to Oremheart via the

Janauaae ofthe Wll'l'ID.ty Deed ii equally Important 1br Sxinl the date of acorua1 II well. With
rClpCCt to wbm the cauae of action accru.ed in this cue, this Comt held that "the

mma with the

IDWR wu the first imtaa.ce that Oreenhrart UMrtecl my ownership in the wat• rights advent
to the Plaintift"I. n.ri>re. the quiet title action filed on April 5, 2012 ii well withm all of the
statute of limitations." Sn Summary Judgment D«:&ton p. 7. Greenhnrt submits that thil

concluaion however is incorrect based on the uncontrovmted evidence.
If the teat fbr accrual is to look at when Oreenheart &st "ussted any ownership in the
water dahtl advene to the Plah:atlifl" the act of contacdna IDWR. ii not the f1nt tmtanco. The

Brat imtance of ulm'tins ownarahip ii when Oremheart recorded the Warranty Deed in the

public rec:orda of Blmore County. Moordiaa to Empq and lrllh water appmtemmt to the
property ii tnm&ftned tmle91 expreuly rl8ll'Ved. Thil Court held the ume in its Summary
Judament Dec!sion. When Oree.oheart recorded the deed in the public records she wu not only

lettiq the whole world know that lhe ii the record owner of the real property leplly described
in that deed, ebe ii a1ao making it known to the world that she owm all appmtenant waur

The Warraty Deed ii attached to the Complaint and a1lo attached to Orecmheart'1

Aftldavit In Suppon of Summary Jud.plmt .. Exhibit B. The Wamnty Deed ii recorded u
Imtrwnent No. 384017, in Elmore, County with a date of January 30, 2007.
MEMORANDVM JN STJPPOR.T OP I>DENIMNT'S MOTION POR.IECONDJERAnON • 9

394

The Complaint

· feb.15. 2013 4:48PM

No. 5188

st Carlton Ave

P. 11/13

wu filed on April 5, 2012 which ii more than !ve years tom t11e date of the reoordJna of the
Wmanty Deed. n..dxe, the Browm' lawsuit ii untimely und.- ldlbo Code Seotion S-216

(five )WI l>t contract aotiona) mi Section S-224 (fbur.ym catch all).
DI. Tile Staaate of Llmltatlou Ila Run Oa Tiii Brvna' Mlltlke Clalm (11 Appllcablt)
Should thil Court detamine that Bmwm . . permitted to introduce evidenee of mutual
miatab and that trial ii neceamy, any reUot atlbrded by the Jaw of mutual miatake ii untimely

'becaUle tJ2at claim wu not broupt within the three-ym ltltUte of Jfmftatiom.
The statute of Jfmttadom on the around of hud or miltab mutt be commenced within

three (3) yean. I.C. f 5·218. Section S-218 ltltll that aC1.WJ1ofac:tion tbr bud or mistake does

not accrue until "until dilcovmy, by the agrieved party, of the Sacts comtitutina the taud or
miatab... Id. In the context of ftaud, "our Supreme Court bu held tJ2at •1CtUa1 knowledge of
the hud will be fnfemd if the alleaedly aarieved party could have dilco'Wll'Cd it by the IDl'Cile

of due dillpnce."' A.ltkn v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 901, 702 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Ct. App. 1985)
(quodq N'1l'U':Y IA• Mina, Inc. v. HanVon, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.:Zd 828, 829 (1973)). The

..4.ttan court hold that tbil same principle applies to causes of action. bued upon. miatab:
We believe the aame principle logically applia to causes of actkm bued upon
miltab. Acoordhialy, we bold that ID action 1""11 rejicf fi:om mjpke will
be timtlmnd tmd« I.e.

f s-211(4) un1w I it ftJcd w#NA tbl1I mm Wr
1U miltakP COJJld hmm dlammd mti&• mn• of 4" 4 P'nnst·
Id. (underlinhia and boldina added).
"Ordinarily, what oomtitutea [the eurcise of] reuonable dilipnee to diacover taud so
11

to a&ct the tine when the statute of Hmitatiom beaim to

nm ii a queation of fUt tbr the

jury.... Of come, wlmt gnly QM coucluemn cm be drawp tom tbo
rnemnablo dlliaow tQ dlgyor

~

fi:tt'41 mg bt dmjdrl by the wqrt y

a

tho qygtign gf

mattm pl lg"
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Cltclf. Inc. v. ScMllbtf, 108 Idaho 634, 638, 701 P.2d 254, 258 (Ct.App.1985)(underlinina
added).

In thil cae, lince tbe law in Idaho bolds that water pu1e1 with the 1ml lln1ea the deed
ccmveylna the 1ud expreuly resems the nts rfsht E,,,,,., 1f1Pra., the Browm oould have ml

sho11ld have dilcowred the miltake on the date tbey liped the Warranty Deed. Then ii no
dilpute that the Warnnty Deed did not oomam

Ianauaa• reservina the sround nter tom the

trau&r oftht property, Thia Court should c:larmine u a mattar of law, that the plain 1quap

of Wllrlllt)' Deed IUPPOftl the ocmoluaioa that the Btowm should of am could of rlisoovad the
nriltlb Oil the date they lipd the Wamnt)' Deed (JU'1W7 2,, 2001).
If the date the Browm siped the Wmaaty Deed is wu not enough to put them on notice
of diacoVflrina the mistake. then the date the Wmu>.ty Deed WU recorded in the real propcty
records pmvidn the next opportunity 1br the Browm to diloover the m:lstlb. The Warnmy

Deed wu recorded u lnstn.mHmt No. 384017, in Blmore, County on January 30, 2007 tbr the
entire world to • · OUr c:ourtl have recopsized that '1t]he primary pm:poac of the recontins
statutes ii to &fve notice to othen that an interelt ii olainied

mreal property,"

Ka/angl "·

RlllCMr, 13d Idaho 192, 196, 30 P.3d 970, 974 (2001). Bued on the lrlllt and Empq holdinp,

it logically tbllowe that a recorded deed Jacldna any reservation 1quaao reprdins water ptaoes

others 011 notice that water wu tramferred with the land.
Based on the diacuaion above, thia Court abould determine that mutual m1ltako ii not &m
available remedy 1br the Browns becauae they ooukt. have cltlooverecl the mistake eithlr on the
date they liped the Wemnty Deed (Jmury 2t, 2007) or the VfllY nut day when the Wmamy

Deed wu recorded (Jmury

Jo. 2007). Either datt ii t>e,ond

tht tbree-ys statute of

limftadom period Idaho Code Section 5-218 ad tbere1bre any claim ofmiltake ii untimely.
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CONCLUSION
Bald upon the undisputed &cu llld the arpments set 1brth above. Oreenhellt
nspecdblly requests that the Court: (1) preclude Plaintift'a ftom mating a claim of"miatab" u

a bail l>r 111)' relief' niq\lllted; ad (2) araat Defendant'• motion fbr summary Judamem bued

on the atatute of limitatiom.
DATBD tbJs 15* day of Pebruary, 2013.

BORTON LAKEY LAw omcss

By~·
.4.ttornq1 for Dt/Dllltmt

CQTIUCAD gr sgytg;

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15* day of Pebrmy, 2013, a truo and correct copy of
the ibresoinl documem WU IMll'VOci by ftnt-clau mail, poltqe prepaid. and addreued to; by fiax
trammisaion to; by ovemilht d.ellvery to; or by personally deliveriq to or leavina with a pmon
in chirp of the ot!oe u indicated below:
Micbael c. Creamer
Thomu B. Dvont
OIVBNS PUlsLBY I.LP
601 West Bmmock Street
P.o. Box 2720
Boiae, ID 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Pacsfmile: (208) 388-1300

[ ] U.S. Mall
[X] Pax

[ ] Ovniaht Delivcy
[ J Hmd Delivery
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LED

Joe Borton [ISi No. 5552]
Victor Villegu [ISB No. 5860]
BORTON LAICBY LAW omcss

1"41 B. Carlton Avt.

Maidia. ID 83642
Bo• Idaho 83702
OfBce: (201) 90M41$
Pu: (208) 49,-4610
Small: victor@bofton-laby.com

..4ttomq.r/OI' ~

IN TD DISTRICT CO'ORT or THE lO'OllTB JUDICIAL DISTRICT 01'
THE STATE or mABO, IN AND FOR TD COUNTY o:r ELMORE

JAY BR.OWN and CHRISTINB HOPSON·
BROWN, Husbad and Wife.

CASE NO. CV 2012-353
DDENDAN'f•S MOttON IN

Plahitifl.

LIMINB TO PRBCLVDE
ALLEGATIONS o:r MISTAKE

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GR.BBNHJ!ART, an indivlduaJ,
Defendant.

Deftmdant, Aupm Sayoko Mimoto Gremheart, by and through her atiomeys of record,
Borton Lakey Law Otflces, moves dlla Court tn ltmlu fbr an Order excludins evidence md
testimony on the iuue of mistake.

Tbis motion fl buecl on the pleldfnp on file, and

Memonn«hrm In Support ot Defendant•1 Motion 1br llecomideration (which fl npoduced in
part withm this Motion) and all filed contemporaneoualy herewith.
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l'N'JJ\QDUCIJON
Thia oao fnvolvea a quiat title ml declaratory action filed by Plainti.tD Jay and Chriatim

Brown (hainak collective1y referred to u "Browm") 1"'dn1 a deolaration that Ddmdlllt
Aupata Oreenhelrt ("Oreenhelrt") bu no riabt, title or interat to certain pound water rigbtl

that a appurtemmt to approximately sixty (60) acrea otreal property that Oreonheart purchased
in January 2001.

~

Both pardos moved tbr cro•motiom tbr IUmm&rf judpient ml this Court ilsued ill

decision titled Order Denying Summary Judpent On Count I and Qrantias In Part Summary
Judpient For Ddmdld On Count II (MSummary Judpient Decilion") on January 31, 2013. At

part of tbil Court'• Summary Judgment Oeoiaion, tbia Com held " ...tu

mau.n prwatld by

both nda In lflPPOl't ofth• motlon.r for"""'"""' jwlpwnt rob1 thl tau of whsther thlre waa a
ml.ftaa

wldch tr o fU"llon offact that precludu llOMI01)' judgm1nt." Summary Judpient

Decision PS. 1O.
PJaintifft did not plead miltako and more importantly Greenbeart tbroush her various
arpmanta on rnmmwy judgment and her motions to strike did not consent to uy the matter of

mistake either throuah express con.sent or by implication.
A&GUMENT

L

Bnnnu Did Not Plead Mistake.

Browm did not plead or othenrile allep miltllce in their Complaint with particularity u
required under the Idaho R.ulel of Civil Procedure which fa why Greeahart never addressecl the
ia\le of· mistake in her .Answs, diacovery or motion 1br rnmmwy judgment. Moreover
Oreenehmt did not try the iuue of miJtake on summary judgment by implication, but rather

made a bma1 objection to the fact that mistake wu not pied. P1efntl1!11hould not be permitted
DEFENDANJ"S MOTION IN LIMINE • 2
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to try a claim that it did not uk tbr, nor did eithrr party quo mistake in their respective
mmmmy judpumt p1-Hnp.
L

Browm clld aot meet LR.C.P. Jhle t(h)'• nqaJn. .t to plead mlltab with

pardc1allrlty.
The pmra1 policy behind the cmrent nilel of oivil procedure ii to provide tlVflr/ lltipat
with hfl or lwr day fn court. Cmillo v. Boile Tire Co., Inc. 152 Idabo 741, 751-752, 274 P.3d
12!6, 1~ • 1267 (2012). The purpose of a complaint ii to int>tm the defendant ofthe material
1Utl upon which the plaintift' bull his action. Id. A complaint need only contain a colldse

• . , . of the 4lcta comdtutiq the C1U1t of action IDd a demand 1br relie£ Id. In some euet.

a heJabtad pleadtna requirement may bo impoaed b)' rule such u aatiom alleaiq miatake ml
thcreibre must be ltatld with particularity. Id.; I.R..C.P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) atatea in pertinent pm:
"In all avsmenta...mistlb... the circumstances comtitutfq... mistake... ahall be stated with

paztieuJcity." I.R..C.P. 9(b).
In this cue, neither the Fact&, Count I nor Count Il of BroWDI' Complaint alb this Court

to render judgment baaed on a mistake. More importantly there la nothins in the Complaint that

ii plead with pll'tfeularity that would put Oreenheart on notice what kind of mistake ii being
IOqht,

II it mutual miltake or I umlatm.l miatake? What WU the mistakes? Althoush this

eoun•s Summary Judpnent Decision states that there ii ID unreaolved factual luue on "mutual
mistake" the relief .ought in Browm• Complamt never uked to rescmd or modliY the contract or
deed which ii tho common remedy granted by cow fbr a mub.111 mistake. S. 1.1. MlcMll111

v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 280 P.3d 176, 181-182 (2012) (reecialion. ii a remedy fbr mutual
mistake).

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMlNE. 3

400

·Feb. 15. 2013 4:49PM

No. 5189

ast Carlton Ave

P. 5/9

It ii clear tom the alleptiona in the Complaint that Browm nevs apreal)' aoqht to
lldpte the iame of mutual misteb. Por example, tbe Browm allep MVa1 post lale IOtivlties

that. aocordina to Plainti~ " .•.demonttrate ml clear!)' lhow that it WU 1mown to the Browm
IDd Deftmdant that DO portion ottbe Wmr RJahta wa Intended to be conve,ed to Ddmdant
Oreenhelrt." Complaint , t 9. 'n1m fl nothing in that alleption that IU8P* that eitmr
Browm or Oreenhelrt made a miltake. Browm' cauae of &Odon and request i>r relief ii beat
aummarizld in pangnph 27 oftht Complaint that reD:

27. The f4cta ml circumltanoet of tho tramactfon by which Defadant
purdwed tho property tom Plaindffl, an4 the pmtiel' mbleq'Uent conduct
thcreaftcl', establish that ID)' ~ that ID)' portion of the Water RJabtl
pmerl to Ddmd1nt Oreenbmt undlr the saeraI appmteaantcy c1auae of the
Warranty Deed ii oonclulfvely rebutted by t.«I clearly demomtratma that it wu
known to both parties that DO portion of the Wat• Rfahts were inteaded to be
conveyed. and compel an interpretation of the purohue ml ale aanement and
Warranty Deed to the effect that the Oreenholrt Property WU purcbued ml
conveyed without wit• rightl, but rather u di)' land.

s. Complaint, J1 (wWrltnlnf atldtd),
Notmns in that pnsrapb allepa that one otthe parties made a miltlke.

Havina &iled to

plead mistake wllh partlcularUy. Browm' lhould not be allowed to preaent fNideace of miatab •

- an aception to the parole evidence rule • diseualld and applied in Koon v. Empq, 40 Idaho 6,
231 P. 1097 (1924).
b. Gntnburt ud/or Bron• did not try tile ltlae of whether mataal mlltl.ke
mlted In th!I cue eltller tlu'Oup apnn or Implied comu.t darl:q llUIUIW')'

Jdpuat.

Oeoerally, illuet not raiaed in the pladinp Jet tried by ex.prma or implied c:onsent of the
pmtles

11'1 to

be treated u if u

thou&h they hid been railed

in the pleldinp, Collllu "·

Parldluon, Pd Idaho 294, 527 P.2d 1252 (1974); Su allo I.R.C.P. 15(b) ("When inues not
railed by the pladmg are tried. by apr• or implied conacmt of the parties, they lha11 be treated
DEFENDANT'S MonONIN UMJNE .4
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in all reepectl .. if tb&:y bad been raised in the plOldinp"). The reqWrement that tho unplOldecl
iuuea be trlld by at least the implied coDllDt of the plltiel auures that the patties have notice of

tht issu• betbre the oourt and an opportunity

to addreu

tboae iuull with evidence and

arpmmt. M. K. .7>mr.rport /no. v. Grovlr, 101 Idaho 345, 349-350, 612 P.2cl 1192, 1196 • 1197

(1980).
The cue of Colllnl v. Parldn.ton wu a quiet title action where appellant argued that the
trial oourt erred mzdmnins a quit: claim deed due to mutual mistake. Collbu at Idaho 296. The

basil fbr appellant's ll'pment WU that mutual miltake wu not presented by the pleadinp. 14.
The Collln.r oourt held that the plltiel tried the iuue by bnplbtfon beoae the appellants did

not objeot: "I'he record fndioatee no objection to the inquiries u to the issue of miltako m
preparation of the quitclaim deed. There1bte the iuuc wu properly raiacd at trial." Id. Based on.
the Colllm court's reuonin& it ii reasonable to conclv.de that bad the appellant objected to the
inquiries u to the isma of mistake, tbm the iaue would not have been tried by bnpllcatlon.

In tbia cue the plltiel have not

aone to trial yet, but nevertheless Oreenehart hu not

consented to try the issue of' mistake at trial nor did GrecmhaTt try the issue of mistake a.prealy
or by implication durfna aummary judsmeat. To the contnry, Gremheart'1 pleadinp in
opposition to Browm' motion fbr tummary judgman.t and pleadfnp 011 her motion to mike wen
premilad 011 the &at that the Browm did not alle1e hud or mistake and theret>re the extrimic

evidence off'cred in aupport of Browm' motion fbr summary judpiont wu barred by the parol
evidence rule u let fbrth in Empq.

OreeDheart'1 araument that taud or mistake wu mt plead by Browns can be tbund in

Oreenhean'• m.emoraadum oppolina Browm' summary judpient. In the context of applyins
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the Empq deaiaion and the parol cvidcmco rule to the faota oftbil cue. Oreenehart't oppoliq
memorandum stated:

More bnportatly, the ucepdon to the pll'Ol evlclat nJ1e (had or
miltlke) that would permit the lntroctacdon of extrJmfo evidence hu newr becm

plld by Browm. Brown'• Complaint doe& not allep hud or mietlko llnd
cctain1y dote not melt LR.C.P. ~) nqu.irins that hud or miltab be plld with
pardcn1Jarity. At a result. the extrimfc evideDco Btown attempts to introduce
(which Greenbellt CUl11l1tly cballqa in her motion to ltrike flied concurrently)
u the fbUDdation fbr tin motion oannot be a buia fbr arantins IWmDll')'

Judameat

S• Mmmandum in Opposition to PJaintifti' Motion fbr Summary Judaznent pp.
5-6.
The quoted argument above ii a clear a.preuion by Oreenehmt that mistake wu not pied

by the Browm nor wu mistab plld with pat1k:u.Wity. More importantl)', tbr pmpo1e1 of thia

motion fbr rocomidatioa, the quoted lanpap above eanot be construed u either expreu or
implied consent by Oreeulw't to try the fuue of mistake. lfln)'thina Greea.ebart'• mpmem Js

an objection that would defeat a findiq of trying an iuuo by implication.

Moreover, du.rins oral argument on the parties' crou-motions fbr mmmary judsment,

counsel t>r Oreenelwt specli1cally aped that hud or mistake wu not pled. by the BroWlll aid
thercfbre the atrimic IVidence offered by th.I Browm lhould not be considered. CoumeJ. ibr
Oreenehatt also stated that while there are rulea wt cue law that &tlow parties to try a unplead

iuuo by express of implied consent. Greeuhart wu not comentins to try the iuue of miatake.
Perbapl the most telling argument direetod to the fact that neither party litigated the iasue
of whether there wu a mutual miltlb ii the lack of argument fi'om the Browm that there wu a

mistake. There 11 nothiq contained in the Browm' pleldfnp mbmitted on the cro•motiom

lbr IUlm1W'Y Judamem that a miltab had been pied or that a mistake hid occurred which would
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINB • 6
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allow a departure tom the parol evidence rule. The Browm' Reply brief m support of their

motion 1br IU1Dm8I')' judgment lddreaet the Empq dectlton only in the context that: (1) it ii
inconsistent with other Idaho cues both bcfbre and after the decision; (2) there

appurtenant water risht; (3) the Purcbue and Sale Aareement confirmed

DO

WU DO

water WU beina

sold; aDd (4) Oreenehart it bmed by estoppe1, 1achea and oth« equitable defenses. At no time in
their briefing or d1Jrinl oral araument did the Browna quo that their extrimic ovidence should

be ooufdered becauae it met the miatab exception to the Pll'Ol evldeDce rale.
Bued on the IDllym above. CJremhe8rt respcctiblly ub this Court enter its Order In

Lbnine to preclude Plaintiff tom ll8ll'ting a claim

ot ~· at the trill of this

matter.

PJaintifft did not plead mistake with part!cularity u requJred by I.R.C.P. 9(b), and mm i.ftbeir
failure wen aCUHd by this Court. a cauae of action ibr miatlb is outaide the three-year etatute

of Hmkationa.

DATED thia 1s• day ofFebnmy, 2013.

BORTON LAKEY LAW OPFICBS

By
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CllTIDCATI Ol QRyJg

I HBl.BBY CBl.TIFY that on thia 15* day of Pebnmy, 2013, 1 true lad conect copy ot
the 1bregofna document Wll mVld by fint-clut mail, poltlp prepaid, and lddreaed to; by Ax
tnmmdafon to; by OVll'Dfaht delivery to; or by penomlly delivlriq to or ltlvina with a penon
fn ohlrp oftht of.Bee u lndlclted below:

Michael c. Creamer

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Pax

Thoma B. Dvorak
OMINsPt.Juuyw

[ ] Ovntabt Delivery

601 W• BIDDOdE Street
P.O.Box2720
Bofle, m13101-2120
Tellpllone: (208) 388-1200
PIOlfmile: (208) 388·1300

[ ] Hand Delivery

Victor

vrutiil
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F\LED

Jot Borton [ISB No. 5552]
Victor Vil1lpl [ISB No. 58~]
BORTON LADY LAW omcss
141 B. Carltoa Ave.
Maridian, ID 83642
Boile, Idaho 83'702
OtBce: (20I) 901-4415

1013 fEB 15 PM 4: 52

~L~~~ 8t~t~tifR\

Pa: (201)49M610

Email:

~n-Jlkey.oom

.4ttornqa/or ~adanl

IN TBI DJSTltlCT COtJRT or THE JOUllTB JVDICIAL DJSTRJCI' or
TBB STAT& or mABO. JN A.ND FOR TBB CO'ONTY or ILMOD
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Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUNTY OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOTION TO AMEND

AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.
COME NOW, Plaintiffs, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the
"Browns''), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby move this
Court pursuant to Rules 15(a) and (b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for entry of an order
permitting Plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
and incorporated herein by this reference. This motion is made on the grounds and for the
reasons set forth herein and in the accompanying Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Motion to
Shorten Time to Hear Her Motions for Reconsideration and Motion in Limine filed
contemporaneously here with. The proposed change on the Amended Complaint is indicated
with redline and in substance seek to clarify the claim for relief by mutual mistake and equitable
esto

el.
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The trial court bas broad discretion to allow amendments to the pleadings at any staao to
confmm to the proo( even when objection is made. See, 0.1., Cameron Salu, Inc. v. Klem18h,
93 Idaho 4Sl. 463 P.2d 287 (1970). In addition. Defendant will suffer no undue prejudice or
delay as a result of the requested amendments as they
aJmMly alleged in the

existin& Complaint and the

~losely

pertain to tho circumstances

legal theory sugested by the factual

circumstancea as noted by this Court in the recent SUDUD1ry judgment ruling.
This Motion is made and based on the records and documents lodged and filed herein.
Oral argument ii requested on this motion.

DATED this

~ ( tr;ay of February, 2013.
GIVENS PURSLEY LU'

B. Dvorak
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown

CER'IMCATE OF SERVICE

thisZ/~

I hereby certify that on
of February, 2013, I caused to be served a truo and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:
Victor Villegas
Borton It Lakey
141 E. Carlton Avenue
Meridian. ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

_ HJnd Delivery
_U_ac
acsisimile
_Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

Thomas R Dyorak
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EXHIBIT ''A''
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030)
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
1422437_6

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
Case No. CV-2012-353

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED COMPLAINT TO
QUIET TITLE

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the
"Browns''), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and for cause of action
against Defendant, plead, allege and complain as follows:
PARTIES

1.

Plaintiffs the Browns are husband and wife residing in Mountain Home, Elmore

County, Idaho.
2.

Defendant Augusta Sayoko Mirnoto Greenheart (hereinafter "Greenheart") is an

individual residing at 8708 Willow Cabin Street, Las Vegas, Nevada.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3.

The amount in controversy falls in the jurisdictional limits of this Court.

4.

Jurisdiction and venue are proper in Elmore County, based upon the location of

the real property and the water rights at issue in this litigation.

5.

The Defendant is subject to this Court's jurisdiction and the laws of the state of

Idaho, including without limitation Idaho Code Sections 6-401, et. seq. and 10-1201, et. seq..
COMMON ALLEGATIONS

6.

On or about February 5, 1988 Jay Brown acquired approximately 320 acres of

land situated in the East Yi of Section 24, T4S, RSE, B.M,, in Elmore County ("Original Brown
Property'').
7.

A true and correct copy of the deed by which the Jay Brown acquired the Original

Brown Property, and which contains a legal description of the same, is attached hereto as Exhibit
'"'A."
8.

The Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") Court in Twin Falls, Idaho,

decreed Water Rights Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 (the "Water Rights") to Jay Brown on October
26, 2000, authorizing the use of groundwater and making the Water Rights appurtenant to a
permissible place of use that encompassed the 320 acres comprising the Original Brown
Property. True and correct copies of the said decrees are attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and
Exhibit "C" respectively (collectively "SRBA Water Right Decrees").
9.

In January of2007, Defendant Greenheart purchased approximately sixty (60)

acres of the Original Brown Property (the "Greenheart Property") from the Browns, leaving the
Browns with approximately 260 acres (the "Current Brown Property'').
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l 0.

A true and correct copy of the deed by which Defendant Greenheart acquired the

Greenhcart Property, and which contains a legal description of the same, is attached hereto as
Exhibit "D."
11.

A true and correct legal description of the Current Brown Property, then, would

consist of the legal description of the Original Brown Property less the legal description of the

Greenheart Property.
12.

Water Right 61-2188 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 164 acres of

land within a 320-acre permissible place of use wholly within the Original Brown Property.
13.

Water Right 61-7151 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 123 acres of

land within the same 320-acre pennissible place of use authorized for 61-2188 and wholly within
the Original Brown Property.
14.

As decreed, the Water Rights may be used together to irrigate no more than 287

acres within the 320-acre permissible place of use.
15.

Neither of the Water Rights has been used to irrigate any portion of the

Greenhcart Property since at least 1986.
16.

On August 28, 2003, the Browns applied to the Idaho Department of Water

Resources ("'Department'') to lease portions of the Water Rights appurtenant to 160 acres of the
Original Brown Property to the Idaho Water Resource Board ("IWRB") Water Supply Bank, and
pursuant to that application, contracted with the IWRB to idle 160 acres of the 287 authorized
acres from irrigation. The Water Supply Bank lease remains in effect as of the date of this
Complaint. The acres idled and not irrigated by the Browns pursuant to the Water Supply Bank
lease have always included the entirety of what is now the Greenheart Property.
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17.

The warranty deed conveying the Greenheart Property to Defendant Greenheart

("Warranty Deed") recites that the premises are conveyed ''with their appurtenances unto said
Grantee and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever."
18.

Under Idaho law, a deed containing language conveying real property •'with

appurtenances" is presumed to convey appurtenant water rights unless it can be clearly shown
that it was known to both parties that the water rights were not intended to be conveyed. Russell
v. Irish, 20 Idaho 194, 198, 118 P. 1031 (1900) (conveyance carries with it the appurtenant water

right unless it was specifically reserved in the deed or it could be clearly shown that it was
known to both parties that the water right was not intended to be conveyed).
19.

The following facts and circumstances demonstrate and clearly show that it was

known to the Browns and the Defendant that the no portion of the Water Rights were intended to
be conveyed to Defendant Greenheart:
a.

In 2007, at the time Greenheart Property was purchased by Defendant
Greenheart, it was dry land and it had not been irrigated during the 19
years that the Browns owned it prior to selling it to Defendant Greenheart;

b.

At the time of the conveyance to Defendant Greenheart there was no
system in place on the Greenheart Property to divert or distribute water to
irrigate it;

c.

At the time of the conveyance to Defendant Greenheart the Greenheart
Property had been idled from irrigation pursuant to the Brown's Water
Supply Bank lease with the IWRB.

d.

The per-acre purchase price in 2007 for the Greenheart Property was
commensurate with prices normally paid in southern Idaho at the time of
sale for non-irrigated grazing land;

e.

Prior to the sale to Greenheart, the Browns and the Browns' real estate
agent each represented to Defendant Greenheart as buyer that the
Greenheart Property was being sold without water rights;

f.

The purchase and sale agreement executed by the Browns and Defendant
Greenheart included a seller's property disclosure form (a true and correct
copy ofwlrieh i9 Mtaeheti herete M=BK:hieit "B"). Uneer die eisele!M'e
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entitled "Irrigation water provided by:", the Browns indicated "NIA" for
not applicable;

20.

g.

After the closing of the purchase and sale of the Geenheart Property,
Defendant Greenheart submitted a June 10, 2007 Notice of Appeal to the
Elmore County Board of Equalization ("Board") for the Greenheart
Property wherein Defendant challenged the classification of the property
as irrigated agriculture and sought to have it reclassified as Category 5 Dry
Grazing, and stated that at the time of the purchase Defendant was told
"that the land is dry." A true and correct copy of the Notice of Appeal
which was provided to the Browns by Ms. Greenheart is attached hereto as
Exhibit "F';

h.

On July 6, 2007, at Defendant Greenheart's direction and upon her express
written authorization, Jay Brown appeared before the Board and
.regresented that the Greenheart Property was dry land and had been
purchased and conveyed as dry land without any irrigation water rights
and would not be irrigated ''unless at such time a water right is purchased
for the property by Ms. Greenheart." A true and correct copy of the letter
from Jay Brown to the Board containing such representations is attached
hereto as Exhibit "G";

i.

On July 6, 2007, the Board granted the Defendant's request to reclassify
the land and upheld the assessor's adjusted valuation of the Greenheart
Property to reflect that it is, indeed, dry grazing land with no irrigation
water. A true and correct copy of the minutes of the July 6, 2007 Board
meeting approving Ms. Greenheart's requested reclassification of the
Greenheart Property as dry grazing. as maintained and published on the
Elmore County website, is attached hereto as Exhibit "H";

j.

Since July 6, 2007, Defendant Greenheart has received a financial benefit
of more favorable tax treatment from that reclassification of the
Greenheart Property as Category 5 "dry grazing";

k.

In a November 8, 2009 e-mail to Ms. Schindele, an employee with Elmore
County concerning Elmore County's offer to purchase the Greenheart
Property, Defendant Greenheart stated, among other things, that "at the
time of the purchase, I also was very aware that the parcel is dry grazing
only due to lack of an irrigation system and no water rights." A true and
correct copy of that November 8, 2009 e-mail, of which the Browns were
included as courtesy copy recipients, is attached hereto as Exhibit "I";

Because the Browns were and are contemplating one or more sales or transfers of

Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151, and wished to clear up any potential issues concerning their
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February 8, 2012 and requested that she confinn in writing that she was aware she did not
purchase the Greenheart Property with water rights and did not object to any sale or transfer of
the Water Rights by the Browns.
21.

In response, on February 17, 2012, without notice to the Browns, the Defendant

instead filed with the Idaho Department of Water Resources a Notice of Change of Water Right
Ownership ("Notice,,) and attached copy of the Warranty Deed. In the Notice Defendant
Oreenheart represented among other things that the Water Rights were "divided proportionally
based on the portion of their place(s) of use acquired by the new owner." The Notice makes no
mention of Defendant's agreement with the Browns and admissions to the Elmore County Board
of Equalization that she had purchased the Greenheart Property without water rights. A true .and
correct copy of the Change of Ownership form obtained from the Idaho Department of Water
Resources electronic water right database is attached hereto as Exhibit "J."
22.

On March 9, 2012, the Department revised its water right database to indicate

Defendant Greenheart as the current owner of portions of the Water Rights, and reduced the
quantity of water and irrigated acres authorized under the Water Rights decreed to the Browns
commensurately. Due to certain technical errors in the Departmenf s revisions the water right
database was subsequently revised by the Department on March 22, 2012. True and correct
copies of the Department's correspondence to the Defendant and to the Browns concerning the
corrections to its water right records database for water rights 61-2188, 61-7151, and for water
rights 61-12272 and 61-12273 as revised on March 22, 2012 are attached hereto as Exhibit "K"
and Exhibit "L" respectively (hereinafter, "Notices").
23.

Each of the Notices states that "[c]hanges to the ownership of water rights in the

department's database are based on infonnation provided in the Notice of Change of Ownership
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by the person submitting the form. The department includes the infonnation provided in its

database, but does not determine legal ownership."
24.

Plaintiffs are without an adequate remedy at law and this Complaint concerns

unique real property, Idaho Code § SS-101, for which the remedy of a decree of rights and/or
specific perfonnance will lie.

COUNT1

Quiet Tltle/Dedaratory Judgment - Contract lnterpretadon

25.

The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated by this reference and restated

as if set forth in full.
26.

Based on information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant claims an

interest or estate adverse to the Plaintiffs in the Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151 in that
Defendant alleges that they are connected with the Greenheart Property.
27.

The facts and circumstances of the transaction by which Defendant purchased the

property from Plaintiffs, and the parties' subsequent conduct thereafter, establish that any
presumption that any portion of the Water Rights passed to Defendant Oreenheart under the
general appurtenancy clause of the Warranty Deed is conclusively rebutted by facts clearly
demonstrating that it was known to both parties that no portion of the Water Rights were
intended to be conveyed, and compel an interpretation of the purchase agreement and Warranty
Deed to the effect that the Greenheart Property was purchased and conveyed without water

rights, but rather as dry land. The facts and circumstances of the transaction and the parties'
prior. contemporaneous and subsequent condu'-1. among other things, create an issue of mutual
mistake and allow the court to consider the extrinsic evidence described in this Complaint for the
12urpose of reforming the Wammty Deed to reflect the parties' mutual intent that no water rights
were to be conveyed.
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28.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment decreeing and declaring

a. that the Purchase and Sale Agreement did not provide for conveyance of
any portion of the Water Rights, and that no portion of the Water Rights
was in fact conveyed by the Warranty Deed to Defendant Greenheart as an
appurtenance the Greenheart Property or otherwise;
b. that the Water Rights, as and to the full extent originally decreed to the
Browns by the SRBA Court, are the sole and exclusive property of the
Plaintiffs; and
~that

the Defendant has no right, title or interest in the Water Rights 61·

2188 and 61-71S1, or those portions of the Water Rights now identified in

the records of the Idaho Department of Water Resources as 61-12272 and
61-12273.

e.d.that the Wammty Deed be reformed and rewritten to reflect the foregoing.
COUNT2

Quiet Title/Declaratory Judgment - Estoppel
29.

The foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated by this reference and restated

as if set forth in full.
30.

The parties hereto have a dispute over the interpretation of their Warranty Deed

and Purchase and Sale Agreement
31.

At the time the Purchase and Sale Agreement and Warranty Deed were executed,

Greenheart knew or should have known that the Greenheart Property was being sold as dry land
with no water rights.
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32.

Greenheart's subsequent conduct including representations to third parties to

obtain a monetary benefit after her consummation of the purchase of the Greenheart Property
was consistent with her agreement that she had indeed purchased dry, non-irrigated land with no
water rights.
33.

Based on Defendant's conduct as alleged in this Complaint and her

representations, the Browns are entitled to a judgment decreeing and declaring that Greenheart is
barred Wlder principles of equitable estogl. promissory estoppel, quasi-estoppel and/or waiver
from insisting or asserting that the Greenheart Property enjoys any benefit of Water Rights Nos.
61-2188 and 61-7151 including any portion of same currently identified as 61-12272 and 6112273 in that
a. The Browns reasonably and detrimentally relied on Greenheart's conduct
and representations;
b. Greenheart, having taken the position that the Greenheart Property was
dry land with no irrigated water rights, is precluded from asserting an

inconsistent position because it would be, or would cause a disadvantage
to the Browns or be unconscionable to permit Greenheart to change her

position; and/or
c. Oreenheart voluntarily and intentionally relinquished any right to claim or
assert that water rights passed with title to her to the Greenheart Property.
34.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment decreeing and declaring
a. that the Purchase and Sale Agreement did not provide for conveyance of
any portion of the Water Rights, and that no portion of the Water Rights
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was in fact conveyed, by the Warranty Deed to Defendant Greenheart as
an appurtenance the Greenheart Property or otherwise;
b. that the Water Rights, as and to the full extent originally decreed to the

Browns by the SRBA Court, are the sole and exclusive property of the
Plaintiffs; and
c. that the Defendant has no right, title or interest in the Water Rights 612188 and 61-7151, or those portions of the Water Rights now identified in

the records of the Idaho Department of Water Resources as 61-12272 and
61-12273.
ATTORNEYS' FEES

Plaintiffs have been forced to retain the services of Givens Pursley LLP to pursue this
action and are entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee and costs incurred for doing so pursuant to
the purchase and sale agreement, Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure 54(d) and 54(3), in an amount not to exceed $5,000 in the event of a judgment by
default or in such other and further amount as this Court may deem appropriate in the premises t
the appropriate time in the proceeding.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray this Court enter the following relief:
1.

For judgment in Plaintiffs' favor on each count of the Complaint, decreeing and

declaring the specific relief prayed for in each such count;
2.

For a declaration that Defendant Greenheart has no right, title or interest in or to

any portion of Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151 as decreed, or in those portions of Water
Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151 currently identified as 61-12272 and 61-12273 in the Department's
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water right records, and further that Defendant Greenheart has no right of notice, review, protest,
consent, authorization or waiver with respect the Browns' beneficial use and enjoyment of the
Water Rights, including but not limited to the Browns' right to sell, transfer or convey the Water
Rights, and any portion thereof, to other persons and to change any element of the Water Rights,
including but not limited to the place of use, point of diversion or nature of use.
3.

For an order of costs and attorneys' fees on the bases set forth above, which are

hereby incorporated by reference, in an amount not to exceed $5,000 in the event of a default
judgment, or in such other and further amounts as may be deemed appropriate by the Court at the
appropriate time in the proceedings; and
4.

For such other and further relief as this Court may deem appropriate in the

premises.
DATED this _ _ _ day of February, 2013.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Thomas E. Dvorak
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this __ day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:
_Hand Delivery
Facsimile
_Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

Victor Villegas
Borton & Lakey
141 B. Carlton Avenue
Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

Thomas E. Dvorak
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'
Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030)
Thomas E. Dvorak. (Idaho State Bar ID# S043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
1702646_1
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR 11IB
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffs,
MOTION SHORTEN TIME TO
HEAR MOTION TO AMEND

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the
"Browns"), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley

LLP,

and hereby move this

Court pursuant to Rule 6(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the inherent power of the
Court to control its docket for entry of an order shortening time to allow their Motion to Amend
to be heard on February 22, 2013 at 2:30 p.m. This motion is critical to the hearing on the
parties' Pre-Trial Conference scheduled for the same day, as it addresses an issue of amendment
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to the pleadings that was raised by the Court's rccc:mt decision on crosa motions for summary

judpnent.

DATED this

Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown

CERTIJICA.TE OF SERVICE

J{.Y

I hereby certify that on this 21
of Pobmary, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foroaoins document to thc persons listed below tbe method indicated:
Victor Villegas
Borton & Lakey
141 B. Carlton Avenue

Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493~10

_

l;iand Delivery

_-V'F_aes
aestimile
_

Ovemigbt Courier
U.S. Mail
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030)

Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID I

5043)

c: . . t. l:

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
60 I West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown

JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 11IE COUNTY OF ELMORE

JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

v.
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,

Case No. CV-2012-353

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME TO
HEAR HER MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND
MOTION IN LIMINE

Defendant.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown, by and through their
counsel of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby files this Response in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Her Motions for Reconsideration and Motion in
Liminc. Plaintiffs believe that the Motion to Shorten Time is not appropriate, as it is prejudicial
to them in that hearing it on February 22 does not allow Plaintiffs' sufficient time to file full
briefs in opposition as contemplated under the rules to each of said motions. Plaintiffs would
simply ask that the Court allow these issues to be orally argued during the time set for the court
trial in this matter and any briefing be done in the context of written closing arguments. In the
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alternative, Plaintiffs would ask that they be afforded reasonable time to draft a brief in
opposition and an opportunity to argue the same to the Court

ARGUMENT

A.

Hearing these Motions at the Pretrial Conference Prejudices Plaintiffs' Ability to
Meaningfully Respond to Them
The Defendant filed a Motion to Shorten Time on two underlying motions, a Motion in

Limine to Preclude Allegations of Mistake and a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's
January 31, 2013, Order On Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. The Motion in Lirnine
appears to overlap with about a third of the Motion for Reconsideration, at least to the extent that
it seeks to exclude evidence based on an argument that mutual mistake has not been plead and
may not be plead at the present time. The Motion for Reconsideration then goes on to seek
reconsideration of the Court's rulings on the statute of limitations issues and also introduces a
new statute of limitations, one applicable to a claim of mistake. The Motion to Shorten Time
seeks to hear all of these issues at the February 22, 2013 Pretrial Conference.
However, these motions were filed on February 15, 2013, and only faxed to Plaintiffs'
counsel's office at approximately 4:50 p.m. on that Friday. By that point, Plaintiffs' counsel had
already left the office on a planned three-day out of town trip with family that was available due
to the occurrence of President's Day (which also caused courts to be closed on Monday). That
left a total of three working days for Plaintiffs' counsel to respond to these motions. In the
course of those three working days, Plaintiffs' counsel had a mediation scheduled in another case
and had already planned to draft the required Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
and Witness and Exhibit Lists for this case, as well as tend to other matters. Needless to say,
Plaintiffs' trial counsel has not had a full and fair opportunity to research the issues raised and
write an adequate response to the same in the limited time available.
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Indeed, Defendant's

counsel themselves from receiving the Court's Decision that was mailed on January 31, 2013,
took a full two weeks to put their Motions together, despite the fact that they have known of the
pretrial conference hearing since it was set on September 2012. This time pressure is prejudicial
to the interests of Plaintiffs in having a thoroughly researched, well-written brief, and is the main
reason that Plaintiffs are unable to file anything but a response in opposition to Motion to
Shorten Time. In and of itself, this is grounds to deny the Motion to Shorten Time and not hear
these other motions. As a practical matter, on this basis and the basis of judicial economy and
efficiency, the Court can deem to take the underlying Motions up in the context of the court trial.
After all, there is no jury to be confused by the evidence if the ruling on the Motion in Limine is
postponed. And, as in most trials, counsel for the Plaintiffs (and presumably for the defense as
well), desires the opportunity to submit written closing arguments. Thus, the Court can take
these arguments up in the ordinary course, within the trial and the written closing arguments, and
rule on the same accordingly without having to rush its decision or rush counsel. There is no
need to shorten time.

B.

The Motion to Shorten Time should be Denied as the Underlyin1 Motion in Limine
and Motion for Reconsideration are Without Basis; This Court bas Discretion to
Find that the Issue of Mistake was Impliedly Tried on Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment; or Alternatively to Allow an Amendment of the Complaint to Reflect the
Reformation by Mutual Mistake as Being Suggested by the Evidence.
In Defendant's Motion in Limine as well as its Motion for Reconsideration, Defendant

argues that Plaintiffs did not plead mutual mistake, that Plaintiffs should be precluded from
raising the issue now, and implicitly, that no amendment of the Complaint should be allowed.
Because these arguments are without merit, the Motion to Shorten Time should be denied.
This Court was essentially correct in its decision when it stated that:
Pleadings in this case and the evidence submitted

tn

support of the motion tor
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summary judgment raise the issue of mistake, which would permit extrinsic
evidence to be considered.
Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at p. 10. In other words, the conclusion that
mistake is the appropriate legal doctrine to be applied in considering extrinsic evidence has been
lurking in this case the whole time, suggested by the evidence that was described in the case, and
nothing about the Court's determination to openly announce the applicable legal doctrine and
bring it to the forefront changed the essential character of the facts and circumstances comprising
mistake that have always been present in this case and will be the subject of a court trial on
March 5. For this reason, the Court has discretion to determine that the issue of mistake was
tried by express consent of the parties.
In the case of Mikesell v. Newworld Development Corp., 122 Idaho 868, 840 P.2d 1090
(Ct. App. 1992), which involved a complaint to quiet title based on an alleged oral contract to
convey land, in answer to an argument that the court had found for a party on fraud, but pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 9(b), that party was required to plead defenses constituting misrepresentation with
particularity, and failure to so plead at all precluded the district court from finding fraud on the
part of the other party, the appellate court noted:
Newworld argues that pursuant to I.R.C.P. 9(b) the Burgesses were required to
plead the circumstances constituting misrepresentation with particularity, and that
their failure to plead misrepresentation at all precluded the district court from
finding fraud on the part ofNewworld. I.R.C.P. 15(b), however, provides: When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by the express or implied consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised by the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect
the result of the trial on these issues.
Pursuant to this rule, the supreme court had held that where a theory of recovery
is fully tried by the parties, the court may base its decision on that theory and
deem the pleadings amended accordingly. Failure to amend the pleadings to
include issues tried Q}'. the express or implied consent of the parties does not affect
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the trial court's findings on those issues. The supreme court has applied this rule
to actions where issues of fraud or mistake have been litigated, though not raised
by the pleadings.

The determination of whether an issue not raised by the pleadings has been
tried by the consent of the parties is within the discretion of the trial court
and such determination will be reversed only when that discretion has been
abased. In this case it is clear that Newworld had notice of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the Burgess's assertions of misrepresentation, and that
the issue was fully litigated by the parties at trial. To reverse the district court's
finding of misrepresentation on a procedural technicality argued by Newworld
would be contrary to the very purposes of Rule 15 which are:

First, to allow the best chance for each claim to be determined
on the merits rather than on some procedural technicality; and
second to relegate the pleadings to the limited role of providing
parties of notice of the nature of the pleader's claim and the
facts that have been called into question.

Clarie v. Olson, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993, 996 (1986). Because the issue
of misrepresentation was fully litigated with the consent of the parties, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in treating that issue as though it had been
properly plead.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's finding of
misrepresentation as well as its order to reform the deed based on that
misrepresentation.
Id. (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

Defendant is essentially arguing that somehow they were able to raise a technical
"gotcha" before trial and thereby cut off the ability of the Court to determine each claim on the
merits rather ''than on some procedural technicality." If a Court has the ability in a trial to
introduce and find on a new cause of action suggested by the evidence because of the desire to
decide cases on the merits, when the same thing happens on cross motions for summary
judgment, i.e., the evidence points to an unplead cause of action, there is no distinguishable
policy that demands a different rule. Indeed, in the present case, the parties filed cross motions
for summary judgment in a matter to be tried by the Court. That action in and of itself is an
invitation for the Court to decide conflicting issues of fact in a trial like setting. See Banner Life
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Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixon Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 123-124. 206 P.3d 481,

487-488 (2009)(holding Court may draw probable inferences from evidence offered on summary
judgment since it will ultimately be sitting as finder of fact). Here, the Court appears to have
determined that the evidence suggests the legal theory of mistake may be applicable, and that the
Court would like to hear additional evidence under the mistake theory. Based on the Mikesell
holding. it is well within the Court's discretion to determine that the door has been opened on
mistake and it has been tried by the consent of the parties. See e.g. Brown v. City of Pocatello,
148 Idaho 802, 808, 229 P.3d 1164, 1170 (2010)(noting that in prior case court held where
complaint facts sufficiently alleged three part test for promissory estoppel but never mentioned
promissory estoppel by name nevertheless the short and plain statement in the complaint
succinctly offered allegations that if true would meet the elements of a claim for promissory
estoppel)(citing Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 56 P.3d 1277 (2002)).
In any event, even in the face of an objection from an opposing party, under I.R.C.P.

l 5(b), a motion to amend under Rule 15 may be made and granted at any time, even after trial.
Given the separate Motion to Amend that Plaintiffs have determined to file as a precautionary
measure with this Response, the portion of Rule 15(b) that is relevant is not the first sentence
relating to trying issues by implied or express consent that is raised by the Defendant, but rather
the parts that come after that sentence, namely,
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result
of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice the party in
maintaining the party's action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such eyidence.
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I.R.C.P. 15(b) (emphasis added). On its face, this rule contemplates that free leave to amend
shall be given even in the face of an objection by the opposing party, and in fact only denied
upon a showing of such prejudice that a continuance would not cure the prejudice. Accordingly,
contemporaneously herewith, amendment of the pleadings is now sought to conform them to the
evidence as outlined in the Court's decision on summary judgment. 1
In applying Rule l S(b), the Court is given broad discretion to allow amendments to the
pleadings to conform to the proof.

See, e.g., Pennsylvania-Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v.

Gallagher, 19 Idaho 101, 112 P. 1044 (1910); Gaskill v. Jacobs, 38 Idaho 795, 225 P. 499
(1924); Durant v. Snyder, 65 Idaho 678, 151 P.2d 776 (1944); Smith v. Big Lost River Irrigation

District, 83 Idaho 374, 364 P.2d 146 (1961). Indeed, the case law reiterates the portion of Rule
1S(b) stating that even if the new cause of action has not been consented to, it is simply
necessary that a party request leave of the court to amend in order to bring the legal issue
forward. Reynolds v. Continental Mtg. Co., 85 Idaho 172, 377 P.2d 134 (1962)(noting that even
if issues are not tried by express or implied consent, if an objection is made that the trial of an
issue not raised by the pleading "an amendment is to be allowed to raise the issue, unless the
objecting party can show that he would be actually prejudiced, and even in that case the court
may permit an amendment and grant a continuance so that the objecting party can meet the new
issue, and thus obviate the prejudice that he would suffer if obligated to litigate the issue at that
time. The sporting element in litigation is eliminated.")(quoting Moores Federal Practice, Vol. 3,
p. 805).

In ruling on such a motion, the trial court has wide discretion to allow such

amendments, even as late as the close of testimony.

implied consent of the parties on summary judgment.
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In the case of Cameron Sales, Inc. v. Klemish, 93 Idaho 451, 463 P.2d 287 (1970), in a
case which had been initiated on the basis of a farm laborer's lien, the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not err in allowing an amendment after the offering of evidence to amend
the pleadings to confonn to proof to show the existence of a compromise and settlement, which
had not been plead. The court noted:
The rule is well established that a trial court has wide discretion in permitting
amendments of pleadings at any stage of the proceeding to confonn to the proof.
Even prior to the adoption of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Idaho
recognized liberality in this regard. l.R.C.P. 15(b) states in pertinent part that:
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission
of such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the
party's action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
At trial, both appellants were represented by the same counsel, even though their
interests were opposed to each other by reason of their different interests in the
check representing the proceeds of the grain crop. Appellants object to the
admission of any evidence related to the January 13, 1968, meeting [at which the
court found a compromise and settlement]. The record, however, fails to show
any prejudice of such nature as to require reversal in that regard. The record
reflects that counsel representing both appellants was present at the meeting,
which was held in his office. At that meeting, he purportedly was representing
both parties. The record fails to show that any request was made for a
continuance of trial in order to prepare a better defense to meet this issue
presented by this evidence of a compromise. The appellants argued that the trial
court erred in allowing the respondent to close the evidence to amend his
complaint to allege a compromise agreement because such amendment, they
contend, introduced a new cause of action. l.R.C.P. 15(b) does not bar
amendments which change the cause of action or the theory of the case. Moore
states that:
Rule l 5(b) has rejected any concept that such amendments are
barred if they result in change to the Plaintiffs' "cause of action."
Rule l 5(b) does not even limit the amendment to the transaction or
occurrence set forth in the pleadings; the only apparent limitation
is. that the court have jurisdiction over the matter tried, although as
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a matter of practice issues tried by implied or express consent
ordinarily do arise from the same general set of facts set forth in
the complaint . . . The fact that tbil involves a change in the

nature of the cause of action, or the legal theory of the action,
ii immaterial as long as the opposing party bu not been
prejudiced in presenting hil cue.
Id at 454, 463 P.2d at 290 (citations omitted).

The case of Collins v. Parkin.son, 96 Idaho 294, 527 P.2d 1252 (1974), cited by
Defendant in its Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration, p. 5, does not imply what
Defendant takes from it. The Defendant cites this case indicating that it was a quiet title action
where the issue of mutual mistake was tried by implication because, as the Supreme Court put it,
no objection was made and therefore the issue was properly raised at trial. Defendant infers that
the converse would be true, i.e., any objection would have prevented mutual mistake from being
raised. However, presumably had an objection been made and the other side asked to amend, the
appropriate analysis would have been under Rule 15(b), the latter portion. In whicll case, the
opposing party would have had to demonstrate prejudice such that even a continuance could not
cure the prejudice. Indeed, in the Collins case, the court noted that,
the remedy of reformation was properly utilized by the trial court because the
final judgment in an action is to afford the prevailing party the relief to which it is
entitled, even if that relief ii not demanded in the pleadings.

Id at 296, 527 P.2d at 1254 (citing I.R.C.P. 54(c) and Nab v. Hilla, 92 Idaho 877, 452 P.2d 981
(1969)).

If anything, Rule l 5(b) contemplates that even as late as trial, a motion to amend will be
allowed and only when the defendant can show unusual prejudice as a result of the amendment
such that cannot be cured by allowing a continuance, should the court exercise its discretion to
deny such an amendment. This is in accord with both Rule 1(a) and its admonition that "these
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rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive termination of every
action and proceeding" and Rule 61, which provides:
No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or admitted by the
court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside
a verdict or vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
l.R.C.P. 1 and 61. Rule 15(b) is one of those rules and must be construed in accordance with
them. This situation fits squarely within those rules. The just determination of this action
requires that it be determined on the facts that are plead, and the Court's determination of the
appropriate legal theory to apply to those facts is an afterthought to determining the matter on the
facts. It would be a miscarriage of justice to not allow the case to be tried on the facts that have
been plead to this point on the basis of a mere technicality. Further, Rule 61 's admonition that
an error is harmless unless it is such that it is inconsistent with substantial justice cries out for
allowing the case to go forward on the issue of mutual mistake as framed up by the Court in its
recent decision on summary judgment.

Defendant simply cannot point to any prejudice or

inconsistency with substantial justice simply because the Court is requiring the Defendant to
meet the facts that have been in the case since the Complaint was filed under what the Court has
determined to be the appropriate legal cause of action.
In the interest of doing substantial justice, and the absence of prejudice to Defendant, the
Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion in Limine are without basis and thus the Motion to
Shorten Time should be denied. Indeed, even if the Defendant requestc; a continuance, Plaintiffs
would have no objection to the same and, in fact, after receiving the Court's decision requested
that the Defendant join with Plaintiffs in seeking a continuance to allow for a mediation of this
dispute The Defendant refused to

engage in the same.
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C.

The Motion To Shorten Time Should Be Denied Because The Motion for
Reconsideration Argument That The Statute of Limitations Has Run in This Case
Likewise Has No Merit.
The argument that the statute of limitations has run in this case has no merit. This issue

was thoroughly briefed and it is and remains the Plaintiffs, position that there is no applicable
statute of limitations or in any case, Idaho Code § 5-203 applies and that clearly the Plaintiffs
were seized or possessed of property within 20 years of the date this lawsuit was filed, as
Plaintiffs were undisputedly seized or possessed of the real property that was transferred (which
allegedly brought along the proportionate share of water rights) as late as 2007 when the deed at
issue was rendered. This falls within the 20-year time frame. Plaintiffs would also cite to and
agree with the Court's reasoning in its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment as to the statute
of limitations. The focus should be on the water rights at issue-which the Browns had every
reason to believe were still their property and not being claimed by Greenheart until February of
2012-and the focus should not be on the real property that was transferred. As this Court held:
Applying the plain language of Idaho Code Section 6-40 l, the applicable statute
of limitations did not begin to run until Greenheart asserted an adverse claim
against the water rights by filing with I.D.W.R. There is no evidence in the
record that Greenheart made any claims in any form or degree to any alleged
water rights for the land she purchased from January 29, 2007, until February 17,
2012. So, filing with the I.D.W.R. was the first instance Greenheart asserted any
ownership in the water rights adverse to Plaintiffs. Therefore, this quiet title
action filed on April 5, 2012, is well within all the statute of limitations asserted
by the parties.
Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at p. 7.

D.

The Motion to Shorten Time Should Be Denied Because the Argument That The
Statute of Limitations Has Run on the Brown's Mistake Claim is Without Merit.
The Defendant argues that Idaho Code § 5-218(4) applies and that the three-year statute

of limitations for a claim based on mistake has passed. Plaintiffs believe that when the mistake
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was discovered or could have been discovered is an inherently factual detennination and that it is
appropriate for the Court to hear evidence on the matter at trial. Plaintiffs contend that that
evidence and the evidence offered at trial provides an ample basis for this Court to conclude that
the statute of limitations wider§ 5-218(4) did not start rwining based on discovery until February
17, 2012, when the Defendant first asserted a claim to the water rights that were allegedly
transferred by means of the deed and its reference to appurtenances.
Idaho Code Section 5-218(4) provides a plaintiff has three years to file suit for:
(a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in
such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved
party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
Idaho Code § 5-218(4). The language itself focuses on discovery of "facts constituting the ...
mistake." The tune sounded by the Defendant in this case is the same technicality-type tune that
she has been playing the whole lawsuit. Namely, that the end all and be all is the reference to
appurtenances in the Deed and that automatically a proportionate share of water rights went
simply by virtue of use of that reference. At this jwicture, the Defendant alleges that the use of
that reference started the three-year clock ticking automatically and that the Plaintiffs should
have been on constructive notice by operation of law and the recording statutes.
In contrast, this is a much more fact-specific test and an archaic term in a deed such as
"appurtenances" that makes no express reference to ·-water rights" cannot be said as a matter of
law to conclusively put a party on notice of the facts comprising a mistake. Indeed, the language
of the statute itself talks in terms of discovery "of the fact constituting the fraud or mistake."
The argument urged by the Defendant is essentially a legal interpretation of the meaning of the
word "appurtenances." The Deed itself does not use the words "water rights" or anything else
that would excite the attention of a reasonable person to the fact that a transfer of those rights had
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accrued, unless they were a legal scholar who was able to divine the framework of the relevant
Idaho case law. See, e.g., McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991)(bolding that
although issue of when cause of action accrued in fraud action is question of law for summary
judgment purposes. where discovery of cause of action commences statute of limitations, date of
discovery is fact question for jury unless there is no evidence creating question of fact).
An argument very similar to that made by Defendant was made and rejected by the Idaho

Court of Appeals in the case of Aitken v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 702 P.2d 1360 (1985). In that
case, the seller, Aitken, had sold certain land near Riggins, Idaho, to the buyer, Gill, in 1962. At
that time, the buyer, Gill believed that approximately 17 acres of land known as Rocky Flat were
supposed to be included with the property to be described in the deed. However, Aitken thought
otherwise. The deed in 1962, in fact, did not include Rocky Flat in the actual legal description.
In 1975, the assessor's office advised all parties that the land description in the deed was
defective for reasons unrelated to the Rocky Flat issue.

To correct that defect, the parties

executed and delivered two more deeds, one in 1976 and one in 1978. Each deed was recorded
shortly after delivery, but both contained descriptions that, unlike the 1962 deed, included Rocky
Flat. In 1981, Aitken, the seller, became aware of the mistake in the 1976 and 1978 deeds and
brought suit in 1982 seeking reformation based on mutual mistake. On appeal, the timeliness of
the bringing of suit was challenged. The Aitken court noted that:
[i]n applying the statute of fraud case, our Supreme Court has held that "actual
knowledge of the fraud will be inferred if the aIJegedly aggrieved party could
have discovered it by the exercise of due diligence." . We believe the same
principle logically applies to causes of action based upon mistake. Accordingly,
we hold that an action seeking relief from mistake will be time barred under J.C. §
5-218(4) unless it is filed within three years after the mistake could have been
discovered in the exercise of due diligence.
In this case, it is uncontroverted that seller sued within three years after the
mistakM was di~overed i11. 198 I, but more than three years after the mistake first
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occurred in 1976 and later reoccurred in 1978. The district judge made no
determination as to whether the mistake could have been discovered by the
exercise of due diligence before 1981. An issue of due diligence is one of fact, to
be addressed in the first instance by the trial court. Whereas here, no finding has
been made upon a material issue, the case must be remanded unless the record is
clear "yields an obvious answer to the relevant question."
Our examination of the record discloses no "obvious answer" to the question
of due diligence. On the one hand, the 1976 deed clearly refers to land in
"section 21 ... lying east of the Little Salmon River:• which undisputedly is
Rocky Flat. On the other hand, it is also clear that the 1976-78 deeds were
intended to remedy an apparent defect unrelated to Rocky Flat. Moreover, the
circumstances surrounding the procurement of property descriptions and the
incorporation of those descriptions in the 1976-78 deeds are obscure. Whether
the sellers failed to exercise due diligence in examining the descriptions is a
question ill suited to appellate fact finding on this record. A remand is required.
For guidance on remand, we note that the recordation of the 1976-78 deeds has
no bearing on the question of due diligence. When deeds are recorded,
constructive knowledge of their contents is imparted to "subsequent purchasers or
encumbrancers." I.C. § 55-811. In any event, such constructive knowledge

can be no greater than the seller's actual knowledge when they signed and
delivered the deeds.

Id at 901, 702 P.2d at 1361 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
In the present case, both parties were apparently laboring under the shared assumption
that no water rights were passed. Indeed, the Defendant herein seems not to have understood the
legal technical meaning of "appurtenances" until 2012. The fact that a technical nuance of the
Deed improperly included the word "appurtenances" and had the legal effect of passing such
water rights is not a fact that is readily within common understanding and not something that
could have easily been discovered by the sellers. The teaching of Aitken is that in a deed mistake
situation, the focus should be on what the seller's actual knowledge was at the time. Further in
this case, the conduct of the Defendant in not asserting such rights until February 17, 2012, after
being contacted by the Plaintiffs would seem to corroborate that no one knew of the effect of the
Deed as being contrary to the original intent of the parties until much, much later than the

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME-14

43R

original delivery of the Deed. Accordingly. there would appear to be an issue of fact to be
detennined on this point as to when discovery could have commenced.

Therefore, the

underlying motion for reconsideration raising the issue of the statue of limitations is without
merit and the Motion to Shorten Time should be denied.

CONCLUSION
Again, based upon the press of time and other matters, counsel for the Plaintiffs has not
had an opportunity to fully respond to the main motions, the Motion in Limine and the Motion
for Reconsideration. Counsel has elected instead to put what response could be put together in
the limited time afforded as an objection to the Motion to Shorten Time. Counsel would offer
and suggest that the Court deem that these matters be taken up in the ordinary course and that the
Court allow for a briefing schedule by way of closing arguments to be presented at the
conclusion of the court trial in this matter. The efficient and inexpensive administration of
justice would be promoted in this fashion and there is no reason why these arguments that are
raised by Defendant could not be orally argued during the Court trial of this matter and be more
fully and formally dealt with and fully briefed at that time as part of the other briefs.

If the Defendant raises an issue of prejudice that requires a continuation of the trial to
address, the Plaintiffs would not be opposed to the same. However, the Plaintiffs did already
offer to stipulate to a continuance of the trial upon receiving the Court's decision in this matter
so as to submit to a mediation, but the Defendant was not so inclined. As part of any such
continuance, the Plaintiffs would ask that the Court sua sponte consider ordering the parties to
participate in a mediation of this matter. But again, only if the Court deems a continuation is
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necessary to avoid prejudice to the Defendant or the Court otherwise dcsiies to more fully hear
the pending motions without holding a Court trial.

RESPBCTFULLY SUBMrrr'.ED this 2o* day of February, 2013.
OJVENS PURSLEY LLP

Attomcys for Jay and Christine Brown

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20111 day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a ttue and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:
Victor S. Villegas, Esq.
Borton-Lakey Law Offices
141 E Carlton Ave.

Meridian, ID 83642
victor@borton-lakcy.com

u. s.

Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

Facsimile (493-4610)
E-mail
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030)
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
1481108_1

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffs,
PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL WITNESS LIST

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (collectively
"Plaintiffs") by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby discloses
the following as witnesses who may be called at trial in this action:
l. JayBrown
2. Christine Hopson Brown

3. Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart

4. Daryl Rhead
5. Terry Hughes, Elmore County Assessor
6. Danni Smith. Idaho Department of Water Resources
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7. Steve Clelland, Idaho Department of Water Resources
8. John Homan, Deputry Attorney General

9. Terri LaRae Manduca

Plaintiffs reserve the right to call any witness identified by Defendant. This reservation is
made without waiving any right to object to Defendant's witnesses or to Defendant's failure to
timely identify witnesses.
Plaintiffs intend this disclosure to include any witness who is needed to lay a foundation
for any exhibit and any witness who may be necessary for the purpose of impeachment or
rebuttal.
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2013.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Thomas E. Dvorak
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2t111 day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:

Victor S. Villegas
BORTON & LAKEY
141 E. Carlton Ave.

_Hand Delivery
V'Facsimile

_Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

Meridian, Idaho 83642
Telephone: (208) 908-4415
Facsimile: (208) 493-4610

Counsel for Defendant
PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER- JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL

lnorton@adaweb.net
hfurst@Jlmorecounty.org
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State a.r ID# 4030)
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
148110l_l

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (collectively
"Plaintiffs'') by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby submits
its Exhibit List as of February 22, 2013. Plaintiffs reserve the right to withdraw, revise, or
supplement any of these exhibits, and/or to submit further exhibits to conform to proof presented
at the time of trial.
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215188 Quitclaim Deed betWeen United
States Department of Agriculture and Jay
Brown (Bates Nos. BROWN0049BROWN0050)
Water Right 61-02188 dated 10/26/00
(Greenheart Deoo Ex. 31)
Water Right 61-07151 dated 10/26/00
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11

12

13

14

10/1410.S RE-2.S Seller's Propaty
Disclosure Form (Greenheart Depo Ex.
No.
MLS #97281069 dated 1'2/18/06 (Bates
No. EK 0044XGrce:nheart Depo Ex. No.

6
114101 RE-24 Vacant Land Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement (Bates
Nos. EK 001-EK 007)(0reenhcart Depo
Ex. No.2
1125/07 Email from Linda Sloderbeck to
Augusta Greenheart fotwarding closing
documents for signature, with
handwritten notes. (Bates No. EK
008 Greenheart D
Ex. No. 5
1/29/07 Warranty Deed, Brows as
Grantors and Augusta Sayoko D.
Mimoto Greenheart as Grantee.
Greenheart D
Ex No. 4
1130/07 First American Title Company's
Statement of Settlement for Sellers.
ates No. BROWN0036
1/30/07 First American Title Company's
Statement of Settlement for Purchasers
Bates No. BROWN0037
2/1/07 Dry Grazing Land Lease between
Augusta Mimoto Greenheart and Jay
Brown (Bates Nos. EK 0041-EK
0043 Greenheart D
Ex No. 18
2/17/07 Sales Verification signed by
Augusta Greenheart (Bates No. EK
0048 Greenheart D
Ex No. 3
6/5/07 -6/8/07 Handwritten Notes
regarding phone conversations Augusta
Greenheart had with various individuals.
(Bates Nos. EK 0019-EK
0021 Greenheart D
Ex No. I 0
6/6/07 Email from Augusta Greenheart
to Elmore County Assessor's Office re:
Elmore County Property Tax Assessment
Notice (Bates No. EK 003 l)(Greenheart
D
Ex No. 12
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15

16

617/07 Email from Augusta Grcmheart
to Elmore County A!SellOr's Office re:
Elmore County Property Tax Assessment
Notice (Bates No. EK 0030)(Greenheart
Ex No. 23
619107 Letter &om Jay Brown to Jo

Gridley, Elmore County Assessor stating
that the property is not irrigated
Greenhcart
Ex No. 13
17

18

19

20

21

22
23

24

6110/07 Notice of Appeal submitted by
Augusta Greenheart (Bates No. EK
0025 Greenheart
Ex No. 1S
6110/07 Notice of Appeal submitted by
Augusta Greenheart (Greenheart Depo
Ex No. 14
· 6/20/07 Elmore County Assessor'
Assessment Notice and Estimate of Tax
(Bates No. EK 0023)(Greenheart Depo
Ex No. 11
6/26/07 Letter from Marsa Grimmett,
Elmore County Board of Commissioners
to Augusta Greenheart regarding
scheduled meeting of the Board of
Elmore County Commissioners to review
her Notice of Appeal (Bates No. EK
0022 Greenheart D
Ex No. 16
7/2/07 Letter from Augusta Greenheart
to the Elmore County Board of
Commissioners re: Appealing my 2007
tax assessment for parcel number
RP04S05E249010A (Bates No. EK
0046 Greenheart D
Ex No. 17
116101 Commissioners Minutes (Bates
Nos BROWN0045-BROWN0047
8/20/07 Email from Augusta Greenheart
to Elmore County Assessor's Office re:
lease agreement (Bates No. EK
0029 Greenheart D
Ex No. 22
8/27/07 Email from Augusta Greenheart
to Elmore County Assessor's Office re:
lease agreement (Bates No. EK
0028 Greenheart D
Ex No. 21
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27

28

29
30

31

32

2007 Elmore County Aueuor'
Assessment Notice (Bates No. EX
003 Greenheart
Ex No. 19
2008 Elmore County Aawtor'
Auessment Notice (Batel No. EK.
0069 Greenhect
Ex No. 20
1213/08 Letter ftom Di111& Ball.
Department of Wau:r Reaourcea, to Jay
Brown re: Rental of Water Right Nos.
61-2188 and 61-71Sl Leued to the
Water Supply Bank. Warrant
Notification. ates No. BROWNOOSS
1l/8/09 Email from Augusta Greenheart
to Kristina Schindele stating that at the
time she purchased the parcel she was
very aware that the parcel was dry
grazing only due to lack of water rights
and irrigation. (Greenheart Depo Ex No.
24
2/14/12 Notice of Change in Water Right
Ownershi Greenheart
Ex No. 25
3/13/12 Letter from Danni Smith,

Department of Water Resources, to
Augusta Greenheart re: change of
ownership for Water Rights Nos. 6112272 & 61-12273. (Bates Nos. EK
0082-EK -118)(Greenheart Oepo Ex No.
27
3/16/12 Letter from Monica Van
Bussum, Department of Water
Resources, to Augusta Greenheart re:
water supply bank lease for right nos. 6112272 and 61-12273. (Bates Nos. EK0079 - EK 0081 )(Greenheart Depo Ex
N0.29
3/22/12 Letter from Michael Creamer,
Givens Pursley LLP to John Homan,

Deputy Attorney General, re: ownership
of Water Rights 61-2188, 61-7151 and
Portions Thereof Re-designated as 6112272 and 61-12273. (Bates Nos
BROWNOl 59-BROWNOl 60
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33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40
41

42
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3/23/12 Letter from Danni Smith,
Department of Water Resources, to
Augusta Grecnheart re: Com:cted change
of ownership for water Rights 61-12272
& 61-12273. (Greenheart Depo Ex No.
30
3/23/12 Letter from Danni Smith,
Department of Water Resources, to Jay
Brown re: Corrected change of
ownership for water Rights 61-12272 &
61-12273. (Bates Nos. BROWN0237BROWN0252
5/10112 Email from Michael Creamer,
Givens Pursley, to Jay Friedly re: the
sale to the City the undisputed portion of
the Water Rights. (Bates No.
BROWN0223
7/17/12 Amended Agreement for Ale of
Water Rights between Jay Brown and
Christine Brown to the City of Mountain
Home. (Bates Nos. BROWN0420BROWN0436
7/24/12 Warranty Deed between Jay
Brown, Christine Brown and Daniel
Lindstrom. Bates No. BROWNOOl 8
11113112 Affidavit of Augusta
Greenheart in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Summ
Jud ent
12110/12 Affidavit of Jay B. Brown in
Support of Motion for Summary
Jud ent.
12110112 Affidavit of Terri LaRae
Manduca
12121112 Affidavit of Augusta
Greenheart in Support o Defendant's
sition to Summ
Jud ent.
12121112 Affidavit of Kenneth Brush in
Support of Defendant's Opposition to
Summ
Jud ent.
Deposition of Augusta Sayoko Mimoto
Greenheart taken on 10/26/12.
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State of Idaho Department of water
Resources Aerial Map for Water Right
No. 61-12272 which depicts the place of
use for the water use taken in 2009. (For
sea onl
demonstrative
State of Idaho Department of water
Resourca Aerial Map for Water Right
No. 61-12273 which depicts the place of
use for the water use taken in 2009. (For
demonstrative
sea onl
Various dated aaial maps downloaded
from Goo e Earth
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DATED this 22nd day of February, 2013.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Thomas E. DvOrak
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:
Victor S. Villegas

_Hand Delivery

BORTON & LAKEY

"'-'f'acsimile
_Overnight Courier

141 E. Carlton Ave.
Meridian, Idaho 83642
Telephone: (208) 908-4415
Facsimile: (208) 493-4610

U.S. Mail

Counsel for Defendant

PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER- JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL

lnorton@adaweb.net
h:furst@3lmorecounty.org
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030)

Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
1617061_1

(11S43-3)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBROWN, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffs,
(PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED)
FINDING OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
GREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

THIS MATIER is currently set for trial on March 5, 2013 and pursuant to this Court's
Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings dated September 19, 2012,
Plaintiffs hereby submit their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Plaintiffs are
submitting this document in accordance with the Court's scheduling order, but Plaintiffs reserve
the right to submit amended or alternative proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law at the
conclusion of the court trial in this matter and would specifically request that the Court afford
them an opportunity to do so. Further, to the extent that any of the following findings of fact
should more appropriately be labeled conclusions of law, and vice versa, it is requested that they
be deemed and treated

as such regardless of their label.
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PROCEDURAL IDSTORY
1.

This action was initiated by Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown

(the "Browns") on April 5, 2012.
2.

In the Complaint, the Browns assert two causes of action against Defendant

Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart ("Oreenheart,').
3.

Each of the causes of action are for Quiet Title/Declaratory Judgment relating to

two water rights owned by the Browns and that Greenheart is now claiming were passed to her
under the general appurtenancy clause of the Warranty Deed when she purchased the Jand from
the Browns.

4.

On May 9, 2012, Greenheart filed an answer.

5.

The Browns' lawsuit seeks to clarify that: a) the water rights owned by the

Browns did not transfer to Greenheart when she purchased the land from the Browns; and b) that
Greenheart was very aware that the land she purchased from the Browns did not have any water
rights attached to it.

6.

On January 31, 2013, after hearing cross motions for summary judgment, this

Court issued an order that denied in part and granted in part those motions. Additionally, the
Court ruled that "the matters presented by both sides in support of the motions for summary
judgment raise the issue of whether there was a mistake which is a question of fact that precludes
summary judgment." Order at p. 10. The Court also noted that the issue of equitable estoppel

had not been plead.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I
On or about February 5, 1988 Jay Brown acquired approximately 320 acres of land

Property").
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II

The Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") Court in Twin Falls, Idaho, decreed
Water Rights Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 (the "Water Rights'') to Jay Brown on October 26,
2000, authorizing the use of groundwater and making the Water Rights appurtenant to a
permissible place of use that encompassed the 320 acres comprising the Original Brown
Property.

m
The decreed Water Rights were limited to the irrigation of a total of 287 acres in a single
irrigation system, which water rights were also limited to being used on the combined total
320-acre parcel owned by Brown.

VII
Water Right 61-2188 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 164 acres ofland
within a 320-acre permissible place of use wholly within the Original Brown Property.

VIII
Water Right 61-7151 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 123 acres of land
within the same 320-acre permissible place of use authorized for 61-2188 and wholly within the
Original Brown Property.
IX

As decreed, the Water Rights may be used together to irrigate no more than 287 acres
within the 320-acre permissible place of use.

x
Neither of the Water Rights has been used to irrigate any portion of the Greenheart
Property since at least 1986.
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v
On August 28, 2003, the Browns applied to the Idaho Department of Water Resources

("Department''} to lease portions of the Water Rights appurtenant to 160 acres of the Original
Brown Property to the Idaho Water Resource Board ("IWRB"} Water Supply Bank, and pursuant

to that application, contracted with the IWRB to idle 160 acres of the 287 authorized acres from
irrigation. The Water Supply Bank lease remains in effect as of the date of this trial. The acres
idled and not irrigated by the Browns pursuant to the Water Supply Bank lease have always
included the entirety of what is now the Greenheart Property. That lease continued until the
filing of the Complaint in this lawsuit and to the present day.

VI
In January of2007, Greenheart purchased approximately sixty (60) acres of the Original
Brown Property (the "Greenheart Property") from the Browns, leaving the Browns with
approximately 260 acres (the "Current Brown Property''}.

XI
Prior to the sale to Greenheart, the Browns' real estate agent represented to Greenheart as
buyer that the Greenheart Property was being sold without water rights

XIII
The purchase and sale agreement executed by the Browns and Greenheart was
accompanied by a seller's property disclosure form. Under the disclosure entitled "Irrigation
water provided by:'', the Browns indicated "N/A" for not applicable. The purchase price paid
was not in keeping with the price charged for comparable ground sold with water rights.

XIV
At the time of the conveyance of the Greenheart Property to Greenheart there was no
system in place on the Greenheart Property to divert or distribute water to irrigate it.
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xv
After the closing of the purchase and sale of the Greenheart Property, Greenheart
submitted a June 10, 2007 Notice of Appeal to the Elmore County Board of Equalization
("Board'') for the Greenheart Property wherein Greenheart challenged the classification of the
Greenheart Property as irrigated agriculture and sought to have it reclassified as Category 5 Dry
Grazing, and stated that at the time of the purchase Greenheart was told "that the land is dry."
Greenheart also made statements to the effect that she had purchased without any irrigation water
rights.

XVI
On July 6, 2007, at Greenheart's direction and upon her express written authorization, Jay
Brown appeared before the Board and represented that the Greenheart Property was dry land and
had been purchased and conveyed as dry land without any irrigation water rights and would not
be irrigated ''unless at such time a water right is purchased for the property by Ms. Greenheart."

XVII
On July 6, 2007, the Board granted Greenheart' s request to reclassify the land and upheld

the assessor's adjusted valuation of the Greenheart Property to reflect that it is, indeed, dry
grazing land with no irrigation water.

XVIII
Since July 6, 2007, Greenheart has received a financial benefit of more favorable tax
treatment from that reclassification of the Greenheart Property as Category 5 "dry grazing" and
that tax savings has been in excess of $600 a year since that time.

XIX
Sometime later, a dispute developed between the Browns and the County over the
propriety of the original split of the Greenheart Property. As part of the settlement of that
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dispute, Elmore County offered to purchase Greenheart's Property. In a November 8, 2009 email to Ms. Schindele, an employee with Elmore County, concerning Elmore County's offer to
purchase the Greenheart Property, Greenheart stated, among other things, that "at the time of the
purchase, I also was very aware that the parcel is dry grazing only due to lack of an irrigation
system and no water rights."

xx
In February 2012, the Browns were contemplating one or more sales or transfers of
Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151. The Browns had an offer to purchase their water rights, and
the portion of the water rights attributable to the Greenheart Property was believed to have value
of approximately $106,000.00 for just the water rights. The Browns spoke with counsel
regarding the potential sale and it was in these discussions that they first learned that the
reference to "appurtenances" in a deed had been interpreted by some Idaho case law to include
water rights even if they were not expressly mentioned, although it was believed at that point that
background circumstances could be used to show the true intent of the parties. Shortly after
learning this information, Jay Brown contacted Greenhearrby telephone.

XXI
On February 8, 2012 Jay Brown contacted Greenheart by telephone and requested that
she confirm in writing that she was aware she did not purchase the Greenheart Property with
water rights and did not object to any sale or transfer of the Water Rights by the Browns.
Greenheart alleges that during the telephone conversation in February 2012, that Jay Brown had
indicated to her that he had "mistakenly sold the groundwater right to her."

XXII
Greenheart has never attempted to apply any water to the land by any method or to file
any paperwork with any governmental agency regarding the allegedly conveyed water rights
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from the 2007 deed until early 2012 after she received a phone call from Plaitniff Jay Brown
regarding the groundwater right at issue.

xxm
On February 17, 2012, evidently prompted by that phone call, and without notice to the
Browns, Greenheart filed with the Idaho Department of Water Resources a Notice of Change of
Water Right Ownership ("Notice,'). In the Notice Greenheart represented among other things
that the Water Rights were "divided proportionally based on the portion of their place(s) of use
acquired by the new owner." The Notice makes no mention ofGreenheart.,s agreement with the
Browns and admissions to the Elmore County Board of Equalization that she had purchased the
Greenheart Property without water rights.
XX1V

On March 9, 2012, the Department revised its water right database to indicate Defendant
Greenheart as the current owner of portions of the Water Rights, and reduced the quantity of
water and irrigated acres authorized under the Water Rights decreed to the Browns
commensurately. Due to'certain technical errors in the Department,s revisions, the water right
database was subsequently revised by the Department on March 22, 2012. These notices of
revisions indicated that they do not reconfirm the validity of the right.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

xxv
Mutual_Mistake
The party asserting mutual mistake bears the burden of proof. Mu" v. Se/ag Corp., 113
Idaho 773, 777, 747 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Ct. App. 1987). That burden is significant-mutual
mistake must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Cline v. Hoyle & Associates, Ins.,
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Inc., 108 Idaho 162, 164, 697 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1985). Because mutual mistake is a question of
fact, a trial court's finding thereof will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Id.
A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain. Bailey

v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671P.2d1099, 1102 (Ct. App. 1983). To prove mutual mistake, a
party must set forth proof of: (i) a mistake; (ii) commonality; and (iii) materiality, i.e., that the
mistake is so substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the party asserting mistake.

O'Connor v. Harger Construction, Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008).
A mistake is defined as an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, surprise
or misplaced confidence. Bailey at 639, 671 P.2d at 1102. Thus, not all mistakes are actionable.
A party is said to bear the risk of a mistake when he is aware, at the time the contract is made,
that he has limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his
limited knowledge as sufficient. This is not a mistake, but is conscious indifference. If the
parties thus treat their knowledge as sufficient, they may be mistaken, however their indifference
may assume the risk of the mistake of which they complain. Id.

As stated, the mistake in question must be shared among the parties. This is relatively
straightforward. However, two issues arise under this element. For example, in Bailey, the
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether, to be entitled to relief under mutual mistake,
the parties must have the same misconception as to the same assumption of fact.

Some

jurisdictions require this. The Court of appeals declined. Thus, as long as there is a different
belief as to the same assumption of fact, the mistake is mutual. This is true regardless of whether
the different misconception as to the same mistake is in itself different.
The other issue that arises is where the mistake in question is only that of one party. In
other words, the mistake is unilateral. The general rule is that unilateral mistake is not grounds
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for rescission unless ''there has been a misrepresentation or knowledge of the mistake by the
other party." Belk v. Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 657, 39 P.3d 592, 597 (2001 (internal citations
omitted). Thus, if the precipitating factor of the mistake is a misrepresentation or the nonmistaken party is aware of the other party's misconception, rescission may still be obtained. Id.
Mutual mistake is a doctrine by which a party may rescind a contract and return parties to
their pre-contract status. O'Connor at 909, 188 P.3d at 851. Mutual mistake may also be
employed to modify or reform a contract so as to reflect the parties' true intent. Primary Health

Network, Inc., v. State, Dep't ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 52 P.3d 307, 312 (2002).
The evidence in the case at hand supports the conclusion that at the time of contracting
and of tendering the Deed at issue, the parties here shared a fundamental mutual assumption, that
the Greenheart Property was being sold as dry ground without water rights. The language in the
Deed is a situation that is referred to by the public as a "legal technicality" in that it does not
reference ''water rights" as being transferred, and instead uses an arcane term "appurtenences,"
which this Court has held is given the legal effect when employed in a deed of transferring water
rights in the absence of fraud or mistake. Mr. Brown and Ml's. Brown have testified to their
understanding that no water rights were being transferred. Greenheart's actions subsequent to
the Deed with respect to taxes and her response to the county attempting to buy her out are
further clear and convincing proof that she shared this misassumption of fact.

Although

Greenheart now says that she had a misconception at the time of what water rights were, this
does not change the fact that she employed this term and ultimately believed at the time that
whatever water rights were, she was not obtaining any. Just as was the case in Bailey, there was
no event or action where Defendant Greenheart claimed a water right had been transferred until
she was called by Plaintiff Jay Brown, who disclosed to her that there was a potential "mistake"
that he had learned of in the Deed and he asked her to confirm the contrary intent.
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW- 9
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XXVI
Quasi Estoppel
Quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party,
which is inconsistent with a position previously taken.» C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist.

No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003). The doctrine applies when: 1) The
offending party took a different position than his or her original position, and 2) either the
offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party, the other party
was induced to change positions, or it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to
maintain an inconsistent position from one from which he or she has already derived a benefit or

in which he or she has acquiesced. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668
(2008).
Some cases have interjected an additional requirement of unconscionability with regard
to the advantage or detriment portion of the doctrine. This does not appear to be required by the
phrasing of the doctrine, though this issue is not settled. In Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138
P.3d 310 (2006), the court stated that "to prove quasi•estoppel, it is not necessary to show
detrimental reliance; instead there must be evidence that it would be unconscionable to permit
the offending party to assert allegedly contrary positions.» 143 Idaho at 114, 138 P.3d at 314.
This suggests that unconscionability must be proven to apply quasi-estoppel. However, when we
go to the Atwood decision, the citation to the above-quoted portion takes us to Thomas v.

Arkoosh Produce, 131Idaho352, 48 P.3d 1241 (2002). This is significant because of a subtle,
but significant, addition to quasi-estoppel law that is not contained in more recent decisions.
Indeed, the Court in Arkoosh begins its analysis with the standard blurb on the law
regarding advantage, disadvantage or unconscionability. However, instead of employing the
disjunctive "or", Arkoosh uses the conjunctive "and."

Thus, to prove quasi-estoppel under
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Arlcoosh, a party must prove an inconsistency, advantage, disadvantage, and unconscionability.
More recent statements on quasi-estoppel use the disjunctive "or," (See e.g. Washington Federal

v. Van Enge/en, 153 Idaho 648, 289 P.3d 50 (2012) (most recent quasi-estoppel case, stating that
to prove the same you must satisfy advantage, disadvantage or unconscionability, but not all
three). Based on the more recent cases, Ar/coo.sh contains an inaccurate statement of quasiestoppel.

Thus, a party does not have to prove unconscionability, just an advantage,

disadvantage or unconscionability.
All of these elements are met here: (l) Greenheart is now taking a different position than
her original position wherein she disclaimed any interest in water rights in 2007 and 2009, and
(2)(a) Greenheart gained a substantial tax advantage over the years by doing so; and/or (b)
Greenheart's actions in confirming the mistaken mutual assumption caused a disadvantage to
Brown in that Brown believed they had the water rights to sell and incurred legal expenses and
took other efforts to sell the water rights, thereby inducing them to change positions; and/or (c) it
would be unconscionable to permit Greenheart, having received the tax benefit and taken the
position she has, especially in light of the value of the water rights, to essentially make off with a
windfall that was never intended by the parties at the time of their contract, and the Court would
be doing so by now allowing her to maintain that the "appurtenances" language operates in a
technical fashion to transfer water rights, an inconsistent position from one from which
Greenheart has (c)(i.) previously derived a benefit; and/ or (c)(ii.) in which she has acquiesced.
A quasi estoppel arises against Greenheart now maintaining that the "appurtenances" language
has the effect for which she argues and entry of an order to this effect is appropriate.
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Equitable Estoppel
The elements of equitable estoppel are: "( 1) a false representation or concealment of a
material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting
estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the
representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the
representation or concealment to his prejudice." Washington Federal Sav. v. Van Enge/en, 153
Idaho 648, 289 P.3d 50 (2012).
In the present case, (l)(a) the original statement in the purchase and sale agreement that
left a blank after the sentence saying water rights to be sold, if any, and (b) Greenhearfs
instructions to Plaintiff Jay Brown to represent her before the tax board and request that he lease
from her, which included her representation that the ground was dry and she had no water rights,
meet the first elements and comprise a false representation of material fact with constructive
knowledge of the trust. (2) The use of an arcane word m a deed with no reference to a transfer
or water rights would not have excited the attention of a reasonable person that the situation was
different than represented by Greenheart, i.e., that she had no water rights and no water rights
were transferred; (3) Greenheart made the representations in the contract and later in sending Mr.
Brown to talk to the Board with the intent that they be relied upon; and (4) the Browns have
acted upon the representation to their detriment in entering into negotiations and expending
money on legal fees to sell these water rights, which Greenheart now claims are conveyed.
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Promissory Estoppel
The elements of promissory estoppel are: (1} reliance on a specific promise; (2) the
detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) substantial loss to the
promisee acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the
promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made. Brown v.

City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 808, 229 P.3d 1164, 1170 (2010}; Zollinger v. Carrol, 137

Idaho 397, 49 P.3d 402 (2002}.
There are two statements of promise here by Greenheart, ( 1} the original statement in the
pmchase and sale agreement that left a blank after the sentence saying water rights to be sold, if
any, and (2) Greenheart's instructions to Plaintiff Jay Brown to represent her before the Board
and request that he lease from her, which included her representation that the ground was dry and
she had no water rights. Both of these induced Mr. Brown to believe that Greenheart shared the
same view he had, than none of these water rights had transferred to her. This reliance was
reasonably foreseeable based on the representations made.

And the consequential damage if

Greenheart is allowed to withdraw these promises that she was not receiving water rights is
substantial in the loss of Brown's right to sell these water rights.

XX1X
Relief Granted
Based on the forgoing, it is hereby ordered that Judgment consistent with the forgoing be
entered on Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint in favor of Brown. Counsel for Brown to
submit a proposed form of judgment.
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DATED this 22nd day of February, 2013.

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

~rak
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of February, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:
Victor Villegas
Borton & Lakey
141 E. Carlton Avenue
Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

_Hand Delivery
V'Facsimile
_Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER - JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL

lnorton@adaweb.net
hfurst@31morecounty.org

Tut?'mas E. Dvorak
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FILED
Joe Borton (ISB No. 5552]
Victor Villepa [ISB No. 5860]
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BOR.TON LAKEY LAW OPPICBS
141 B. Carlton Ave.

Mntlan, m83642

Boile, Idlbo 83702
OfBce: (208) 908-4415

Fax: (208)493-4610
Email: vlctor@borton·Jakey.com

A.ttorn'1' for Dt(adant
IN TD DISTRICT COVRT or TBB FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRicr or
THE STATE or IDAHO, IN AND JOR THE COVNTY or ELMORE
JAY BR.OWN md CHRISTINB HOPSONBR.OWN, Husband md Wife,

CASE NO. CV 2012-353

PJaintifli,

DEPENDANT'S PROPOSED
FINDINOS OPPACI' AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
AUOUSTASAYOKOMIMOTO
OR.EBNHBAR.T, an individual,
Defendant.

Defendant, Augusta Sayoko Mbnoto Greenheart, by and· through her attorneys of rec;ord,
Borton Lakey Law Oftlcea, aubmita Deftmdant'a Proposed Finctinp of Pact and Conclusiom of
Law pursuant to this Court's scheduling order. Defendant reserves and resp~y requests that
thfa Court allow Defendam to submit amended or supplemental fhidfnp or &ct and/or

conclusions of law at tho condusion of the trial in this matter. Some of the proposed tlndm11 of
fact or conclwriom may be used intc:rdumpably or considered mixed findinp of &ct and law.
Defendant reqi1Mt1 tbli this Comt to apply tbem accoa:dinaJy reprdlu1 oftMir law.
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l'INDINGS or FACT

1.

On or about February s. 1988 Plaintitr Jay Brown acquired approximately 320

acres of land situated in the But ~of Section 24, T4S, RSE, B.M., mElmore County ("Original

Brown Property").
2.

The Snake River

Bum Adjudication ("SRBA")

Court in Twin Falls, Idaho,

decreed Wat« RJahts Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 to Plaintil' Jay Brown on October 26,2000,
authoriziq the use of aroundwat« to the 320 acres eompriaing the Original Brown Property.

3.

On January of 9, 2007, Defendant Greenheut and Jay Brown entered hlto a

written contract to purchase approximately sixty (60) acres of the Original Brown Property (the
"Oreenbeart Property") from the Browu, leavma the Browns with approximately 260 acres (the

"Current Brown Property").

The two written documentl oompdsina the contract between the

parties includet an RB·24 Vacant Land Real Estate Purchase and Sale

Aareement ("Purchase

and Sale Agreement") and an RB·13 Counteroffer (Cowiteroft'er").

4.

The tm:ms of tho Purchase and Sale Aareement inelude the transfer of any and all

water rfahts that appurtenant to the real property being sold. Pa:raaraph 16 of the Purchase and
Sale Asrnment reads:

"16. WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rl&hta, water systems, wells
springs. water, ditches, ditch riahts. etc. if any, that are appurtenant thereto
that are now on or UICd in conmction with the premises and shall be included
in the sale unless otherwise provided herein:
[blank]
"
S.

Oreenheart did not prepare the type written

tanauas• in the Purchase and Sale

Aareement or the Counteroffer.
6.

Durins the purchase of tho Oreenheatt Property, Ms. Oreenheart never pcnonally

met or had any conversations with either Plaintiff' Jay Brown or Christine Hopson-Brown.
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Greenheart hid previoUlly purcbued real property In Emmitt Idaho ("Emmett

Plol*t1"} prior to the purchae of the Oramhurt Propolty.

8.

The :Emmett Propolty that Oreenbem:t purcbuecl hid a ditch rwmina across the

propllty that hid water nmning tbroup it.

9.

At part of the purchase of the Bmmett Pioperty,

ar.mu.t received lharet of

wat« throup m iniption district.

10.

Bual on her prior purobue experience of the Emmitt Propolty, Oreenheart

believed that that a purcbaMr of real proptrty obtained a "water right" by virtue of 9\lritace wat«

travelfna aero• the property.
t t.

Until thil lawsuit wu filed, Oreenheatt did not know that a "water riaht" could

cover "ground" water or that a court of law could dacne a apecitlc amount of ground water to a
particulat piece ofreal property.
12.

Greenhetrt hu no specialized training or experience in Idaho Water Law.

13.

At no time durlna the tramaotion wu Oreenboart told orally or in writing that

there wu an adjudicated and decreed ground water riaht by the Snake Riv• Buin Adjudication

auodated with the 320 acre property.
t 4.

At no time during the tramadion wu Oreenheart told orally or in writing that

Water RJabta Nos. 61-2188 and 61·71'1 existed and that it wu excluded from the aale of the
Greenhelrt Property.

wat•.

t5.

<lncm.beart wu led to believe that a could dia a wen to aet

16.

Orecmhcart undentood that there wu nothhia at all beins exc1wlec1 ftom the sale

of the Oremhell't Property.
17.

Gnenheut expected that upon the purchase of the Oreenheat Property, she

would receive everythfna that would normally be included in a purchue of real property.
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thll opportunity to review the tenm of tho

mplrtioular Paragraph 16, prior to obHpting tbamelvea

contractually to tell the Oreeaheart Propey.

19.

The purc:hue price b' the Greenheart Pmpert)' WU S1,333.33 ptl' acre.

20.

The pmchue price ii oommemurate with 1IDd that hu wat•

riahts but was

undeveloped fbr frription at the time of Ille. The word "undeveloped" refi:n to real property
that Jac:b frript1oD improvemcmt1 such u m frript1on system ooutstma of distribution

matnJfnes ml a sprinkler l)'ltem such u wheel lines, pivots, or handline sprink1en or 10me tbrm
of ar&vity frript1oD lyltem and UIOofated 1IDd Jevelfna.
21.

Jay and Christine Brown uec:uted a Warranty Deed dated January 29. 2007

tramfenina the Oreeaheart Pmperty to Ms. Oreeaheat.
22.

The Warnnty Deed WU recorded in the real property recordl of Elmore County

on January 30. 2007 u Imtrum.ent # 384017.
23.

The language in the Wam.nty Deed mabl no mention ofreservina water riahts

and recita that the premiaea are conveyed •6witll their appurtenances unto said Grantee and to the

Onntee's heirs aDd 1utan1 fbrever."
24.

Greenhmt did not prepare the language in the Wmauty Deed or live directions

u to how the Warranty Deed should be prepared.
25.

Oreeahmt was not present in the room when the Browns aiped the Wazrmty

Deed nor did Oreonheart see or have po9MSsion of the Wmauty Deed until after the Browm
signed the Wmauty Deed.

26.

Jay and Christine Brown had a ft.ill opportunity to read the

Janauaae

Wamnty Deed and make any changes they deemed necessary prior to aignin1 it.

27.

Jay and Christine Brown were nealiaent fn reviewina the Warranty Deed
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The Browm mUtakenly believed that by placins the water m the Idaho Water

28.

Bank. the wn wu leplly levered tom the portions of llDd that were not irrigated.
Aft• the Ille, Plaintiff Jay Brown knew that u of Jun 9, 2007, the Blmore

29.

County AllellOr had messed the Oreenblart Property u tnipted sround.

CONCLUSIONS or LAw
L Matul Mlltake
A "miltake ia an unintentional act or omiuion lrisina tom iprance, smpriae, or

misplaced confidence." Bat/11 "· Ewlni. 10! Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Ct.App.
1983). A mutvll m1stab occun when both par:det abare a miaconception about a vital fact upon
which they 'baed their 'barpin at the time of contracdna. Id. The mistake must be material or,
in other worda, ao l1.lbltantial and filDdamental u to defeat the objeot of the parties. Id.

"rhe assumption or fact must be the same; otha:wiso two unilateral mistakes, Instead of
om mutual mistake, would result." BaU11 v. Ewtna, 10$ Idaho 636, 639-640, 671 P.2d 1099,

1102 • 1103 (Ct.App. 1983). Be1bre relief will be sranted, it must appear that tha mistake WU
mutual Ud•lavlm v. KelcM11, 33 Idaho 165, 190, 191P.1029, 1030 (1920).

'4The burden ofproof ii on the party al1eaiq mutual mistake." Uulavltz "· X.tch•, 33
Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029 (1920). 'TAI evidence must be clear and lltisfactory, leavhla but little,
if any, doubt of the mistake. It must be made out by the clearest and mo• utisfictoty tesdmony

such u to leave no tm and reasonable doubt on the mfnd that the writing does not comct1y

embody the real Imation of the parties. A mere prepondenmce of the evidence will not
suftlce•.•" Id.
R.elciufon is an equitable remedy which ideally brfnp the partie1 to their pre-contract
1tatu1 quo.

O'Connor v. Hfll'ler Con.rt, Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846. 851 (2008).

DUENDANT'I PROrOSD PINDDICS OF FACT AND CONCLVSJONI OFL4W • 5

469

Fel>. 25. 2013 4:24PM

No. 5232

ut Carlton Ave

P. 7/12

R.eeciasion ii the proper rmnedy where there it a mutual mistake of fact that ii material or
~mdamental to the oonttact.

Id. •'[M]utual mistake permits a party to reacind or modify a

contract u Iona u the miltak.o ia ao IUbltantial and fimdamental u to defeat the object of that
pmty." ld.

ffl"tlnr Prllltal'y Hltlltlt Network, Inc. v. Sta#, DIP't ofA.dwdn., 137 ldabo 663, 668,

S2 P.3d 307. 312 (2002). Mutual mistake may alao be uaed to modify or reft)nn a contract to

reftect the tnJ.e intent otthe partiot. "A court Ida properly 'm refbrmina an instrument when it
appem tram the cvidmce••. that the inatrummt do• not reflect the intmtiona of the parties'"
becauloofthomutualmistake. Ballqv. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 641, 671P.2d1099, 1104
(Ct.A.pp. 1983) tJllOllnl &;,,,,, v. Po'f'WM41-Manll Yallq lrrlptlon Co., 38 Idaho lSS, 220 P. 112
(1923).

usumption of tact shared by the pertiet. Gteenheart wu never told that a around wat• rfaht

existed let alone that decreed Water lUgb.tt Nos. 61-2188 and 61-71.51 were excluded tom the
ale of the Gremhcart Property. Gnenheart wu led to believe that I.he could dig a well to git

water if 1he d.elired. The Purchue and Sale Agreement makot no mention that any around water

riaht• were a.eluded tom the Ille of the Oreenheart Property. The WamntyDeed likewise
do• not reserve wat• tom the transfer of the Oreeahurt Property.
IL Statute of IJmitadom ('Mlltake)

The statute ofllmitatiom on tho around of taud or mistake must be commenced within three

(3) years. I.C. f S-218. Section 5-218 states that a cause of action tbr ftaud or mistake does not
accrue until "until discovery, by the agrieved party, of the ficta constituting the bud or
miltake." Id. In the context of fraud, "our Supeme Court bu held that 'actull knowledge of

the bud wW be. inferred if the alleaedly agrieved pirty could have disoovend it by the exercise
of due diligence.'" .A.ltan v. GUI, 108 Idaho 900, 901, 702 P.2d 1360. 1361 (Ct. App. 1985)
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(quoting Nancy Lu Mina, Inc. v. Harrllon, 9! Idaho 546, 547, 511P.2d828. 829 (1973)). The
J.lthn court held that thit same principle appliet to C1UM1 of action hued. upon mistake::

We believe the ume principle Joatcally applies to Cl\1lel of aotion baaed upon

mfatake. Accordiqly, WO hold that ID aotion ""'101 reUot tqm mi•eke wW
be tim•lamd pndc l.C, f }-211(4) uplw it la ftlcd wjtNn throe nart ak
the mfatW sgpld ha!' l!tm dltsgyen4 la da' mnla pf dpt dW1pg.
A party•• nealiaence may preolude a 8ndiq of due dilipnce necesmy to ftnd that 111 action wu

timely bfouPt. J.ltka v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 902, 702 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Ct. App. 1985)
In t1m oue, usumina the Browm can prove t1m both parties intended to exclude a
proportionate share ofWater R.ightl NoL 61-2188 and 61-7151 tom the Ille ofthe Oreenheart

PJ:operty, the Browm in an exercise of due diligence could have and should have discovered the
alleged "miatab" on three separate oecuiont; at the time of contracting and once again at the

dme of olosiq.
First, upon exercise of due diliaence. the Browm could have and should have noticed that
the terms of the Purchuc and Sile Agrcem.cmt and in particular Paraaraph 16, clearly stated that

water wu included in the sale of the property. The Counteroftir incorporates all the tc:nns of the

Purchase and Sale Aareement except the purchase price. The Counteroffer was signed and
create a bindiq contract on January 9, 2007 which is more than 3 years tom the date of the

f!llna of the Complaint in this action.
Second, the Browns could have and should have discovered the mistake when each of

them siped the Wamnt Deed. Idaho law recognizes that "a watc right is an appurtenance to
the land on which it hu hen and will pu• by conveyanco of the land." Ruu1ll v. Irl.rll, 118 P.

soi. 502 (1911). "A division of a tract oflm:t to which water Is appurtenant, without
sesrepting or mervfna the water right, worb a division of such watc right in proportion u the
land ii divided." Hunt v. Bremu 216 P. 964, 965 (1929). "Unless [water riahtsl are expressly
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reserved In the deed or it is clearly shown that the parties Intended that the srantor would remve

them. appurtenant water rigb:ta pua with the land even thouah they are not mentioned In the deed
and the deed does not mention •appurtenances.' " Bailq v. 77aonuuon, 149 Idaho 799. 803, 241.

It ii undisputed that the Warranty Deed does not contain Ianauaae reservins Water R.isJita
Noa. 61-2188 and 61-7151. Oreenheart did not pnrvent the Browm fiomrmdfna the language of
the Wmanty Deed. Oreenhcmt did not prepare the Janauaao of the Warranty Deed or have

coa.trol bow the deed would have been prepared. The Browns could have and should have

.

diacovcnd the mistake whm each of them Biped the Warrant Deed on Iamwy 29, 2007, which

is more than 3 years tom the date of ftlina the Complaint.
Lastly, when 1ay Brown wrote his June 9, 2007 letter to Elmore County Auesaor, Jo
Oridley. Iay Brown knew that the U1e110r'a office had levied the Greenheart Property as
irriptc:d pound.. That fact should have put Jay Brown on notice that IOmetbJ:na had caused tho
use110r11 oftlce to comid• the Greenheart Property u irrigated sround. In the exercise of due

diligence, Jay Brown could have discovered that something could be wrons with the Warranty
Deed at that time. This timehm.e apjn ii beyond the 3 year statute of limitations. ·

ID.Quul Ettoppel

This doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when: (1) the oft'ending party took a diftirent
position than his or her original position and (2) either (a) the offendina party pined an
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party wu induced to chanae

positions; or (o) it would be unconscionable to permit the offendina party to maintain an
inconsistent position tom one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. .Atwood v.
Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006).

In this cue, there is no evidence that duting the sale of the Onenheart Property that show
Ms. Greenbeart dfd anything to induce the Browns to execute the Purchase and Sale Agreement
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beins 1e>ld with the Oreeahmt Property. Likewise, there ii no

ovldonce that Oreenheart took any action d\lrins the sale that would have induced the Browm to

execute the Warranty Deed that clearly lacked 1aquaae reaervina the pound water riahta tom
the transfer.
The evidence ahow8 that Greenbeart never penonally met or communicated with the

Browm durlna the purd1ue and sale tramaction. The evidence a1eo shows that Greenheart did
not prepare tbl Warranty Deed or the typcwrittm Janguqo in the Purohue and Sile Aafeement.
She WU not presem f.n the room when the Browm siped the Warranty Deed. Then ii limply DO

avidcmco that Orec:mhmt made the Browm chanp positiom.
IV.Promlts0ry Ettoppel

Tc prevail on a promissory estoppel olafm, a party must prove the existcmco of all four
elements of promissory estoppel: (1) reliance upon a sped!c promise; (2) substantial economie
1011 to the promisce as a result of such reliance; (3) the loo to the promisee wu or should have

been fi>raeable by the promisor; and (4) the promisec'a reliance on tho promise must have been

reasonable. Black Canyon Racqudtball Club, Inc. v. Idaho Flnt Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171,
182, 804P.2d 900, 911 (1991); Zolltnprv. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 399, 49 P.3d402, 404
(2002). Promissory estoppel does not require a netirioua intent on the part of the promiaor to

cauac hmm to the pmmisce. Rule Sala and Savtce, Inc. v. U.S. Bank Nat. .41.t'n, 133 Idaho 669.
61!. 991P.2d857, 863 (Ct. App. 1999). With respect to the Promisor's atate of mind. the

doctrine requires only thaf lfh~le to the promiaor that the promilee would tab 10me
action or ilrbearance mreliance upon the promise and would thereby ~· 1Ubstantial lo11 if
the promise wen to be dishonored. Id.
In this cue. the elements for promissory estoppel canmt be mlt. Then is no evidence
that during the purchaso and sale phase, Grecmheart made a promise either oral or in writina to
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the Browm that would have caused the Browm to tab aome action or tbrbcarance. At stated

above, Oreesahemt did not prepare tho Warranty Deed or the typewritten languap in the
Purcbue al2d Salo Aareement- Tbarc ii no eri4onco that Greenhoart prevented the Browm hm

readfDa the Warranty Deed bd)re they *'led it either. The elemenb tbr promillOl')' estoppe1
cannot be met in thit cue ml therei>re pmmisaory estoppel does aot apply.
V. Equitable Eltoppel
The Verifted Complaint do• not raise 1 claim tbr equitable atoppcL Theretbre punulDt to
thfl Court'• pftvioua mlysfl in its Orr.le /Anytng Summary

Jud"""" on Count I and Granting

Jn Plll't Summary J""'7nat For Dtfendant on Count JI, tho Court will not comider or apply
equitable estoppel in this cue.
VI. Rde£

Without waivina itl objectiom raised in its motion in limine al2d motion for reeomidation
that mistake waa not plead, Defendant Oremhcart ukl this Court to conclude that the Brown's

lawsuit on the iuuc of mutual mistake is untimely and therefure enter an order and judgment
dism!ains the lawauit.

If thia matter fl not dWmi•aed on statuto of limitatiom aroundl. Oreenheart alb thil Court to

enter an order ftndins that the Browm have not prove11 the element• of mutual mistake or the
application of any equitable theories of promillory and quui eatoppel.
DATED this 25t1s day of Fe'brumy, 2013.

BORTON LAKEY LAW OPPICES
By

)1W;'.
Victorv·

A.ttomeya for Defouiant
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CIBTIQCA,D or SEBYJCI

I HEREBY CERTIFY that OD this 2s• day of February. 2013, a true and correct copy ot
tho fbreaoina documeAt WU served by flrtt•CWI mail, poltl.p prepaid, and addreaed to; by fax
trllllmibion to; by overnight delivery to; or by pcnonally deliverina to or leaviq with a person
in charge of the ofBce u indicated below:
Michael c. Creamer

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Fax

Thomu B. Dvorak

GIVENS PtnlSLEY UP
P.o. Box 2720
Dolle, m 83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
PacaimiJe: (208) 388-1300

[ ] Ovcmisht Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivwy

Honorable L)'DD. 0. Norton
Fourth Judicial District Court
150 S. 4th B, Ste. 5
Mountain Home, m 83641

lnorton@adawe'b.net
hf\nt@elmorccounty.ora
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Joe Borton [ISi No. 5552]
Vk:tor Villeau [!SB No. 5860]
BORTON LADY LAW OPPICBS
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Maidian. ID 83642
Boile, Idaho 13702
Offtoe: (208) 908-4415
Fu: (208)493-4610
Bmail: victor@borton-Jakey.com

..4nonwy1/or Dl(endtmt
IN THI DISTRICT COtTRT 01' nm FOtTRTB JDDICIA.L DISTRICT or
THI STATE or mABo, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON·
BROWN. Huaband and Wife,

CASE NO. CV 2012-353
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL
WITNESS UST

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
ORBENHBART. an individual,

Defendant.

COMBS NOW the Defendant Augusta Sayoko Mimoto ar.nbcart, by and throup her
counsel of record Victor Villeps of Borton Lakey Law Offices. and hereby disclosa the

followina u witneae1 who may be called at trial in this aetion.
1. Aup.sta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenhc:art
2. Kenneth Brush
3. Andy Enrico
4. Daryl Rhead

476

Paplof2

(+:

46

No. 5231

st Carlton Ave

P. 316

Defendant ream:vn the riaht to call ID)' witnea identifted by Plaintift's, without waivina
ID)'

objection to Plaintiffa' witDetses. Defendant ia.teadl this diloJoSUfl to include witneuet

.

who have been pmioualy identified by any party. or any witnel• who ii needed to Jay a
tbundation tbr ID)' exhibit, u well 11 any witnell tbr the parpo• of lmpeaehment or rebuttal.

DATBD thfa 25* day of Pe'bruary, 2013.

BORTON LAKBY LAW OFFICES
By

A.ttomq1/or Defimdant

CEBTR'ICAD OF SIBYJCI
I HBR.BBY CBllTlPY that OD thU 25* day of February, 2013. a true and c:oMCt copy of
the fbresaina doc:mnut WU .vecS by ffnt-clul mail. poltqe prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
transmisllon to; by ovemiaht delivery to; or by penonally delivering to or leavina with a penon
charp of the ofllco 11 indicated below:

m

Michael c. Creamer
Thom8I !. Dvorak
OMNS Puut!Y ll.P
P.0. Box 2720
Boise, m83701·2720

[ ]
[X]
[ ]
[ ]

Honorable Lynn O. Norton
Fourth Judicial Diltrict Court
ISO S. 4th B, Ste. !
Mountain Home, m83647

Jnorton@adaweb.net
hibrst@elmorecounty.org

U.S. Mail
Pax
Overnight Delivery
Hand Dellwry

Telephone: (208)388-1200
FIClimile: (208) ~88-1300

Pqe2of2
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ast Carlton Ave

No. 5231
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Joo Borton [ISB No. SSS2]
Vbor Vlllepa [ISi No. 5860]
BOR.TON LAKEY LAw omcBS
141 B. CarJton Aw.
Mlridian, m13642
Boill, Idaho 13702
otace: (208) 908-4415
Pax: (208) 493-4610
Email: victor@borton•llkey.oom

P. 4/6

LE [)

diJFEB 25 PH 4: 47

.A.ttomq1 for Dt(ndtmt

IN TBB DISTRICT COtJR.T OJ TD i'OVRTB JVDICIAL DISTRlcr or
nm STATE or mABO, IN AND POR THE COUNTY or ELMORE
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINB HOPSONBROWN, Husband and Wife.
Plaintifti,

CASE NO. CV 2012-353
DDENDANT'S TRIAL
EXBJBrr LIST

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOK.O MIMOTO
O.RBENHBART, an imividual.

De1iod&nt.

COMES NOW the Defendant Auaust& Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart, by and through bar
counsel of record Victor Villogu of Borton Lakey Law Oftlcea, and disc1oae1 her anticipated
exlu'bi.tl to be \JSCld at the trial ofthil matter u follows:

1
2

l/W'/ U-24 VICBI LIDd Riil lltlte
PmobalD and . . Ap-- ml RE-13
Coum.oft'lr (Ba. Nol. BK OOl·BJt 007)
Ml.S#97281069 dated 12118/06 (Bltell No. EK
()()4.4)

3
Paael of3

.

.Feb. 25. 20 13 4:27PM

'

4

s
6

No. 5231

: ut Culton Ave

'

.

.

P. 5/6

..

:

~

.

1/3CW7 , . . Amlriclll Tilll Compusy'1
S...,,.,, of SectJlrmd k Sellll'I (Bata No.
BROWN0037)
l/30t'07 mt AmlrJaa Tide Co~·
ofldtlamed l>r Parabum (Bltcl
No. BROWN0037)
6/9/07 Ltk tom Jay Btuwn to Jo OrkUly,
mmor. Coaaty AJl•Dr - - d.c thl

s··--

J'l'OIMlt1 fl . . . . • lmaated
7

•
9

Wltlr lllabt 61.Q2111 dlted 1Ol'l6IOO
Wu llfabt 61-07151 dad 1Ot'26IOO
'J/23112 IAtta' hmDIDli ~ ~
ofWa llelourom. to ADP* Orembmrt re:
Corrected chap of owmnhlp IJr watlr riabta
61-12272 A 61-122'73
Defendant raervea the risht to uae my exlu'bitl dilcloled ml/or \lied by the Plaintiff in

tlDI action. De&ndant flHl'Vll the right to amend, supplement, or modify this list of cxhibitl
with notice to the other partiet in this action.

DATED this 2st11 day of February. 2013.
BOilTON LAKEY LAW OPPICES
By

Pap2of3

4 79

• ..... Feb. 25. 2013 4:27PM

ast Carlton Ave

No. 5231

P. 6/6

CEBmJCAD OF DRYJCE

I HEREBY CBR.TIPY that on t1Us 25* day otFebnuary, 2013, a true and correct oopy of
the tbrqoirJa docmnent WU .-Ved by ftrst·olul mail. poltap prepaid. IJld addressed to; by fax

tnm'"'i•lion to; by overniaht delivery to: or by penonally delivering to or leavina with a pmon
in obarse of the oftlce u tndlcated below:
Miohle! c. er-Tbomu B. Dvorak
OJvsNs PUasLiY w
P.O. Box 2'720
Boile, m83101-2120

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Pax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

Telephone: (208)388-1200
FIClilnilo: (208)388-1300
Honorable Lynn a. Norton
Fourth Judicial District Court
150 S. 4th E, Ste. S
Mountain Home, ID 83647

lmrton@adaweb.net
hfbnt@elmorecounty.ors
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· ut Car l ton Ave

FILED

Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552]
Victor VilllP' [ISB No. 5860]
BOllTON LADY LAW OPPICBS
141 B. ClrltonAve.
Meridian, ID 83642
Boile, Idlbo 83102

ZOil FEB 27 PM a.a ftO
:BARBARA S~E
CLERK Of THE
RT

DEPUT

•·

Oi!ol:(208)901-4415
Pax: (208) 493-4610
Smail! viotor@borton-lakey.com
.4ttonwy1 for Dlfadant

IN THE DISTRICT COt11lT or THE FOURTH JVDICIAL DJSTRicr or
TBE STA.Tl 01' mABO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or ILMORI

JAY BllOWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON·
BROWN, Husband and W"ife,

CASE NO. CV 2012-353
Dll'ENDANT'S AMENDED

Plaintim,

TRIAL EXBIBIT LIST

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
ORBENHBART, an individual,

Det.mdant.

COMBS NOW the Defendant Augusta Sa)'Oko Mimoto Oremheart, by and throu&h her
co\llllel of record Victor Ville111 of Borton Lakay Law Of!ce1, and dilclo1e1 her anticipated
exlu'bit1 to be med at the trial of this matter u ft>Uowa:

1/IJ071lE·24 VIClllt Lal Real Estate
A
B

c

Purcbue and Sale Aareement ad 0.13
Counteroffer (Bates Noa. EK 001-BK007)
MLS#97211069 dmd t2/11/06(BnNo. Bit
0044)

am Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenhelrt u
Grantee
Papl of3
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1/30J07 Pint Alllfta Tldl Complllf'1
Stat.,.. otStttlemem tbr StDln (Bm• No.
UOWN0031)
1130/07 Pint AmlrlolD Ti&l9 Coq»llly'1
.,...., otSettJmnmt IJr P\Rbua (Ba
No. DOWN0037)
6l9lf1'I LeUs hm Jay Blown tD Jo Orldlly,
B1mon Coamy Am111or ltltiq t!llt the

. .
0

., .

No. 5247

st Car l ton Ave

20 13 4:37PM

· _.
.. llunmdu'-·~

Wltlr JU1bt 81.ollll dUI lOl26/00
Wmr JUab161-0'7U1 dal lOl26IOO
3123/12 Liits hm Danni Smith, Dtpll1ma
ofWltlr a-=-. tD Aupeta OrelDbelrt re:
Camctld dwnp of ownmbip l>r Wltlr ria1D
61·12272 A 61-12273

Defendant reserva the risbt to uso any exlu'bita disclosed and/or used by the PJaintift' in
tlUa action. Defendant l"ll8l'Vtl the ri&ht to amend, supplement. or modify this list of exhibitl

with notice to the other parties in this action.
DATED this 27* day of February, 2013.
BORTON LAI<EY LAw omCES
By
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F'eb~ 27. 2013 4: 38PM

ast Carlton Ave

No. 524 7

P. 4/4

(;ATilJCAD or 111yic1

I HEUBY CER.TIFY that on tbil 27* day of February, 2013, a true and comet copy or
the fbrqoq doomnmt wa ICl'VCd by h-dan mail. poltap prepaid. and addreued to; by fax
tnmsmi81ion to; by ovaf&ht dllivery to; or by penonally delivaing to or laviq with a penon
in cbarp of the oflb u indicated below:

Michael C. Creaam'
Thoma B. Dvorak
OIVSNS PU1t.SLBY W

[ ] U.S. Mail
[XJ Fax
[ ] Ovemigbt Delivery
[ ] HIDd Delivery

P.O. Box 2720
Boile, m83701-2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Faoshnfle: (208) 388-1300

Honorable Lynn G. Norton
Pouzth Judicial District Court
150 S. 4th E, Ste. 5

Mountain. Home, m83647
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Michael C. Creamer (lcWao .._a. mt 4030)
lbomaa B. Dvorak (ldlbo Stata B• ID t 5041)
OIVBNS PURSLBY w
601 Wost JJntw:k. Stzeot
Pott OfBce Box 2720
Boile, Idaho 83701·2720
Telephono: 201-381-1200
Feoeimilet 201-388-1300

BARBARA STE£•E
CLERKOf~RT

DEP'<J~

17UllG'U (1 IMM)

.Attomcyt for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown

JN nm DJSTlUcr COUR.T OP nm FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUcr FOR nm

STA'IB OP mAHO, IN AND FOR THB COUN1Y OF BLMORB
JAY BR.OWN end CHRISTINE HOPSON·
BROWN, husband and wife.

Case No. CV-2012-353
PRB-T.RIAL BRIBP RE: POST

v.

Plain1Ufs.

AUGUSTA SAYOK.O MIMOTO
GREENHBAR.T. an individual,

CONVEYANCB BVIDBNCE OP
MU'IUAL MISTAKB AND
PURCHASE AGRBBMENT AS
EVIDBNCB OP MISTAKB

Defendmt.

COMB NOW, Plaintifti. Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the
"Browm"), by and throuah their attomoya of record, Qfvem Pursley UP, and hereby submit this
pre-trial memorandum to address cmtain legal iuues that may arise at the trial of thia matter:

P1a1mift'I should be allowed (a) to ofter post-conveyance course of subsequent performance and
sublequent statements to prove mutual mistake at the time of contracting; and (b) evidence of the
terms

ot the Pmcbue and Sale Agreement, despite its merger into the Deed, in order to prove

that the terms of the Deed by reason of mistake do not reflect the true intent of tho parties.
A.

EVID&NCI OP POn-CONVB\'ANCI STATDU.NTS IS ULBVANT TO WBBTBIR OR NOT TBB

PARTIU 'WID MISTAKEN AT THI TJMB Oll' CONTllACl'INO.

Al a tbn:ahold issue, to be admiaaiblc. all ovidence must be relevant. Idaho R. Bvid. 402.

Relevance ia defined u "evidence havina gy teadgsy to mate the existence of any fact that ls
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF RB: MUTUAL MISTAKE· 1
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of ccmsequenoe to the determination of the action more probable or leas probable than it would
be without the evidence." Idaho R. Bvid. 401 (cmphaaia added). "The standard of rclcvanoy ii
not atrici." Untttd Statu ,,, Mb-ant/a, 649 P.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). Ju noted by the

United States Supieme Court. Rule 401 'a "buic standard of relevance 1hua ia a liberal one."
DfJllbut Y. M1"1ll Dow Pltannaaadlcall, Inc.• 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).

Havbia the basic rulcs of relevant evidence in mind, it is now appropriate to focus on
what is allowable and appropriate proof of a mutual mistake at 1he time of contract. It goes

almoat without aayina that to be entitled to one of tho equitable remedies afforded under tho
doctrino of mutual mistake, the mistake in question must be shared and exist ..at the time of
contracting." Hughu v. Fllher, 142 Idaho 474, 482, 129 P.3d 1223, 1231 (2006). In other

words, a nUstab or fact that OQ;Ur1 8i\er an agrcemmt wu signed is not a mistake to which tho
law will provide redrca. Id.
Of C01llle. there is a difference between a mistake of fact that occurs post~ and
post-contrlct evidence that has ..any tendency" 1o show that the party harbored a mistake at tho

time of the agreement. While Idaho appellate courts have not dimct1x ac:ldn:med tho matter rub

.Judlu, other juriadictiona expressly allow post-contract extrinsic evidence to prove mistaken
intmt at the timo of execution. Those juriadlctions rcuon that coune of perlonmmce after

contracting, but "before it comes to be tho subject of controveny, is deemed of snat, if 11ot

contnrua1 blflaace." F1dllral l1'.ftll'ance Company v. A.mllrical Imwance Company, 2S8
A.D.2d 39, 44 (N.Y.1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U.S.
100. 118 (1913)). As noted in the Restatement, "The parties to an agreement know best what

they meant rm their intended agreement]. and their action under it ia often the strongest evidence
of their meaning.., Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 202, comment g (cited with approval in

Clvtstenaen v. RaMom, 123 Idaho 99, 844 P.2d 1349 (Ct. App. 1992)).
PRB-TIUAL BRliF RB: MUTUAL MISTAKE· 2
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Colfl/KllJ1 "· 'J'l'ansatlan1lc .bin.nlrana. Company, 69 A.D.3d 71. 886

N.Y.S.2d 133 (2009). contains an excellent summation of why post-contract extrinsic evidence is
not only relevant but '1ll8hly probative" of tbe parties• intent at the time of contl'lotina:

Aa Supreme Comt com:ctly recopized, to support a claim

tor

refbrmadoo. a "mutual mimke Dl1lll exilt at the time the agreement

is slped." Supnme Court errect. however, In cond•dla1 that
thll •...,..f-perlormaaee evkl•ee ii not probative of a bellet
bf G.iba• wlaea tile 199' ad 2880 JAL coatnetl were
1lped, that Ha perceata1• partldpatloa wu a ,.......... of
Gaits entire aponn tor ffl RVI bualn•· Bow tile partl•
perlorlll a collfnet
fl mulfelted after e1:eaadoa of
tile coatnct, bat their pertormu.ce 11 Jdahlr probative of their
date of mhad 1t th• Chae tile contraet wu 1lped.

••••rlly

69 A.2d at 85, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (emphuia added); F1dmll /"""'1nCt1, 258 A.D. at 4.5, 691

N.Y.S.2d at 513

~'Pederal'a

evidence unequivocally showa that, both durina tho underwrithlg

Procell and after tho underlying accident, the parties acted consistetJtly with their understanding
that Pyramid's automobiles were not covered under the BAPj; J.P. Morgan Chan "· Wlng1t,

2012 WL 53:42412 at •1.s (B.D.Mich. 2012) ("Although a 'mutual mistake muat exist at the time
the agreement is siped,' the parties' course of porformance under the contract is considered to

be tho most persuasive evidence of tho agreed intention oftbc parties").

Plaintifti should be permitted to introduce extdnaic evidence in the form of oourse of
performance and subsoquent statements to prove a mutual mistake that neither party believed
water riahts were being tnnsfened u part of the sale at the time of con1nctini. For example,

then are key written post-conveyance statements by tbe Defendant acknowledging her. intent,

e.g.• "(A)t tbe time of tlae pvehue, I also WU very aware that the parcel is dry

arums only

due to lack of an hrlption system and no water riahts." Plah>dft's Exhibit 24, 11/08/09 :Email
from Dcftmdant Gtee.nheart to Kristina Schindele. Another example is Defcndant•s July 18,

2999 Notiee ef Appeal

Eel~

•89).

Pilimi89 ~ 13 mcl 14, .,Mg 'Yd the time of

PRB-TR.1AL DlUBP llB: MUTIJAL MISTAKE- 3
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purchuo, I was told that the land is dry • . • ... Another example of probative course of
perfonnance evidence ii tho absence of conduct by <Jreonheert to assen any claim to these water

rlgbta fiom the date of the deed, JantllrY 29. 2007 until February 17, 2012. Which wu the ftnt
time lhe contacted the Idaho Department of Water Reao\JICeS to effect a transfer of these water

ript1.'
First, the standard at iasue tor admiaaion of such evidence ii liberal and not strict. There
fs no jury in this cae, so there ii little dqer of the court being confused or not beina able to put

the evidence in its proper context. It mdcnoo bu ..any tendency" to make it more probable that
a Riven &ct occurred, it is relcvmt and lhou1d be admitted unleu there is some other reason. in
law tor acluaion. Here, evidence of Dofendant's post-contract, prc-laWBUit atatementa that
Defendant never acquirccl water rights undw the purchase and sale aa;reement with Plaintiffs. that
the property she acquired was "dry," and Defendant's actions or lack thereof that would appear

consistent with sur.h a belief certainly bu a

~·

to make it more libly than not that

Defendant harbored this same belief at the time of contracting. Thia it especially the case since

the content of the contract is conaiatent with Defendant'• subsequent oommcmtl reprdina the

ripts that aha thought were, or \Wft not, conveyed at the time of contracting.
Second, the above authorities specilically permit the evidence souabt to be offered by
Plaintiffs in this matter. Aa wu the case in Gulflnnrrance Company, how Defendant viowed the

contract and the sentiment she expressed to others regarding her understanding of the agreement
with Plaintiffs before any lawauit came to fruitloa, is not only relevant but "hiply probative of

[her] state of mind at the time the contract waa signed.,. Gulfhtnlrant:e Company, 69 A.2d at SS,
886 N.Y.S.2d at 143. In short, what wm said after the contract and the actions that occur.red

1 After the iuue wu bmugbt to

her llttention by Plalotlt'ft.

PRE-TltlAL BR.IBP RB: MUTIJAL MJSTAKB-4
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followina the same, la reJmmt md probative In deutnnining Dofendaut'1 likely Intent at the time
of comractina- Al ruch. Defeadant'a poat-contraGt statemellll are relevant and admillible.
B.

Evm.INCS '11'I'll&CONTBNTI0. TRI tulCHAD .AND 1.41.& .A.GUDIBNT, AL1110VGR
THAT DOCUMSNT 18 MDGSD INTO TR& DS&D, A.RB PROBAnv& OM TU l8SW Ot

WDTIDR TID PARTlll' INTINT II NOT RDUCTBD IN THI OllO ~NDlll TRB DOCTalN&
O'Ml8TAKL

Thil Court noted that "[l]f miatlb ii not pmven by competent evidence, the Court
cannot tbrther OODlider pre-convcyanoo extrinsic evideace 88 to the water ripm. The c.ontract

was merpd with the deed and can no longer be oonsidered." Order at p. 11. TM COJWel'IO of
the

Court'•

comment hnplia that the lanauage of the purchase and Ille contract can be

considered 88 potential probative evidence of mistlb. This proposition was stated expressly by
1he Court of Appeala of Texas in the case of Hal'dy v. B~cld. 368 S.W.3d 643 (Ct. App. Tex.
2012). In that cuo, the contract stated "all min.erlla will be reserved by acllcr... However, the
key deed in the cue did not nave the minenlL 1n rejecting the arpmcnt that the deed should

be considered and nothing else. the HOl'dy court noted:
When tho perdea mistakenly believe minerals were resaved in an instrument,
equity will grant relief by way of reformation if the cimumstances otherwise
warrant an excrciae of its power. A person who, because of a mistake of law a to
the effect of wonts used in a conveyance, bu transferred to another more than she
intendocl and more 1ban the parties mutually agreed ahe should do, ii cmtitled to
restitution of the excess. An instmmcnt based on a mutually mistalam
undmtandina of O'M1etlbip of mal property can bo set aside by a court of equity.

. . . The expteSI wonting of the contract here was that "all mincrall will be
reserved by tba seller." Although the real estate comract normally mera• With
the subsequent deed, foreclosing it 88 evidence in cxmstruina the deed, we may
eoulder tlae coatnet when analyzing an allegation or mutual mistake not
otherwise evidenced OD the face of the deed.

Id at 650 (citations omitted)(emphuia added).

PR.S-TRJAL :BRIBF RE: MUTUAL MISTAKB • 5
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Likewise. mthe present ouc. there is probativo evidence on the issue of mistake in the
languago employed in tho RB-24 VACANT LAND RBAL BSTATB PURCHASE AND SALB
AGR.BEMENT, Plaintiffa Exhibit 6. For example. in paraaraph 16, the following lanpase
appears:
16. WATBR RIGHl"S. Description of water rights. water syatems, wella.
springs, water, ditches, ditch rights. eto. if any. that are appurtenant thereto that
aro now on. or used in connection with the premises and abal1 be included in the
sale unless otherwile provided herein: [None]."
And in paragraph 21, "Not Applicable" is checked next to the box. for "Water Riahts Transfer

Fee." Thia infonnadon is highly probative on the shared intent of the partiu vt.r a vl.r water
rights at tho time of the deed at issue.

DATED 1bla

y r'fday ofMarch, 2013.

CER.TmCATB 01' SERVICE

this£

I hereby certify that on
day of Match. 2013, I causc:d to be served a true and
oorrect copy of the forogoing docmnent to the per80DI listed below the method indicated:
Victor Villegu
Borton & Lakey
141 B. Carlton Avenue
Meridian. m 83642
Pacaimile: 493-4610
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Hand Delivery

:5l FIC'imile
-

Overnight Courier

U.S. Mail
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Mfcbael C. Creamer (ldlbo Sllte S. JD t 4030)
Thoma B. Dvorak (ldlho S . I• ID I 5043)
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BARUARA~
CLERK
OF TH SL£

GIVBNS PURSLBY UP
601 West Bannock S1reet
Poat Office Box mo
Boill, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 201-388-1200
Pacalmile: 201-381-1300

DEPUT

17107tl_I (1154).3)

AUomeys for Plaintift'a Jay and Chriltine Brown
JN nm DISTR.Icr COURT OP nm POUR.TH JUDICIAL DISTR.Icr FOR. nm

STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR. mB COUNTY OP Bl.MORE
JAY Bl.OWN Ind CHRISTINE HOPSON·
BR.OWN, husband and wife,

C. No. CV-2012-353

Plaintiffi,

v.

MOTION IN LIMINJ&

AUGUSTA SAYOIC.O MIMOTO
OREENHBAR.T, en IAdividual,

COMB NOW, Plaintiffs, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter tho
"Browm"). by end through their attomeys of record, Givens Punley w, and hereby move this
Court for an Older proluotting testimony:
(a)

Of'.Mr. Andy Bmico regarding the intent of the parties in using the purohuc and

sale qreement and of how real estate apnts are taught to fill out such an agreement, as aucb
testimony, ii apcoulation and lnvadea the province of the court as finder of fact.
(b)

As to value, to the extent such testimony is based on documents and methodology

not disclosed in discovery in this case.
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This motion ia made and based upon l.R.C.P. 602, 701, 705, the Memorandum in Support
of Motion in Unrine filed contemporaneously herewith, the pleacffnp and documents ftled and

lodaecl in this caee du tar and which may 1?e cited bc=aftcr.

DATBD

tbia--1:!:.

day of March. 2013.

OIVBNS PUR.SLBY LU

Attorneya for Jay and Christine Brown

CERTUICATE OJ' SERVICE
,-~

~Y

I hereby certify that on this
of March, 2013, I caused to be served a true and
coneot copy of the foregoing document to the persona listed below the method indicated:

vtctor Villegu

_Hand Delivery

Borton & Lakey

1Facsimilo
__..:. Ovemiabt Courier

141 B. Carlton Avenue
Meridian. ID 83642

_u.S.Mail

Facsimile: 493-4610
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Micbael C. Creamer OdlbG Stata a.mt 4030)
'lbomu B. Dvorak (Jdlllo SlllfD k ID I 5043)
OIVBNS PTJR.SLBY w
601 West Bmmock: S1reet
Poll Oft1ce Box 2720

BARBARA SH.ELE

CLERK Of THE ca:vtT
DEPUTY

U'--

Boiae,Idabo 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
FIClimile: 208-388-1300
l110tlt.• (115414)

Attome.YS for Plaintifli Jay ml Christine Brown
IN THB DISTRICT COURT OP THBPOUR'm JUDICIAL DISTRICT POR. nm
STATS OF mAHO, IN AND FOR. nm COUNTY OP BLMORB
JAY BR.OWN and CHIUSTINB HOPSON·
BR.OWN, husband ml wife,

Case No. CV·2012-353

Plaintiffs,
:MEMORANDUM JN SUPPORT OJI'
M0110N IN LIMINE

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
OREBNHB.ART, 111 individual.
Defendant.

COMB NOW, PJ.aintifti, Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (hereinafter the

4Browns"), by and tbrouah theit attomeya of record, OiVIDI Pursley w, 8lld hereby submit this

1

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine.
A.

ML ANDY EM.UCO'•

onum

nm

or

TUTIMONY JS IN
N.ATVU
snctJLA'nON AND
INTD.PRITATION OJ' TBB LANGUAGS USID IN TR& COM'l'RACT, TIDRDY
IMPDMJSllBLY 1NVADING nu PR.oVINC& Oll'TID mm:n.oir J'Acr.

Defendant has diacloacd Andy Bmieo ("Bnricoj u an expert witness. There is no

contention that he bu any factual knowledge .about these particular cinnunstances that would
make him a lay witness. In Defendant,• Di.sclosun: of Bxpat Witnessea, he ts described u a
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w

Real Estate Commiuioner for the State of Idaho and u "an 8"1'Cditecl real estate instructor
ICCleditcd by the Idaho Real &tate Commiuion teechina ccmtinuina education claaes au.ch u

teldJing apnca how to me and fl1l out YlrioU1 Raltore forms." It ii proffered 1bat Bmico .._
expert:iac in how reel estate forms developed by the Idaho Auociation of Realtorse me to be
filled out. Mt• .Bmico will testify that it water rlahta were intended to be excluded fi:om tho sale
in thil cue. then the RB-24 Vacant Land Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement or an
Addendum to the RB-24 would have identified the water riahta beina ox.eluded." Defendant's

Diaclosure or Expert Witnessa at p. 4. This of&red testimony ia speculation on the intent or the
patties and also appears to be legal concluaion. As sudl, it ii not proper and any testimony by
which Bmico dempta to prove and/or show legal conclusions about the cft'=t of the documonta
or what the patties intended in their purchuc and sale agreemcrnt lhould not be admitted.
LR..B. 602

am 701 ii buio to any testimony and requires that no witness be allowed to

testify ~- l'Vi.dcnce is introduced sutBcient to aupport a finding that the witness has personal

knowledge of the matter" and that such testimony bo "rationally based on the perception of the
witness." Jn addition to prohibitina testimony that amounts to speculation. the Rules of Bvidence
require that the evidoDce not invade the provjnco of the finder of fact I.R..B. 702 and 703 •. &1

also e.g., State v. Ellington. 151 Jdabo 53, 253 P.3d 727 (201 l)(acoidmt reconstruction expert's
testimony that deftmdant acted with intmticnal state of mind was inadmiuible because "[c]xpert

teltfmony that ccncems conclmiom or opinions that tho averap juror is qualified to draw ftom
the facts utilizing the juror's eommon _,. and normal experience is inadmissible."); Howard v.

Orlgon Mutual bv. Co •• 137 Idaho 214, 219, 46 P.3d SJO, SIS (2002) ("Because the issues

related to ambipity before the 1ria1 judp were matters of law, the offered expert opinion wu
irrelevant, and there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the testimony."); Summus v. J..L
MBMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINB • 2
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Gllbut Co., ti al.• 69 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1179 (1999) ('*the admiuibility of opinion evidence

that embw an ultimate iuue in a al80 does not bestow upon an expert carte blm:hc to expreu

any opinion hi or a wiahel. There are limitl to expert teatimony. not the lout of which ii the
prolu"bition apinat edmiuion of an expert's opinion on a question oflaw").
Here, to the extent Bmico seek.I to ofter testimony that bean on the pmtiea' intent ml the

meaning of the putt.hue and Ille qrecmeat. such testimony is lnadnUISi.ble and should be
excluded.
B.

Nman ML ENalCO NOR TD A.PPRAISR KINNITll BRUSll SHOULD •• nnrmn
TO TIS'llW UCAUR Du&NDAMT'I DllCOV&RY DJICLOIUUI UN AJ'OUL 01' R.llLS 705
or TD IDABO R.uLSI or Evmua: AND Rm.a 26 01' TD IDABO RUL&S or Qvu.
Plloa:DURli AND TJIBY BAVB ONLY GIVDf A OZIURAL 8TA'l'IMINT OP 'l'Blllt Ol'INION
OPV.AL1JI.

Aa to

both Mr. Enrico and KcmJl&rtb Brush. Defendant dlsclosee simpl)' that they are

"cxpeotcd to rebut the testimony of Plaintifrs expert u well u tutif.y that the purcbue price

Defendant paid for the property is commensurate with property with m appurtenant water' riabt-"
Defendant's Disoloauro of Expert Witnaaes at p. 3 and 4. Both are claimed u "Pact and Data

Relied Upon" to rely on cmremly available documentary evidence. including. but not limited to.
the Bxhibita to tho Complain1, documenta produced by the parties in discovmy and docum.enta oa

file with the Idaho Department of Wat/J/l resources." In Discovery served in this matter, the
Plain1ift't asked that the Defendant for each such expert witness "set forth specifically and in
detail the underlying facts and data upon which such person's opinion and tutimony is baaed;

and the manner in which such person became &miliar with the allcptions, facts, events, and/or

individuals

rclatlna

to this matter."

Plaintiffs' First Set of Inteirogatoriea, Requests for

Production of Documents and Requests for Admission, p. 8, dated May 21, 2012. Plaintiffs
served a Request for Supplomentatio.n of Discove:ry Responses on February 13. 2013. but have
MBMORANDUM JN SUPPOR.T OP M0110N IN LIMINE • 3
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iecelved no responso thereto. Accordingly, Plaintiff's would ask that an order in limine be
entered preveoting thae cxpa1a from

aivina Ill)' tcatimony that is DOt substantiated and based

upon underlyiq doomnorats that are not in the record, such u comparable properties.

IRB 705 stat.es:
The expmts may testify in tezma of opinion or lnferenu and give
the n1MOD1 therefor without prior disclosure of the undcrlyina facts
or data, provided that tho court may require othenriae, and
provided f\Jrther that, jf requested pmunt to the rules of
discovery the undslyiq facts or data were ctiacloaed. The expert
fDMY ha any event be required to disclose tho underlying flctl or
data OD croas-eumination.

Idaho R. Bvid. 70S; 11• ol.ro Idaho R. Civ. Proo 26(b)(4)(A)(i) f'Discovery of facts known and
opinions held by experts expected ~- ~, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of

subdivision (bXl) of this rule and acqui:rod or developed in anticipation of litiption or for trial.
may

be obtained by intcnoptory ad/or depoai1ion. including: (AXi) A complete ltatemeat of

all opiulou to be expnued 1pd

Sh• bull

gd rwom

thtnftn;

tJae dag or othv

lpfgpadop cpntidmsl bz the wbgg lg forminl tin• pnlnlmy; ay a•lbffl to bt ued u a

nmma&')' of or mpport for the oplnlom") (emphasis added).
Here, the buia of the appraiser's flJstlmony and the information consJdeted in forming an
opinion bas not been dilcloaed. Accordingly. Defendant baa nm afoul of the basic nlles of
discovory and evidence. Dofen.dant has only disclosed the seneral subject matter on which

Defendamts cxped9 will testify. This may be appropriate in instances in which we are dealing
with lay witne111 disclosures. It is not, however, appoprlate when. 'we are in the realm of

witnessea who will provide spcoiali7.ed and technical opinions for the fact finder to consider. A
contrary view would tum f'IVer/ trial into a gucssin1 1ame reprdins the speciftc opinion to bo
provided by one another's expert witnesses. If Defendant's apprais&r is permitted to testify,
MBMORANDUM JN SUPPOR.T OP MOTION IN LIMINB • 4

495

03/0&/2013 KOH 13138

... ..

.'

aoo11ooa

PAX

Plaintift'I will be UDdul;y prejudiced since such testimony would be offered notwitbstanding
Defendant'a decision t.o provide the expert's opinion. but omit the basil for that opinion.

DATED this

,i_ f'1day ofMaroh. 2013.
OIVBNS PURSLEY lJ.P

Thomu B. Dvorak
Atto.meys tor Jay and Christine Brown

CERTIFICATE OJ' SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this _day of March, 2013, I caused to be 88l'Ved a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document t.o tbs pcnona listed below the method indicated:
Victor Villegas
Borton & Lakey
141 B. Carlton Avenue
Meridian. m 83642

Hand Delivery

Xfacsimile

_ OVemight Courier
_U.S.Mail

Facsimile: 493-4610
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Mlcbael C. Creamer (lcllllo s• e.. JD I 4030)
Thomas B. Dvonk (ldlho
m1504!)
GIVBNS PURSLBY w
601 West Bannock S1rect
Poat OSee Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720

,._a.

Telephone: 208-388-1200
Faoefmile: 208·388-1300
17Jot13_1 (US4M)

IN 11iB DISTRICf COURT OP THB FOUR.'ni JUDICIAL DIST!Ucr POR. THB
STATE OP mAHo, JN AND FOR. nm COUNTY OP PJ...MOR.B
Cue No. cv..2012--353

JAY BROWN ml CHRJSTINB HOPSON·
BR.OWN, husband and wif'e,
Plaintiffs,

v.

MOTION TO SBORTBN TIME TO
BEAR MOTION JN LIMINZ

AUGUSTA SAYOICO MIMOO'O
GRBENHBAR.T, an individual,

Defendant.

COMB NOW. Plaindff'a, Jay Brown and ChriJtine Hopsan-Brown (hereinafter the
"Browns"), by and tbroup their attom~ of record; Oivem Pursley Wt. and hereby move this
Court punwmt to Ruic 6(b) of the Idaho R.ulet of Civil Procedure and the inhenmt '9'JWfSf of tho
Court to control its docket tor ,ntry of an order shol1enina time to hear their Motion in Lirrrine,

. __!L!_day of March, 2013.

DATBD this

=~

Attorneys tot lay ana Cliriitine BiOwn
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Victor Villepl
. Borton & Lakey
141 B. Carlton Avenue
Meridian, m 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

:s::~very
_Overnight Couriar

_U.S.Mail
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FILED
Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552]
Victor Villegu [ISB No. 5860)
BOllTON LADY LAW OPPICES
141 B. Clrlton Ave.
Maidian, ID 83642
Bofla, Idaho 83102
Oi!co:(208)908-4415
Fu: (208) 493-4610
Email: victor@borton-lakey.com

2013 APR -8 PH 4: tO
BARBARA STEELE
CLERK Of TH\..f~ 1
DEPUT~

.A.ttomqa for Df(""1ant

IN TBI DISTRICT COURT or TD FOVRTB JlJDICL\L DISTRICT or
THE STATE or mABO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or ELMORE
IAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON·
BR.OWN, Husbaml and Wife.

CASE NO. CV 2012-353

Plaintitta,

DBnNDANT•s PDlST AMENDED

PR.OPOSBD FINDINGS OP PACT

AND CONCLUSIONS OP LAW

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOK.O MIMOTO
ORBBNH!AR.T, m individual,

O.&adant.

Defendant. Auausta Sa)'Oko Mimoto Oreenheart, by and throuah her attomeYs of record,
Borton Lakey Law Offices, submits Detendant's Proposed Pfndin.11 of Pact and Conclusions of

Law punuant to this Court'• schcduq order. Some of the proposed fbldhtp of fAct or

conclusiom may be uaod interchaqeably or considered mmd tlndinp of fict md law.
Dtfendant reqaestS that this Court to apply them aeeordingly reprdlea of their label

FINDINGS or l'ACl'
1.

On or about February S, 1988 Plaintiff' Iay Brown acquired approximately 320

acne of land situated in the But~ of Section 24, T4S, R.SB, B.M., h1 BJmore County ("Oriainal
Brown Propc:rty").
DUEN.DANT'S FmT AMDDID PaoroSID FllllDINGI OJ' FAt:r AND CONCUlllOMS o• LAW. 1
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The Snake R.ivs Buin Adjudication ("SRBA") Court h1 Twhl Falll. Idaho,

decreed Wat• Righta Nos. 61·2188 and 61·7Ul to Platnti!' Jay Brown on October 26,2000,

autborizfna the UM of aroumwater to the 320 &Cl'el comprisiq the Original Brown Property.
3.

On Jumary of 9, 2007, Defendant Oteeaheart and Jay Brown entad into a

written contract to purchue approximately sixty (60) aa:ea of the Origina1 Brown Property (the

"Oreenbeut Property") !om the Browns. 1eavfq the Browm with approximately 260 acres (the
"Oment Brown Property').

The two writtm doouments comprisiq the contract between the

parties includes an llB-24 Vacant Land Real Bltate Purchase and Salo Agreement ("Purchaae

and Sale Aareemont"> ml an RE-13 Counteroffer (Counterofter").
4.

The t m of the Purchase and Sale Agreement include the transfer of any and all

water rishta that appurtenant to the real property beiq sold. Paragraph 16 of the Purchue and

Sale Aareement reads:
"16. WATER. RIGHTS: Description of water rights, water syatems. wells
aprinp. water, ditcbcs, ditch rights, etc. i£ any, that are appurtenant the.retO
that are now on or used mconnocdon with the premises and lhal1 be included
in the sale unlea otherwise provided herein:
[blank]
"
$.

Greenheart did not prepare the type written language in the Purchue and Sale

Aafeement or the Countaoffer.
6.

Durma the purchaae of the Oreenheart Property, Ms. Ommheart never personally

met or bad my convenations with either Plaintiff Jay Brown or Chriltino Hopson-Brown.

7.

Orecmheart bad previously purchased real property in Emmett Idaho ("Emmett

Property") prior to the purchue of the Gremb.eart Property.

8.

The Emmett Property that Orec:nheart purchued bad a ditch runmna across the

property that had water nmnfn1 throuah it.
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Al part of the purchue of the Emmett Property, Oreenheart received shares of

water throuah en krlption distriot.
10.

Baled on her prior purchue experience of the Bmmett Property, Oreenheart

bt1itved tbat that a purcm. ofreal piopmty obtained a "water right" by virtue of aurface water

traveq aaroa the property.
11.
COVIi'

Until this lawsuit wu Sled, Oreeaheart did not know that a "watcr right" could

"sround" wat• or that a comt of law could dea:ee a specific amount of around water to a

particular piece of real property.
12.
13.

At

DO

time

durlnl the transaction wu Greenheart told orally or in writing that

there WU an adjudicated and decreed lfOuM water ri;ht by the Snake Riv• Buin Adjudication

mociated with the 320 acre property.

14.

At

DO

time

duriJls the 1.l'mUlaction wu Oremheart told orally or in writma that

Water Rights Nos. 61·2188 and 61-7151 mated and that it wu excluded from tho sale of the

15.

Greenheart wu led to believe that sbe could dig a well to aet water.

16.

Oreenheart understood that there wu nothlna at all being excluded itom the sale

of the Greenheart Property.
17.

Plaintiff Jay Brown testified that tho Purchase and Salo Ap'eement did 110t

exclude water rights itom the sale not the Purcbue and Sale Aareement include water riahts.
(Tr. Pio 99, L 22 tbru pa. 1OCJ L 9).
18.

Greeaheart expeeted that upon the purchue of the Oreenheart Property, lhe

would receive evarything that would normally be included in a purchase of real property.
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Jay and Christine Brown had a fl111 opportunity to nrviow the terms of the

Purdwe Ind Sale Apement Ind

mpartioular Parqraph 16, prior to oblipdq themaelvea

eontn=al1y to sell the Greenheart Property.
20.

The parc:lwe price tbr the Greeaheart Property WU $ 1,333.33 per acre.

21.

Jay and Qriattm Brown executed a Warranty Deed dated January 29, 2007

tramfinins the Oreenheart Property to Ms. Oreenhelrt.
22.

ne Wmnnty Deed wa recorded in the real property reoordl of BJmore County

on January 30, 2007 u
23.

~ # 384017.

The lanauap in the Warranty Deed makes no mention of reservins water riahts

and recitel that the premisea are conveyed Mwith their appurtenances unto said Orantoe and to the

Onmtee's hein and usipa tbrever."
24.

Grecmbeart did not prepare the lamguap in the Wmanty Deed or give directions

u to how the Warranty Deed should be prepared.

25.

Oreenhmt wu not preunt in the room when tho Browm sfanod the Warranty

Deed nor did Oreenheart aoo or have possession of the Wamnty Deed until after the Browm

1fped the Wmanty Deed.
26.

Jay and Christfno Brown had a Ml opportunity to read the language of the

Wmmty Deed and make my chanpa they deemed necoaary prior to sipin1 it.

27.

1ay and Christine Brown were negligent in ravining the Warranty Deed.

28.

Tho Browm mistakenly believed that by placing the water in the Idaho Water

Bank, the water wu leplly severed tom the portions of land that were not irrlpted.

29.

Aler the sale, Plaintiff' Jay Brown knew that u of Jun 9, 2007, either the Elmore

County Aaamor had useued the Oreenheart Property

II

irrigated.

srom>d or
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Gteeaheart at least believed that the Orecnheart Propcty was befnp taxed aa irripted around.

(Tr. pg. 84, 1110-25).
30.

During that June 9, 2007 timehme Plaintiff Jay Brown did nothiq to ucertain

why either the !lmore County Asteaor and/or Ml. Greenbeart would believe that the OreenbHrt
Property WU being taxed 18 frripted

31.

around (Tr. pg. 106).

After Plaintiff Jay Brown authored the June 9, 2007 letts, he did not call anybody

to inquire whether or not water rfahta hid actually transferred to Ms. Oreenheart. (Tr. Pl· 107).
32.

After Plaintiff Jay Brown authored the June 9, 2007 letter, he did not call or go

speak to any govcnment oftlcer to determine whether or not the Oreenheart Property could be
inipted back in lune of2007. Id.

33.

Plaintiff Jay Brown testified u of June 9, 2007, he did not take any action to

investipte whether a mistake had beea made. Id.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Mutual MDtab
A.

"mistake is an unintentional act or omission

misplaced confidence." Batlq

11.

ariains tom ignorance,

surprise, or

Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Ct.App.

1983). A mutual mistake occurs when both parties share a misconception about a vital fact upon
which they based their barpin at the time of contracting. Id. The mistake must be material or,

in other words, ao substantial and &ndamental 11 to defeat the objeet of the partiet. Id.

'1'ho assumption or ii.ct must be tho same; otherwiae two unilateral mistakes, instead of
one mutual mistake. would result." Ballq v. Ewing. 105 Idaho 636, 639-640, 671 P.2d 1099,

1102 • 1103 (Ct.App. 1983). Befbre relief will be snmted, it must appear that the mistake wu

mutual. Udslavttz 11. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 16.5, 190, 191P.1029, 1030 (1920).
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"Tha bmdm of proof ii on the party 11Jeain1 mutual mistake." Udelavttz v. Kltch.n. 33

Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029 (1920). "The tvidence m\llt be clear and lltiar.atory, leaviq but little:,
if any, doubt of the miltake. It must be made out by the c1elrest ml most satis&ctory testimony

.m u

to leave no &tr ud reuonable doubt on the mind that the writina doe1 not conectly

embody the real intention of the parties. A mere preponderance of the evidence will not

suffice•• ," Id.

R.eacialion ii an equitable remedy which ideally brinp the partiea to their pre-contract
1tatu1 quo. O'Connor v. Harpr Con.rt., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008).

Relciasion ii the proper rct.mdy whc:ro there ia a mutual miatake of fact that is material or
ftmdamental to the oontract. Id. "[M]utual mistake permits a party to reteind or modify a
contract u loq u the mistake ls so subttantlal and Amdamental u to detiat the object of that

party." Id. fJMOtlltJ Primary Health N1twork, Inc. v. Stat1, ])q't of.4.dmln., 137 Idaho 663, 668,
.52 P.3d 307, 312 (2002). Mutual mistaka may also be UICld to modify or reform a contract to

.

.

reflect the true inta ot the parties. ..A court acts properly 'in re:tbnning an instn1ment when it

appean tom tho evidence••. that the fmtrument does not reflect the intentions of the parties ..•
because of the mutual mistake. Ballq v. Ewtnr, lOS Idaho 636, 641, 671 P.ld 1099, 1104
(Ct.App. 19~3) quoting Exum v. Port1n'l/-Manh Yalll)' lrrlgatlon Co., 38 Idaho 155, 220 P. 112

(1923).

· uaumption of fact abated by the parties. Greenheart wu never told that a sround water riaht

existed let alone that decreecl Wat• R1ahta NOL 61·2188 and 61·7151 w. . ac1uded tom the

sale of the Oreenheart Property. Onenheut wu led to believe that she could dia a well to pt
water if she deaimi The Purchue am Salo Asreement makes no mention that any around water
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riahts were a.eluded tom the sale of the Grecmheart Property. The Wmanty Deed likewiae
does not reaerve water tom tho transfer of the Oreemheart Pxoperty.
D. Statute of LJmltatlom (Mlltab)
The statute oflimitatiom on the around of hud or mistake must be commenced within three

(3) )'WI. I.C. f 5·218. Section 5-218 states that a cauae of action tbr taud or mistake docs not

accrue until "until discovery, by the agricved party, of the facts comtitutins the taud or
mistake." Id. In the context of tauct. "our Supzeme Court hu held that 'actual kmwledp of
the hud will be infimd if the allegedly agricved party oould have diaooverecl it by the exercise

of due dilfaence.'" .4ttlam v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 901, 702 P.2d 1360, 1361

(Ct. App. 1985)

(quotfna Nancy IA• Mtna, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546. 547, 511P.2d828, 829 (1973)). The
.A.ltln &Xlmt held that this wne principle applicl to caUICI of action based upon mistake:

We believe the same principle logically applies to cauacs of action bued upon
mistake. Acc:ontinaly, we ho]d that an actipn wJdn1 relief ftom mfeteko will
be tfmt:lwred un4« I.C. I S-218(4\ imJw It is filed within three yom •fttr

tbt milt• Hglcl hm bag 41govr14 md!•·mrw gf dge dW•ct.

A party'• negligence may preclude a fin.dins of due diligence necessary to find that an action wu
timelybroup.t. A.ttlcdn v. Gill, 108 ldabo 900, 902, 702P.2d1360, 1362 (Ct. App. 1985)

In this cue, umming the Browns can prove that both parties intended to exclude a
proportionate share of Water Rfahts Nos. 61-2188 and 61·7151 tom the sale of the Oreenheart

Property, the Browm in an exercise of due dili1ence could have and should have discovered the
alleged "mistake" on three separate occuiom; at the time of contracting and once apin at the
time of closing.

First. upon exercise of due dilipnce, the Browm could have and should have noticed that
the tmm of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and in particular Paragraph 16, clearly stated that
water wu included in the sale of the property. The Counteroft'er incorporates all the terms of the
DUENDANT'I l'luT AMINDID PJloJloSED J'INDJNGI Of 'ACT AND CONCUJllONI or LAW. 7
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Purehase and Sale Apement except the purcbuc price. The· Countcioffer wu sfaned ml
create a b!ndJna contract on January 9, 2007 which it more than 3 yean ttom the date of tbe

filina of the Complaint in this action.
Secondt the Browm could have and should have &covered tbe mistake when each of
them signed the Warranty Deed. Idaho law recopizea that "a water riaht is an appurtenance to
the land on which it has been and will pau by conveyance of the Im.t... Ru.rnll v. lrllh, 118 P.

!01, !02 (1911). "A division of a

~

of land ·to which water it appurtenant. without

Mareaatina Or reservbla the Wit« riaht. workl I

division. Of sacb Wit« zilht in proportion U the

land fa divided." Hunt v. B,..,,,.,. 276 P. 964, 965 (1929). "Unleu [water rfahts] ere expre11ly
reserved in the deed or it is clearly shown that the parties Intended that the srantor would reurve

them. appurtei1ant water riahts pass with the 1and oven thouah they aro mt mentioned in the deed
ml the clced does not mention 'appurtenancn.• "Bagl.y v. Tho1n01on, 149 Idaho 799, 803, 241.
It it undisputed that tba Wammty Deed does not contain languap reservina Water Rishts
Nos. 61·2188 and 61-7151. Greenhwt did.not pnmmt the Browm tom reading the language of
the Warranty Deed. Oreeahelrt did not prepare the languap of the Warranty Deed or have

control how the deed would have been prepared. The Browm could have and should have
discovered the mistake when each of them lianed the Warrant Deed on Ianuary 29, 2007, which
is more than 3 years tom the date of filing tho Com.plaint.

Lastly, when Jay Brown wrote his June 9, 2007 letter to EJmore County Asleuor, Jo
Oridley, lay Brown knew that the

UM110r'1

oftlce had levied the Oreenheart Property u

inipted around. Additionally, Jay Brown tettifled that he believed. it wu Ms. Oreenheart who
told him the Greenheart Property WU befna taxed U inipted sn>und.

the Oreenheart Property wu sold without water. Those ficts should have put Jay Brown on
DDENDANT'I FDllT AMEND.ID PaOIOll.D FINDINGI OI' Fltl:r AND C0NCU19IONI or LAW • 8

5 ') 6

Apr. 8. 2013 4:04PM

No.5357

ast Carlton Ave

P. 10/12

notice that somethUla hid caused the u•sor's oftlce to consider the Oreenheart Property 11
inipted

lfOUDd. In the exercise of due dilipnce. Jay Brown could have disoovered that

aomethina could be wrong with the Wmanty Deed at that time. The June 9. 2007 timellme

upon which Jay Brown could have dilcovered the mistake II be)'ond the 3 year statute of
limitations.

m.Qaul Ettoppel
Thia doctrine of quui estoppt1 applies when: (1) the offendins party took a dift'enmt
position than bil or her original position and (2) either (a) the offendfna party phled an
advmtap or caused a disadvantqe to the other party; (b) the other party wu induced to chanp

poaitiona; or (c) it would be uncomcionablo to permit the oftending party to maintain an
incomiatmt position fi'om one he or lhe has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. .4.twoad v.

Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006).
In this cue, there is no evidence that during the sale of the Greenhcart Property that show
Mt. Oreenheart did a.nythiq to induce the Browm to execute the Purchase and Sale Agreement

that clearly atatcd water wu

bcins aold with the Oreenheart Property. Likewise. there ii no

evidence that Greeaheart took any action duriq the sale that would have induced the Browns to
execute the Warranty Deed that clearly lacked language reservma the around water riahts tom
the transfer.
The evidence shows that Greenbeart never personally met or oommunicatcd with the

Browns dming the purchase and sale transaction. The mdcnce also shows that Oreenheart did
not prepare the Warranty Deed or the typewritten language in the Purchase and Salo Aareomont.
She wu not present in the room when the Browns lianed the Wmramy Deed. There is simply no
evidence that Oreenheart made the Browns ehange positk>m.
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IV. Promluory Estoppel

To prevail on a promissory ostoppel claim, a party must prove the existence of all tbm

elem.ems ofpromisaory estoppc:l: (1) reliance upon a specific promise; (2) aubstmtial economic

Ion to the promisee u a result of such reliance; (3) the lo11 to the promiaoe wu or should have
been ft>reseeable by the promisor; and (4) the promiaec'a reliance on the promise must have been

reasonable. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'I Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171,
182, 804 P.2d 900, 911 (1991); Zollln,,,. v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 399, 49 P.3d 402, 404

(2002). Pmmisaory estoppel does not require a nefarious Uitent on the part of the promisor to
cause harm to the promisee. Rull Sala and~. Inc. v. U.S. Bank Nat. All~. 133 Idaho 669,
615, 991 P.2d 857, 863 (Ct. App. 1999). With respect to the promisor'I state of mind, the
doctrino requires only that it be tbreseeable to the promilor that the promisee would take aome

action or ibrbeanmcc in reliance upon the promise and would thereby suffer subltaZltial loss if
the promise wen to be dishonored. Id.
In this cue, the elements for promissory estoppel cannot be met. There ii no evidence

that durina the purchase and sale phase, Greenhcart made a promise either oral or in writina to

the Browns that would have caused the Browns to take aome action or forbearance. Al. ltatcd
above, Oreenheart did not prepare the Warranty Deed or the typewritten language in the

Purchase and Sale Aifeement. There is no evidence that Oramhcart prevented the Browns from
reading the Wammty Deed betbre they aqed it either. 'The clements fbr promissory estoppol

cannot be met in this case and thereibre promissory estoppel does not apply.

v.

Equitable Estoppel

The Verifled Complaint does not raise a claim fbr equitable eatoppcL Therefore pursuant to
this Court•a previous analyaia in its Ord,, Denying Summary Judgment on Count I and Granting
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In Part Summary Jud,,,.,,.t For Df/endant on CIJunt 11, the Court will not consider or apply
equitable estoppel in thil cue.
VI. ReW.
Without wafvina its objections raised mits motion mllmine and motion tbr reconsideration
that mistake wu not plead, Defendant Greenheart uka this Court to conclude that the Brown's

lawsuit on the issue of mutual mistake ii untimely and theretbre enter an order and judgment

dismi•sin& the lawsuit.
If this matter ii not dismissed on statute of limitations arounds, Oreenheart ub thia Court to
enter an order Win& that the Browns have not proven. the clement& of mutual mistake or tho

application of any equitable theories of promissory and quasi estoppel
DATED this sm day of April. 2013.
BORTON LAKEY LAW omCEs

By

I HER.EBY CERTIFY that on this a• day of April, 2013, I true and correct copy of the
fol'OSoing dooument WU served by ftnt-dua mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
trammiuion to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally deliveriq to or leaving with a person
in charp of the oflicc u indicated bc:low:
MlchulC.Creamer
Thomas E. Dvorak

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Fax (208) 388-1300
[ ] Ovemight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery

GIVENS Pt1J.sLEY W
P.0. Box 2720
Boise.. ID 83701-2720
Honorable L~ a. Norton
Fourth Judicial District Court
150 S. 4th E, Ste. S
Mountain Home, m 83647

lnorton@adaweb.net
hfunt@elmoreccnmty.org
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601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 201-388-1300
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown
IN nm DISTRICT COURT OP nm FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THB

STATB OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR. THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
Case No. CV-2012-353

. JAY BR.OWN and CHRISTINE HOPSONBR.OWN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

(PLAINTIFFS'.AMENDED
PROPOSED] J'JNDING 01' PACTS
AND CONCLUSIONS OJ' LAW

v.
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO
OREENHEART, an individual,
Defendant.

mIS MATTER. was heard as a court trial on March Sand 6, 2013. Thomes E. Dvorak

appeared representina the Plaintiffs and the Defendant was represented by Joseph Borton and
Victor Villegas. At the conclusion of the trial, the parties' counsel presented oral closing
arguments, but the Court allowed the parties until April 8, 2013, to submit proposed findings of
fad and conclusions of law so that, at the request of the parties. the parties could have the benefit

of a written transcript of the proceedings to inoorpora.t.e into the proposed findinp of fact and
conclusions of law. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as

follows. 1
1

To the extent that any of the following Findings of Pact should be more appropriately labeled Concluaions of Law,
and vice vern~ they are hereby deemed as such and treated as such regardtes1 ofthefr actual label.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

Thia action wu initiated by Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown

(the "Browm") on April S, 2012.

2.

In tho Complaint, the Browns usert two causes 6f action against Defendant

Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenheart ("Dr. Orccnheart").

3.

Dach of the causes of action are for Quiet Tide/Declarato.ry Judsment relating to

two water rights owned by the Browns and that Dr. Oreenheart is now claiming were paased to

her under the gcnoral appurtonancy cJauso of the Warranty Deed when she purchased the land
ftom tho Browns.

4.

On May 9, 2012, Dr. Oreenheart filed an answer.

S.

The Browns' lawsuit seeks to clarify that: a) the water rights owned by the

Browns did not ttansfer to Dr. Orecnheart when she purchased the land from the Browns; and
b) Dr. Orccnheart was very aware that the land she purchased from the Browns did not have any
water rights attached to it.

6.

On January 31, 2013, after hearing cross motions for summary judgment,. this

Court issued an order that denied in part and granted Jn part those motions. Additionally, the
Court ruled that ~e matters presented by both sides in support of the motions for summary
judgment raise the issue of whether there was a mistake which is a question of f'act that precludes
summary judgment." Order at p. l O. The C_ourt also noted that the issue of equitable estoppel

had not been plead.

7.

On February IS, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine, as well as a Motion to

Shorten Tbne. The Plaintiffs responded by filing a Motion to file an Amended Complaint. For
the reasons verbally set forth by the Court, both at the pretrial conference on February 22, 2013,

and during the trial of this matter, the Court denied these Motions.
FINDING 01' FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
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On March 4, 2013, Plaintift's filed a Motion in Liminc in this matter, as well as a

Motion to Shorten Time. For the reasons act forth on the written transcript of proceedings of
trial, tho Court granted the Motion to Shorten Time and also granted the Motion in Limino.
9.

Testimony was offered at trial from Plaintiff Jay Brown, Defendant Augusta

Oreenhcart, and from Plaintiff Christine Brown. Tho Court now enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
ftNDINGS OP PACT
I
On or about Pcbruary .S, 1988 Jay Brown acquired approximately 320 acres of land

situated In the East ~ of Section 24, T4S, RSE, B.M, in Elmore County (''Original Brown
Property,,).
II

The Snake River Basin Adjudication (''SRBA j Court in Twin Falls, Idaho, decreed
Water Rights Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 (tho "Water Rights") to Jay Brown on October 26,
2000, authorizing the use of groundwater and making the Wat« Rights appurtenant to a

permissible place of use that encompassed tho 320 actes comprising the Original Brown
Property.

m
The decreed Water Rights were limited to the irrigation of a total of 287 KreS in a single
irrigation system, which water rights wexe also limited to being used on the combined total
320-acre parcel owned by Brown.
JV

Water Right 61-2188 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 164 acres ofla.nd
wtth1JI a 320-BCit pemdssib!e ptaee of m-e wboHy within the Original Bfo'WB Pt'epeft)I.

J'INDING OP J'ACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OP LAW-3
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v
Water Right 61-7151 was decreed authorizlna the irrigation of up to 123 aciea of land
within tho same 320-acre pennissible place of use authorized for 61-2188 and wholly within the
Orialnal Brown Property.

VI
As decreed, the Water Riahts may be used together to iaigate no more than 287 aacs

within tho 320-acre pennissible place of use.

vu
Neither of the Wrrter Rights haa been used to i1ripto any portion of the Oreenheart
Property since at least 1986.

vm
On August 28, 2003, the Browns applied to the Idaho Department of Water Resources

("Department'') to lease portions of the Water Rights appurtenant to 160 acres of the Original
Brown Property to tho Idaho Water Resource Board ("IWRB") Water Supply Bank, and pursuant
to that application, contracted with the IWRB to idle 160 acres of the 287 authorized acres from

irrigation. The Water Supply Bank lease remains in effect as of the date of this trial. That lease
continued until the filing of the Complaint in this lawsuit and to the present day.
IX
In January of2007, Dr. Oreenheart purchased approximately sixty (60) acres of the

Original Brown Property (the ''Oreenhcart Property') from tho Browns, leaving the Browns with
approximately 260 acres (the "Current Brown Property").

x
Prior to the sale to Dr. Gteenheart, the Browns' real estate agent Daryl Rhead represented
to Dr. Greenheart as buyer that the Greenheart Property was being sold without water rights and
ll'INDING
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they discussed that tho property was "dry." All communications between Plaintiffs Brown and
Dr. Greenhcart at the time of the sale wore through the real estate agent, Mr. Rhead.2 The phrase
"water rights" was uacd in Dr. Greenhelrt'a diswssion with Mr. Rhead and when they spoke,

they did not "differentiate'' between 81ll'face water and other water.3 At the time of the

conversation with Mr. Rhead in early 2007, prior to makin11 an offer on the property, Dr.

Greonheart did not believe that in order to dig a well she needed to have a decreed water right.4

Dr. Orccmheart admita during discussion with the rea1tor Rhead prior to her purchase of the
property that she was told that the property wu dry, but that she could dig a well, although there

· was no discussion about the volume of water that she might want to remove with the well.5

XI
The written Multiple Listing Service listing at the time, which was prepared from
information provided to Mr. Rhead by Mt. Brown. included blanks by "inigation." "iniption
district" and "iaigation district name" because Mr. Brown said there was no iniption.' He alBo

gave information that there wero no water shares or water delivery 'system available in order to

fill out that form.7

XII
Mr. Brown testified that at the time of reviewing the Purchase and Salo Aareem.ent, he
read paragraph 16, whioh read "Description of water rights, water systems, wells, springs,

ditches, ditch rights, etc., if any, that are appurtenant thereto that are now on or used in
connection with the premises and shall b& included in the sale unless otherwise provided herein:,,
with nothing following the colon as ''there was nothing listed, so there was nothing that was - as
2

nial Tramcript al pp. 72., 139-140.
, Trial Transcript at p. 148.
4
Trial Tramcript atp. ISS.
9
ldii MD8cnpt It JJ. 131.
6
Trial Transcript at pp. 67-68.
1

Trial Transcript at pp. 67-68 and Exhibit S.
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far as water rights go there wu no water rights going after the colon."1 With respect to a

different portion of the contract, which taJ.b about a water rights transfer fee and had an "X" in
the box for not applicable, Mr. Brown testified that ho took the impression away from that part
that there would be no water rights transfer fco because there were aotng t.o be no water riahts
transferred.'

XIII

Dr. Greenhcmt cannot point to any portion of tho Purchase and Salo Aareement the
parties cxe~tcd where it was promised or represented that she would have water rights. 10 The
Purchase and Salo Agreement executed by the Browns and Dr. Oreenheart was accompanied by
a Seller's Property Disclosure fonn. Under the disclosure entitled "Irrigation water provided
by:", the Browns indicated "N/A'' for not applicable, and Dr. Oreenheart thinks she probably saw

this fonn prior to purchase. 11

XIV
At the time of the conveyance of the Orcenheart Property to Dr. Oreenheart there was no
system in place on the Greenheart Property t.o divert or distribute water to irrigate it
Brown testified that he has never applied irrigation to any portion of the property other
than that depicted in the dark areas on Exhibits 45 and 46 (which does not include the 80 acres

sold to Dr. Oreenhcart) and that there was no apparatus or setup Jn 2007 at the time of the sale to
Dr. Oreenheart that would have allowed water to be applied to her property nor has there been
any such setup since he has owned the property since 1988. 11

8

Trial Tnm8Cript at pp. 69-70.
' Trial Transmpt at pp. 70-71 and Exhibit 6.
1
• Trial triiiicnpt if p. 174.
II Trial Transcript at pp. 179-180; Bx. 4.
12
Trial Transcript at p. Sl-52.
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xv
After the closing of tho purcbue and sale of the Oreenheart Property, Dr. Oreenheart
submitted a June 1o, 2007 Notico of Appeal to tho Elmore County Board of Equalization
c.uBoard") for the Oreenheart Property whcroin Dr. Oreenheart challenged tho clatsitication of
the Orccnhcart Property as irrigated agriculture and souaht to have it reclassified as Cateaory 5
Dry Ora.zing. On July 2, 2007, Dr. Oreenhcart wrote to the assessor's office sayina "1 purchased

60 acres from Mt. Jay Brown on January 30, 2007. At the time of purchase, I was told that the
land was dry and tho grass that powa is good for cattle, and that there is no structure of any kind;
therefore the tax would be at minimum. I was very surprised when I received the year 2007 tax
assessment. "13
XVI
On July 6, 2007, at Dr. Oreenheart's direction and upon her express written authorization,

Jay Brown appeared before the Board and represented that the Oreenheart Property was dry land
and had been purchased and conveyed as dry land without any inigation water ripts and would
not be irrigated "unless ~ such time a water right is purchased for the property by Ms.
Orcenhcart." Mr. Brown made that statement in a letter he drafted at Dr. Oreenheart•s request

and copied to her and sent to the Elmore County Board of Tax Equalization.14 SpccificaJlY, he
indicated: "The property referenced. hu no water right with the Idaho Water Resources. 1t was
strictly for dry grazing. Ms. Oreenheart, s tax levy indicates that the property is inipted;

however, the property is not and will not be irrigated unless at such time a water right is

purchased for the property by Ms. Oreenheart."15 Mr. Brown testified that when he made that

.. l'flll namttlpt il£p. 111 mtd l!Xlaiblt 16.
See Bxhlbit J6.
"Trial Transcript at p. 83.
14
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statement he still had the same belief that no wator right had been transferred that informed his
intent at the time of the orilinal deal. 16

XVII
Mr. Brown also signed a dry grazina lease at Dr. Greenheart' s request, in order to help
her obtain this favorable tax status. Dr. Greenheart drafted this dry arazing lease by
downloading a Word version of an apartment lease off the lntemet and then modifying it herself

into a dry arazing Jcase. 17 Jn drafting the lease, she specifically provided that lessee shall not use
tho leased premised for any other pwpose other than dry grazing. 11

xvm
On July 6, 2007, the Board granted Dr. Greenheart's request to reclassify the land and
upheld the assessor's adjusted valuation of the Gteenhcart Property to reflect that it is, indeed,
dry &razing land with no irrigation water. Dr. Orecnheart was appreciative of the help Mr.

Brown gave her, as she said "[h]e took time out of his busy schedule and composed letters, went
to appropriate plaus physically and helped me greatly, I am very appreeiative for it."19
XIX

Since July 6, 2007, Dr. Oreenheart has received a financial benefit of more favorable tax
treatment from that reclassification of the Oreenheart Property as Category S '4dry grazing" and
that tax savings has been in excess of $600 a year since that time.

xx
Sometime later, a dispute developed between the Browns and the County over the
propriety of the original split of the Oreenheart Property. As part of the settlement of that
dispute, Ehnore County offered to purchase the Greenheart Property. In a November 8, 2009 e16

Trial Transcript at p. 84.
Tttal TiiliSCriPf af pp. 195· 195 8M EX111&ff I!.
11
Trial Transcript at p. 197.
" Trlal Transcript at p. 187.

1
'
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mail to Ms. Schindele, an employco with Elmore County, conccmina Elmore County's offer to
purohase the O.roooheart Propa ty, Dr. Orccmbeart stated, among other things, that "at the timo of

the purcbuo, I a1ao was very aware that the parcel is dry grazing only due to lack of an irrigation
s)'3fem

and DO water righta."20

In Februaty 2012, tho Browns were contemplating ono or more salm or transfers of
Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151. 'llte Browns bad an offer from the City of Mountain Home
to purcbue their water rightl for $2,000 por acre. The Browna spoke with attomey Michael

Creamor iegarding the potential sale and it was in these discuuions that they first learned that the
reference to "appurtenances" In a deed bad been interpreted by some Idaho case law to include
wa1er riahts even if they were not expressly mentioned, althoup it was believed at that point that

background ciIGumstances could be used to show the true intent of tho partiet. Shortly after
teaming thia information, Jay Brown cont.acted Dr. Greenh.eart by telephone.

UJI
On February 8, 2012, Jay Brown contacted Dr. Greenheart by telephone and requested
that sho confirm in writing that she' was aware she did not purchase the Oreonheart Property with
water rights and did not object to any sale or transfer of the Water Rights by the Browns. Dr.

Oreenheart alleges that during the telephone conversation in February 2012, that Jay Brown had
indicated. to her that he had umistakenly sold the groundwater right to her."

XXllI

Dr. Grecnheart has nover attempted to apply any water to the land by any method or to
file any paperwork with any govemmental agency regarding the allegedly conveyed water ~ahts

20

Bxhlblt 28.
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from the 2007 deed until early 2012 after she received a phone call from Plaintiff Jay Brown
regarding the groundwater right at issue.

XXIV
On February 17, 2012, evidently prompted by that phono call, and without notice to the
Browns, Dr. Oreenheart flied with tho Idaho Department of Water Resources a Notice of Change
of Wlfl:ll Right Ownership ("Notice''). In tho Notice, Dr. Oreenheart represented among other
things that the Water Rights were "divided proportionally based on the portion of their placo(s)

of use acquired by the new owner." The.NoUce makes no mention of Dr. Greenheart's
agreement with the Browns and admissions to the Elmore County Board of Equalization that she
had pmchased tho Grecnheart Property without water rights.

xxv
On Marc;h 9, 2012. the Department revised its water right database to indicate Dr.
Oreenheart as the current owner of portions of the Water Rights, and reduced the quantity of ·
water and irrigated acres authorized under the Water !lights decreed to the Browns

ex>mmensuratcly. Due to certain technical errors in the Department•s revisions, the water rl&]lt
database was subsequently revised by the Department on Marc~22, 2012. Those notices of
revisions indicated that they do not recontbm the validity of ownership of the right.
CONCLUSIONS 01 LAW

Mutual.Mistake is Establlahed by Clear and Convincln1 Evideace
AJ this Court noted in its decision on swnmary judgment, ..[p]leadings in this case and
the evidence submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment raise the issue of

mistake, which would permit extrinsic evidence to be considered.,. Order on Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment at p. 10.
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Lepl Standards Appliable to Mutual..Miatake

11lc party asserting mutual mistake bean the burden of proo£ Muw v. Sslag Corp., 113

Idaho 773, 777, 747 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Ct. App. 1987). That burden is aignifioant-mutual
mistake must bo proven by clear and convincing evidence.. Clint "· Hoyls ct Assoclatu, Ins.,

Inc., 108 ldaho 162, 164, 697 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1985). Bouuae mutual mistake is a question of
fact, a trial court's finding thereof will not bo overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.

Id.

·A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at tho time of con1ractina, share a

misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain. Balley

v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P .2d 1099, 1102 (Ct. App. 1983). To prove mutual mistake, a
party must set forth proof of: (i) a mistake; (ii) commonality; and (Hi) materiality. i.e., that the
mistake is so substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the party asserting mistake.

O'Connor v. Hargtr Conatruction. ltu:., 14S Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008).
A mistake is defined as an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, surprise
or misplaced confidence. Bailey at 639, 671P.2dat1102. As stated, the mistake in question
must bo shared among the parties. This is relatively straightforward. For example, in Balley, the
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether, to be entitled to relief under mutual mistake,
the parties must have the same misconception as to the same assumption of fact. Some
jurisdictions require this. The Court of appeals declined. Thus, as long as there is a different
'
belief as to the same assumption of fact, the mistake is mutual. This is true regardless of whether

the different misconception as to the same mistake is in itself different.

J'JNDJNG OP FACl'S AND CONCLUSIONS oir LAw-11
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B.
All Unintentional Act or Oml11ion Occarred
As to the fhst of tho elements, proof of a mistake-en unintentional act or omission

arising from ignorance, surprise or misplaced confidence-is required. Ballq at 639. 671 P.2d

at 1102. Here, tho mistake was a belief that no water rights were being transferred as part of the

sale of the property when in fact 1he deed that 1ranlferred the property used language that

effected just sueh a transfer. The facts supporting the existence of a mistake are Mr. Brown's
testimony that (i) ho never intended to sell tho water rights, (ii) he has a sale pending of the water
rights alone to a third party at this time for $1,400 an acre just for the water rights, (iii} Mr.

Brown never used water rights on that portion of the property that was sold to Dr. Green.heart;
(iv) tho Seller's Property Disclosure fonn (Ex. 4) has ''NIA" for not applicable next to the entry
for irrigatlon water available; (v) the Multiple Listing Service Listing (Ex. 5) has a "blank" next
to irrigation; and (vi) the Vacant Land Purchase and Sale Agreement (Bx. 6) in paragraph 16
talks in terms of "Description of water rights ... if any ... included in the sale unless otherwise

provided herein: _ _.. and provides that the water rights transfer fee is "NIA", which is
defined by contract to mean "evidence that the parties have contemplated certain facts and
conditions and determined that such facts or conditions do not apply to this agreement or
tranaaction.'' Further, Mr. Brown was asked that if he had known in 2007 at the time he signed
the deed. the information that he had learned in early 2012 from Mr. Creamer, i.e., that the deed
would work to effect a transfer of water rights, whether he would have signed the deed, and he
responded no. because "the value of the water righU was actually worth more than the value of
tho property itself',i1 Mr. Brown testified that he continued to hold the belief that Dr.

Greenheart did not have any water rights for the property from the time he signed the deed up
21

TrJal Transcript at p. 79.
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until the time ho spoke with attomey Mika Creamer in early 2012.zz Mr. Brown testified on

redirect that with respect to Bxhibit 6, tho Purchase and Sale Agreement, he did not personally
havo any understanding of language that works a transfer of water rights in that document in the
same way 1hat he now understands based on the Court's January decision, Bxbibit 8, the deed.
and tho language "with their appurtenances" works a transfer of those water rigbts.23

Christine Brown likewise testified that her understanding at the time sho signed Exhibit 8,
tho Deed, was that no water rights were going to be included in the sale because the water rights
were under contact to someone else and the sale was strictly for the land.24
Dr. Oteenheart made a number of admissions against interest that lead to the conclusion
that she shared a belief that no water riahts were being conferred as part of the sale. In addition

to her initial conversation with the realtor Rhead in which she admitted asking if there- were
water rights and being told tho property was "dry," there was nothing in the Purchase and Salo
Agreement that would have changed this assumption. Dr. Oreenheart testified that while she
discussed a well, she did not discuss any volume of water she desired and that she did not think
that she needed a water rigbt in order to have one. And in fact this accords with the law on
point.25 Six months after the sale, Dr. O:reenheart acted on he.r belief that this property was "dry"
by asking Jay Brown to write to the county and in fact writing to the county herse)£ all to the

effect that she undorstood at the time of the purchase OO:it the property 'WU dry and there would
be no water rights unless she purchased such a right (see Ex. 16 and 18). Dr. Oreenb.eart herself

drafted a Dry Grazing Lease Agreement to the end of the property being taxed as dry grazing and
specifying that the property would be used for no other pw.pose than dry grazing. Ex. 11. Dr.

22

Trial Transcript al pp. 84·8S.
u Trim Transcript at p. I 13.
111
IHii JilUW!fiP't at p. 21:,.
25
See Idaho Code §§ 42-227 and 42-111 (providing that no water right it necessary to operate a well for broadly
defined "domestic pwposes").
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Oreenheart later confinncd this belief on November SJ 2009, more than two years after the sale,
when in n:sponding to an otter to purchase the property fiom her, Dr. Oieenheart drafted au email without ulistance and selected all the words that were used that stated: "Apin, at the time
of the pmchase, I was also very awaie that the parcel is dry grazing only due to the lack of an

irrigation system and no water ript...26 Dr. Oreenheart's failure to act to have tho Idaho
Department of Water Resources recoplze the transfer until five years after the sale, after Jay
Brown told her he believed a "mistake" had occurred, speaks volumes in terms of this lack of
any beliof' that water ripts had transfer.red at the time of the sale.
ThUI, the mistake in this caac ia that both parties believed no water ri&hts were to be
transfcned with sale of land, but that the Deed in fact has language on its face that transferred
water rights. The evidenco in the case at band supports the concl~on that at the time of .

contradina and of tendering tho Deed at issue, tho parties here shared a fundamental mutual
assumption, that the G:reenheart Property was being sold as chy ground without water rights. The
language in the Deect"is a situation that is referred to by the public as a "legal technicality" in that

it doot not reference "water rights" as being transferredJ and instead uses an ~e term
"appurtenances," which this Court has held is given the legal effect when employed in a deed of

transferring water rights in the absence of fraud or mistake. Mr. Brown and Mrs. Brown have
testified to their understanding that no water riahts were being transferred. Dr. Green.heart's
actions subsequent to 1he Deed with respect to taxes and her response to the county attempting to
buy hot out are fbrther clear and convincing proof that she shared this m.isasswnption of fact.

Although Dr. Gree.ohcart now says that she had a misconception at the time of what water rights
were. this does not change the fact that she employed this term and ultimately believed at the
time that whatever water rights were, she was not obtaining any. Just as was the case in Bailey,
28

Trial Tramcript at p. 203 and Exhibit 28.
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there was no event or action where Dr. Orccnhcart claimed a water right had been transfcaed
until she wu called by Plaintiff Jay Brown, who disclosed to her that there was a potential
"'mistake,, that he bad teamed of in the Deed and he asked her to confinn tho contrary intent.

c.
The Mistake wu Common to, Botll Partlu
Dr. Oreenheart takes the position however that the mistake in the present case does not
nieet the second element of mistake,

commonality, primarily because she claims to have in 2007

only thought of "water rights" as comprising surface water. Even if her .testimony that sbe
believed water rights only related to surface rights is credited, applicable law indicates that the

parties do not have to make tho exact same mistake, so long as they share the same basic
misassumption of fact. Further, the Court finds Dr. Grccnheart's testimony in this regard
incredible and non-:believable.
C.A.
The Parties Shared the A11umption that No Water Ripa Were Tranlferred

Even if her testimony is taken at face value in this regard, such a belief does not prevent
the clement of commonality from beina satisfied in these circumstances. A "mutual mistake also
has been defined to include situations in which the parties labor under differing misconceptions
as to the same basic assumption or vital fact. 0 Bail'Y v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d
1099, l 102 (Ct App. 1983). According to the Restatement ofComracta, Section 152 cmt. H,

..[t]he rule stated in this Secti~n applies only where both parties arc mistaken as to the same basic

assumption. Their mistakes need not be, and often they will not be, identical.,, Both parties in
this case shared tho same basic misassumption on a vital fact, i.e., that no water rights were being
transferred. The Browns knew what water rights were precisely. Dr. Oreenheart testified that
she did not have any belief that she had acquired any water rights until the 2012 conversation
FINDING OF Ji'AC1'S A.1111> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW• 15
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with Mr. Brown.27 Dr. Oroenheart thouaht she knew what water rights were (right to get surface

water), but most importandy did not think she was getting any water rlahts, i.e., she thouaht the
property wu dry, and said she was not &ottlng water rightl. Her desire to have a well at the time

included a belief that she did not need to have 1 water right for a well, which is cuctly in accord
with Idaho law.

S•• Idaho Code §§ 42-227 and 42-111 (providing that no water right is

n«ossary to opc.rato a well for broadly defined "domestic purposes."). Th.us, there was a

commonality of mistake as to the same basic assumption, that no "water rights" were being
transferred.
CJL

Dr. Gneaheart Knew What Water Rlpta Were

Alternatively, on the element of commonality, this Court does not credit Dr. Oreenheart's
claim that she had such a limited understanding of the phrase "water rights" at the time of the
sale. It is common sense that
A person necessarily intends the probable, natural consequences of his own
voluntary acts. In tho absence of an admitted intent, the only yardstick by which
one'• intent cu be determined 11 hit external acta and conduct, what he does
and what he •Y•, and one cannot excuse the probable conseqaeneea of one's
owa vohaatary act hr daimln1 that he bad • mental raervatlon and
performed the act or acts voluntarily done without an in1ent.

State v. Missenberger, 86 Idaho 321, 386 P.2d 559 (1963)(quotingState v. Johnson, 74 ldaho
269, 261 P.2d 638 (1953))(emphasis added). The Court finds that Dr. Greenhcart's claimed

explanation that she believed the phrase "water ri&hts" only included sutface water and not
ground water to be an artificially pinched and narrow definition, and to have the characteristic.s
of an after-the-fact rationalization or justification. It is most likely that Dr. Oreenheart believed
that there was no water available on the property short of a well, as this is consistent with her

asking tho realtor about '\vater rights:• the rea!tor telling her that the property was "dry" and her
21 Trial Transcript

at p. 20s.
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belief that she did not need water rights to put in a well. Her story appears to be still evolving, as
evidenced by the fact that during trial, Dr. Oreenheart offered testimony to the effect that her
belief that water rights only in.eluded surface water had to do with experience she had with
property she owned in Emmett, ldaho.21 However, during summary judgment in this case, she
offered an Affidavit executed on December 17, 2012, explaining in detail her beliefin .this regard
(Exhibit 41) and yet made no reference to her experience with the Emmett property somehow
informing that belief.19 It appears the first time that any reference was made to tho Emmett

property wu shortly before trial in Dr. Greenheart's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law. This has the hallmarks of an after-the-fact justification or rationalization, not a

contemporaneous, honestly-held belief. Dr. Greenheart is a highly educated and intelligent
person, having started college before finishing high school, and going on to obtain no less than
four separate degrees, an associate degree in drafting, bachelor of fine arts in interior design,
master of arts in teaching, and a doctorate in education.30 The separate words of the phrase
"water rights" are not complicated to decode-"water" is self explanatory and ..rights" meaning
an ability to demand or expect something. ·Dr. Oreenheart bad seen crop pivot irrigation systems
from the air prior to 2007 and understood that they ran on mechanical apparatus and that the
water was pressurized with a pump and she understands the pump can be hooked into an open
surface waterway or to a well to pump water. 31 She also drafted a lease agreement, transforming
an apartment lease into a dry grazing lease (Ex.. 11). These actions and background imply that
she understood "water rights" to mean exactly what that phrase does in fact mean, a property
right describing both surface and ground water, and that this understanding informed her intent
21

'lrhd Transcript at pp. 141-148.
:u See Ellbibit 41, Affidavit sipJed on December 17, 2012.
30
Inabil to eak. or comprehend English has not kept Dr. Oreenheart from writing a dissertation in order to
o
a octorale egree l1l uca on,
·
·
her inability to communicate in English. Trial Transcript at pp. 121, 126.
" Trial Transcript at pp. l S0..152.
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and thinking at the timo of tho Deed when she acknowledges discussing "water ripts" and being
told tho property was "dry...

D.
The Mistake wu Material
The third element of mutual mistake, materiality, meam essentially that the mistake is so
substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the party asserting mistake. 0 'Connor v.

Harger Construction, Jnc., 14.S Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 8S1 (2008)(quotina.Pnmary
Health N•twork, Inc. v. StaJe, Dep't of.A.dmln., 137 Idaho 663. 668, 52 P.3d 301, 312 (2002)).

Mr. Brown testified as to his understanding of the value of the water rights and how he would

not have gono forward with the transaction bad he known that they were being included. Mr.
Brown testified that he always viewed water rights as a separate, extremely valuable right, going
back to when ho was a child and his father would always tell him that the farm ground out there
might not be the best, but they had an extremely valuable right to pump water separate and apart
from the land. 31 After purchasina the property in 1988, Mr. Brown initiated the adjudication
process to pedect water rights on the property.33 Mr. Brown testified the priority date for Water
Right 61-02188 was an ex1remely old priority date and more valuable as a consequence.34 He

further testified that both the 1966 and 1973 priority dates were relatively senior water rights out
in that area.

3
'

Mr. Brown testified that by mid-2006 he had put a major portion of the water rights, i.e.,

272 acres of the water rights, associated with all of the property, including the 80 acres that was

eventually sold to Dr. Oreenheart, under contr~ct to Idaho Water Company or Del Coates and

n Trial Tnmsc:ript at p. 47.
,, trlil 'fiiiiSCriPl if pp. 48-49.
3

~ Trial Transcript at pp. 48-49.

" TriaJ nanscript at p. ,o.
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had mivod at a price of S1,4SO per ac;re and that tho water rights were under contract at the same

timo as the sale to Dr. Greenhcart. Ultimately that water rights contract fell through in 2009.36
Mr. Brown testified that at tho time of the sale ho told the realtor, Mr. Rhead, that in
coming up with a price, it was "for the dry ground, and then would be no water rights to go with
it.•tl7 He testified that in coming up with that price, he had a friend who sold property to the
north of this proporty by two miles and that the friend sold an 80-acre parcel for Sl.500 an acre
without water rights whereas another friend sold development property for around $3,000 an acre
with water rishts.31 Mr. Brown testified that it was not his inteDt to transfer water rights at the

~o of the sale.39
The price of the water rights standing alone as separate property ho testified to, especially

the offer at Sl,500 at the time on the water rights alone, and later the $2000 an acre price offered
by the city1 are strong evidence that conoborates the material nature of this assumption. Both of
the Browns testified they would not have utilized the deed had they known that it was in fact

transferring the water rights at issue.

E.
The Statute ofLbnitation1 Does Not Bar a Claim ofMutaalMi.ltake
The argument that the statute of limitations has rnn for a claim of mistake is without
merit. As this Court held in the context of the cross motions for summary judgment:
Applying the plain lanauage of Idaho Code Section 6-401, the applicable statute
of limitations did not begin to run w>.til Greenheart asserted an adverse 'Claim
against the water rights by filing with l.D. W.R. There is no evidence in the
record that Gteenh.eart made any claims in any form or degree to any alleged
water rights for the land she purchased ftom January 29, 2007, until February 17,
2012. So, filing with the I.D.W.R. was the first instance Greenheart asserted any
ownership in tho water rights adverse to Plaintiffs. Therefore, this quiet title
"Trial Transcript at .PP· 56-61.
" filil 1i'ans&ipt if p. 62.
"Trial Transcript at pp. 62-63.
3
' Trial Transcript at p. 63.
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action filed on April S, 2012, is well within all the statute oflimitations asserted
by the parties.
Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at p. 7. The Defendant araues that Idaho Code §
S-218(4) applies and that the three-year statute oflimitations for a c:laim based on mistake has
passed. Based upon the following analysis, the Court c:onc:ludea that the statute oflimitations
under§ 5-218(4) did not start nmnina based on discovery witil Febnwy 17, 2012. when the

Defendant first assorted a claim to the water rights that were allegedly transferred by means of
the deed and its reference to appurtenances.

Idaho Code Section 5·218(4) provides a plaintiff bas three years to flle auit for:
[a]n action fot relief on the growid of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in
such oase not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery. by the aggrieved
party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
Idaho Code§ 5·218(4). The language itself focuses on discovery of"facts constituting the ...
mistake." The Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs should have discovered the mistake at three
points, each of wbioh would have been more than three years prior to the filing of the Complaint
in the instant action: (1) at the time of the execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement; (2) at

the time of the execution of the warranty deed; and (3) when Jay Brown authored a letter to the
tax authorities on June 9, 2007, and indicated that the property was assessed as inigated.

As to the argument that the Purchase and Sale Agreement gave notice of facts
constituting the mistake, this Court is hesitant to find that somethina within the Purchase and
Sale Agreement could have operated to put the Browns on notice when the deed at issue, the
document about which the parties were in fact mistaken, had not yet even been executed. But
even it if could, this Court has found that said Purchase and Sale Agreement is ambiguous as to
whether water rights were transferred. This Court now finds that there is no portion of such
Pw&Aue a Sale Apeenwnt that would have imputed such ngtice,
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Turning ahead to tho June 9, 2007 letter, this Court finds as a factual matter that
regardlesa of how Mr. Brown bcoame apprised of the fact that the County was asscssin1 the

property as irrigated, novortheless Dr. Oreenhoart's confirmation to him at tho time that she still
understood she had not received any water rights aa a function of the sale overrode any

conolusion he might have drawn to the oontrary. In other words, when Jay Brown was having
discussions with Dr. Oreenheart in June of 2007, it is clear that both were proceeding from tho

mistaken assumption that no water rights had transferred as part of the earlier January sale and
thatthe property was eligible to be assessed as dry grazina.

This leaves Defendant's argument that the deed itself and its reference to appurtenances
somehow imparted the requisite notice to the Browns. The argument urged by the Defendant is
essentially a legal interpretation of the meaning of the word "appurtenances." The Deed itself
does not use the words "water rights" or anything else that would excite the attention of a
reasonable person to the fact that a transfer of those rights had accrued, unless theyr were a legal
scholar who was able to divine the framework of the relevant Idaho case law. An argument very
similar to that made by Defendant was made and rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in the
case of A.Itkin v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 702 P .2d 1360 (198S). In that case, the seller, Aitken, had
sold certain land near Riggins. Idaho, to tho buyer, Gill, in 1962. At that time, Gill believed that
approximately 17 acres of land known as Rocky Flat were supposed to be included with the
}1IOperty to bo described in the deed. However, Aitken thought otherwise. The deed in 1962, in

fact. did not include Rocky Flat in the actual legal description. In 1975, the assessor's office
advised all parties that the land description in the deed was defective for reasons unrelated to the
Rocky Flat issue. To correct that defect, the parties executed and delivered two more deeds, one
in 1976 and one in 1978. Each deed was recorded shortly after delivery, but both contained

descriptions that. unlike the 1962 deed, included Rocky Flat. In 1981, Aitken, the seller, became

r
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awaro of the mistake In the 1976 and 1978 deeds and brouaJtt suit in 1982 sceldng reformation
based on mutual mistake. On appeal, the timeliness of the bringina of suit was challenged. The

Altken court noted that:
[i]n applying the statute of fraud caao, our Supreme Court baa held that "actual
knowledge of tho fraud will bo inforred if the allegedly agrieved party could
have disco'Vered it by the exercise of due diligcnco." We believe the same
principle logically applies to causes of action based upon mistake. According1y,
we hold that an action seeking relief from mistake will be time barred under LC. §
5~218(4) unless it is filed within three years after the mistake could have been
discovered in the exercise of due diligence.

In this case, it is uncontrovertcd that seller sued within three years after the
mistake was discovered in 1981, but more than three years after the mistake first
occurred in 1976 and later reoccurred in 1978. The district judae made no
detonnination u to whether the mistalco could have been discovered by the
exercise of due diligence before 1981. An issue of due diligence is one of fact, to
be addressed in the first instance by the trial court. Whereas here, no finding has
been made upon a material issue, the case must be remanded unless the record is
clear "yields an obvious answer to the relevant question."
Our examination of the record dlsdotu no "obvious annver" to the question
of due dillgence. On the one hand, the 1976 deed clearly refers to land in
"section 21 ... lying east of the Little Salmon River,'' which undisput.edly is
Rocky Flat. On the other hand, it is also clear that the 1976-78 deeds were
intended to remedy an apparent defect unrelated to Rocky Flat. Moreover, the
circumstances surrounding the procurement of property descriptions and the
incorporation of those descriptions in the 1976-78 deeds arc obscure. Whether
tho sellers failed to exercise due diligence in examining the descriptions is a
question ill suited to appellate fact finding on this record. A remand is required.

For guidance on remand, we note that the reeordatlon of the 197'-78 deeds hu
DO bearinl OD the quutiOD of due dililence. When deeds arc recorded,
constructive knowledge of their contents is imparted to "subsequent purchasers or
encumbrancers.,, I.C. § 55-811. In any event, such constructive lmowledae
can be no greater than the seller's actual knowled1e when they oped and
delivered th• deeds.

Id at 901, 702 P.2d at 1361 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
In the present case, both parties were laboring under the shared assumption that no water
rights were passed. Indeed, the Defendant herein seems not to have understood the legal

technical meaning of"appurtenances" until 2012. The fact that a technical nuance of the Deed
li'INDING OP Ji'i\CJ'S AND CONCLUSIONS Olf LAW• 22

531

.

0•/08/2013 KON 15105

PAX

~024/028

improperly included the word "appurtenances" and had the legal effect of passing sw;h water
riahta is not a faot that is readily within common understanding and not something that could
have easily been discovered by the sellers. Tho teaching ofA.ltun is that in a deed mistake
situation, tho focus should be on what tho seller's actual knowledge wu at the time. Further in
this case. tho conduct of tho Defendant in not asserting such rights until February 17, 2012, after

being contacted by the Plaintiffs. corroborates that no one lcnew of the effcet of the Deed as beina
contrary to tho original intent of the parties until much, much la1er than the original delivery of
the Deed. Accordingly, this Court finds that date wu the date that Plaintiffs first knew that tho

Defendant was assertina an adverse interest and claiming that she had indeed received water
rights as a result of the Deed oonveyance.

XXVll
Quul Eltoppel
Quasi-estoppel ''prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party,

which is inconsistent with a position previously taken.,, C &: G, Inc. "'· Canyon Highway Dist.
No. 4, 139 ldaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003). The doctrine applies when: 1) Tho

offending party took a different position than his or her original position. and 2) either tho
offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party, tho other party
was induced to change positions, or it would be uncon9cionable to permit the offanding party to
maintain an inconsistent position from one from which he or she has already derived a benefit or

in whioh ho or she bas acquiesced. A.ll1n v. Rcynoltb, 145 Idaho 807. 812, 186 P.3d 663. 668
(2008).
Somo cases have interjected an additional requirement of unconscionability with regard
to the advantage or detriment portion of the doctrine. This does not appear to be required by the
phrasing of the doctrine, though this issue is not settled. In.Atwoodv. Smith, 143 ldaho 110, 138
.FINDING OJ' FACIS /\ND CONCLUSIONS Of LAW· l3
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P.3d 31 O(2006), tho court stated that ''to prove quasi-estoppel, it is not necessary to show
detrimental reliance; instead there must be evidence that it would be unconscionable to pcsnnit
the offending party to assert allogedly contrary positions." 143 Idaho at 114, 138 P.3d at 314.

This suggests that unoo~ionability must be proven to apply quasi-estoppel. However, when we
go to the A.twood decision, the citation to the above-quoted portion tabs us to Thomas v.

A.rlcoosh Produu, 137 Idaho 3S2, 4& P.3d 1241 (2002). This is significant because of a subtle,
but significant, addition to quasi-estoppel law that is not contained in more recent decisions.
Indeed, the Court in A.rlcoosh begins its analysis with the standard blmb on the law
regarding advantap, disadvantage or unc:onscionabiJity. However, instead of employing the
disjunctive "or',,A.r'koosh uses the conjunctive "and." Thus, to prove quasi-estoppcl under

Ar'koosh, a party mWit prove an inconsistency, advantage, disadvantage, awl unconscionability.
More reoent statements on quasi-estoppel use the disjunctive "or," (See e.g. Washington Ftderal
v. Vim Enge/en. 153 Idaho 648, 289 P.3d SO (2012) (most recent quasi-estoppel case, stating that
to prove the same you must satisfy advantage, disadvantqe or unconscionabillty, but not all
three). Based on the more recent cases, .A.rkoosh contains an inaccurate statement of quasicstoppel. Thus, a party does not have to prove unconscionability, just an advantage,
disadvantage or unconscionability.
AU of these elements me met here: (1) Dr. Greenheart is now taking a different position
than her original position wherein she disclaimed any interest in water rights in 2007 and 2009,

and (2)(a) Dr. Greenheart gained a substantial tax advantage over the years by doina so; and/or
(b) Dr. Orcenheart's actions in confirming the mistaken mutual assumption caused a
disadvantage to the Browns in that the Browns believed they had the water rights to sell and

incutred legal expenses and took other efforts to sell the water rights, thereby inducing them to
change positions; and/or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit Dr. Greenheart, having
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received tho tax benefit and taken the position she bu, especially in light of tho value of the
water rights, to essentially mako off with a windfall that was never intended by the parties at the
time of their contract, and the Court would be doing so by now allowing her to maintain that the
"appurtenances" language operates in a technical fashion to transfer water ripts, an inconsistent

position from one from which Dr. Oreenheart has previously derived a benefit; and/ or in which
she bas acquiesced. A quasi estoppel arises against Dr. Greenhcart now maintaining that tho
"appurtCnances" language has the effect for which she argues and entry of an order to this effect
is appropriate.

Dr. Greenheart is now taking a different position than her original position wherein she
disclaimed any interest in water rights in 2007 and 2009. Dr. Oreenheart gained a substantial tax
advantage over the years by doing so and by having the property reclassified as "dry grazing" as

a consequence, and her property taxes dropped from $628 to SI 7.90 per year.40 Alternatively,
Dr. Greenheart' s actions. in confirming the mistaken mutual assumption of both parties caused a
disadvantage to the Browns in that the Browns believed they had the water rights to sell and
incurred leaal expenses and took other efforts to sell the water rights, thereby inducina them to
change positions. Finally, it would be unconscionable to permit Dr. Greenheart, having received
the tax benefit and taken the position she bas, especially in light of the valu~ of the water rights,
to essentially make off with a windfall that was never intended by the parties at the time or their
contract, and the Court would be doing so by now allowing her to maintain that the
"appurtenances" language operates in a technical fashion to transfer water rights, an inconsistent
position from one from which Dr. Oreenheart has previously derived a benefit; and one in which
she bas acquiesced. A quasi estoppel arises against Dr. ~eart now maintaining that tlio

40

Trial Transcript at p. 199 and Exhibits 19, 22 and 25.
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"appurtenances" language has the effect for whioh she argues and entry of an order to this effect

is appropriate.

xxvm
ReUefGnated

Mutual mistake may bo employed to modify or refonn a document so as to reflect tho

parties' true intent. Primary Health Network, Inc., "· Stat•, Dq 't ofA.dmtn., 137 Idaho 663, 668,
52 P.3d 307, 312 (2002). Reformation has been employed as a remedy even where not souaJit as

part of the original complaint. Se1 e.g. Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 527 P.ld 1252

(1974X"The remedy of reformation was properly utilized by the trial court because tho finaJ
judgment in an action is to afford the prevailing party the relief to which it is entitled, even if that
relief ls not demanded in the pleadings.").

In tbia case, mutual mistake and the doctrine of quasi estoppol justify the Court refonning
the deed to become the deed that the parties would have made but for the mistake. Based on the
forgoing, it is hereby ordered that judgment consistent with the foregoing be entered on Counts I
and II of tho Amended Complaint in favor of the Browns. Counsel for the Browns to submit a

proposed form of judgment suitable for recording in the real property records that decrees that
the deed from the Browns to Dr. Oreenheart is refonned effective as of the date of that original

deed so that the reference to "appurtenances" is refonned to read: '*appurtenances (excluding
and reserving unto gnmtor any irrigatiQn water rights, including all of its right, title and interest
in Water Right Noa. 61-2188 and 61-7151)."

FINJ>ING OJI' J'Acrs AND CONCLUllOllfS OJ' LAW- 26

535

04/08/2013 KON 1510S

' .

~021/028

FAX

DATED thiJ 31.b day of April, 2013.

OIVBNS PURSLEY LIJJ

Thomas B. Dvorak
Attomcys for Jay and Christine Brown

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 8111 day of April, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of tho foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:
Victor Villeaas .
Borton & Lakey
141 B. Carlton Avenue
Meridian, ID 83642
Facsimile: 493-4610

_Hand Delivery
Vfaosimile
_Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER· JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL

Inorton@adaweb.net
hfurst@3lmorecountt.or1
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